

Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington, D C)
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of Interdisciplinary Sciences of Georgia (Tbilisi, Georgia)

Culture & Philosophy

A JOURNAL FOR PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY

2009

Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington DC, USA)
Phenomenological Society and Centre of Interdisciplinary Sciences of Georgia
(Tbilisi, Georgia)
Department of Humanitarian Sciences of Tbilisi State University
Tbilisi City Hall

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THEMATIC INTRODUCTION

Meditations on the phenomenological problems of the previous issue

The initial idea for this *Culture and Philosophy* journal-yearbook occurred at an international philosophical conference held in Tbilisi in 2007, and was first expressed in a conversation by Professor George McLean. This journal has only recently been established (2008) by the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington, DC) and the Phenomenological Society and Centre for Interdisciplinary Sciences of Georgia (Tbilisi, Georgia). The Phenomenological Society of Georgia was founded in 2004 as a part of the World Phenomenology Institute. The president of this institute, Professor Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, played an active part in its establishment. The editors of the journal are Father George McLean and Professor Mamuka Dolidze. The Executive Secretary is Professor Hu Yeping.

The first issue of this journal was published with the financial support of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (President: Academician Tamaz Gamkrelidze) and the Georgian State Academy of Art (Rector: Professor Gia Bugadze). This second issue of the journal is published with the financial support of Tbilisi City Hall and thanks to a scientific contract with Tbilisi State University.

This journal reflects the scientific and creative life of Tbilisi, the Georgia capital, and its philosophical contacts with the USA and Great Britain. This vast sphere of observation would threaten to cloud the clear intention of the journal without a definite method of integration with the various fields of research. The method of phenomenological philosophy plays a role this. Its method consists in arranging the content of the journal so that it can unfold the philosophical essence of the culture from a selection of scientific works. One should realize that this is only a normative way of creating order from diversity as a great number of papers are required to distinguish the phenomenological development of an idea of culture. It is an ideal maxim that urges us to select works according to how they contrast with and differ from each other.

Scientific works should reflect a wide range of problems. This is an interdisciplinary journal striving for the phenomenological illumination of the philosophy of culture. Despite the wide scope of science and art, scientific research can merge with artistic-creative thinking.

The first issue of this journal contained sections on the history of philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical problems of physics, phenomenology, and the globalization of culture. A thematic introduction and an introductory dialogue between the editors of the

journal, Father George McLean and Professor Mamuka Dolidze, preceded the main content. At the end of the journal there were some observations on philosophical events in London University in 2006-7.

The introductory dialogue centred on the problem of the globalization of culture. If globalization offered to construct one supranational culture instead of a diversity of cultures, such a mixture of disordered values could lose the face of culture. Phenomenology offers a new solution to this problem. It is the uniqueness and originality of national culture which is open toward the other culture and, thanks to such intentionality, the intersubjective essence of the phenomenon of culture can be revealed. Globalization seeks to discover this intersubjective essence, providing the culture with originality and uniqueness. So the way of the individualization of culture presents the way of the globalization of cultures.

The content of the previous issue of this journal began with a paper by Guram Tevzadze elucidating the state of Georgian philosophical thinking through the twentieth century down to our times. This was a heroic intellectual effort, especially because of the obstacles raised during the Soviet era to freedom of thought. Ideological hardships seem to prevent the development of mental life but it is strange that, as a matter of fact, the deepest and most important achievements of Georgian philosophy and culture coincided with the period of the greatest repression of intellectuals. This paradoxical nexus between violence and creativity would be inexplicable unless we appeal to the phenomenological standpoint. Indeed, the development of thinking in a way depends on the external limits the consciousness must overstep to unfold its hidden and internal essence.

Thus the phenomenological effect of ideological pressure became obvious: the less the language of the Soviet reality was acceptable for intellectual life, the more the thinker would address a phenomenological attitude: to take this language in brackets, that is to say, to keep and follow this dogmatic language externally, in a formal way, but to shift its meaning internally according to contemporary thinking.

Thus, in the case of the soviet regime, ideological hardship played the role of a provocative factor such that the philosopher could deceive the censor by furtively changing the sense of the concepts and ideas he was urged to use as an unavoidable standard. Eventually, the thought of soviet thinkers become more flexible. In the case of Georgian thinkers, this flexibility did not transform philosophy into a sophisticated tendency creating disorder and anarchy within it but, thanks to strong national cultural traditions, it kept its spiritual face. Flexibility of philosophical language acquired a positive value, enriching Georgian philosophy by foreign influences which, thanks to the traditions of the culture, could not destroy the originality of Georgian mental life.

One such significant influence of modern European thinking leads us to the impact of phenomenology on twentieth-century Georgian philosophy. The creative works of Kote Bakradze, Angia Bochorishvili, Zurab Kakabadze, Merab Mamardashvili, Givi Margvelashvili, Guram Tevzadze, Nodar Natadze, Geronti Shushanashvili, Geja Bandzeladze, Anzor

Bregadze and Mamuka Dolidze presented examples of this philosophical inheritance and new, original developments of phenomenology. The director of the Institute of Philosophy, Niko Chavchavadze, heroically supported the creativity of his colleagues under the soviet regime. The current (second) issue of this journal offers the reader the theoretical part of Georgian phenomenology of the twentieth century.

The incompatibility of being and thinking clearly revealed in the example of the soviet system and beyond, in the wide scale of the internal / external schism in the world, is considered to be the source of phenomenological insight. This problem needs to be developed in the field of the relation of person and society. Mamuka Dolidze's paper *Personal Freedom and Open Society* deals with this problem. The conflict between the soviet system and the person was not accidental. It was not even the result of a distortion in the development of society. This conflict had its roots in the duality of subjective and objective beings. It is the intentionality of the subjective self which helps him out of this duality. A person has intentionality which does not depend on relation to another person. Here, the author encounters with difficulty Aristotle qualified as a problem of individual substance. An individual thing would include its idea if it existed not *per accidents*, but *per se*, or according to itself. (Robert Sokolovski in his article *Knowing Essentials* also touched on this theme.) What does the existence of the individual according to itself mean? It means the existence of a thing according to its subjective essence, since the latter attaches the unique self to this thing. This unique form is not accidental: it is essential; it derives from God, from the 'form of form'.

Thus 'this thing' avoids contingency as it is opened to the form of form or to the relation which goes beyond all relations to other things. We can call this pure relation *intentionality*.

Intentionality reveals the subjective essence of the individual person. If personal freedom could avoid contingency and anarchy it would design personal existence according to himself or according to his subjective essence. Aristotle showed that the essence of 'this thing' is revealed in relation beyond all relations so, therefore, personal freedom reveals the subjective essence through intentionality, which does not depend on relations to other people. Eventually, the intentionality of a person appeals to God, who is the source of the individualization of being.

Thus the author determines the constitution of personal freedom. Intentionality provides the person with a subjective self, facing God through the relation of relation which means the integration of all possible and real interactions between humans.

The open state of society presents the result of this integration. An open society is considered as a subject that refers to the total world as the creation of an absolute subject.

Comparing the phenomenology of personal freedom with the metaphysical establishment of individual substance by Aristotle, the author endeavours to extend subjectivity beyond the person. He is searching for a point of rest for existential phenomenology. Aristotle had revealed the process of individualization of being showing, as the author sees it, the

intentionality of 'this thing'. Indeed, if 'this thing' communicated with the form of form which is pure intentionality, it would exist according to itself and, in this case, have the full power to embrace its essential idea.

Intentionality penetrates the world, as the latter arises as a consequence of the individualization of being. The author introduces the principle of distinction as a source of this individualization and asserts that it is an act of individualization leading us to the generalization of being. What is the difference between live and lifeless systems? The author makes the point that in case of life the generalization of the system is obtainable through keeping the distinction and autonomy of its parts. A live system keeps wholeness not only through the autonomy of its parts but also by self-separation and differentiation from other objects which eventually unite it with them. For precisely this reason the method of phenomenology requires abolishing the existential claim of phenomenon and thus separates consciousness from an external object.

As far as dead matter is concerned, individualization of being means the generalization of its parts according to their similarity. Accordingly, the intentionality of a 'dead' object consists in fact that it strives for merging with other objects or follows the general rules so that its individual face could be lost. Therefore the individuality of a dead object is accidental, while the individuality of a live one is essential.

In unfolding this idea the author considers the freedom of a quantum particle as the emergence of life within a physical system. Therefore, a phenomenological approach is acceptable for a quantum system and we are on a threshold of establishing the phenomenological conception of quantum theory.

Because of the individualization of life, a quantum system is comparable with a social system and it is not senseless to speak about the quantum conduct of a person within an 'open' society.

Similarly, one could match the social system with artistic reality if the latter had the 'open' structure of a live being.

* * *

The first issue of this journal presented a range of papers by Georgian philosophers: *The Interpretation of Kant's Theory of Knowledge in Russell's Philosophy* (Nino Pipia), *Responsibility to the Fatherland* (Paata Chkeidze), *The Philosophical Interpretation of Political Pluralism* (Kakha Ketsbaia), *Political Thinking and Identity Crisis* (Givi Amaglobeli), *The Philosophy of Pseudo-absolute* (Sergi Avaliani), and *The Puzzle of Time* (Irakli Batiashvili).

Visual Intelligence in Painting by Professor Robert Sokolowski drew an analogy between the art of language and the art of painting. If thinking were expressed in the use of

language, that we ‘thought in the medium of words’ it would be also true that we could think in the medium of pictures. These two ways of thinking are interrelated. The author asserts that, philosophically, words and pictures can be used to illuminate one another and to shed light on what it is to think.

In *The Mental Causation Debate* Professor Tim Crane considered the problem of the compatibility of physical and mental causations. Ultimately he concludes that mental causation is a problem for those who reject the identity theory. However, given the standard response to this problem, it is puzzling that physicalists think there is still a need to answer the question: What is an adequate version of physicalism? If this is a significant question, then physicalists still have to explain why.

Papers by Georgian scholars Irakli Kalandia and Marina Ambokadze dealt with the issue of the globalization of culture. This issue had also been discussed in the introductory dialogue.

Finally, the first issue of this journal offered observations based on several discussions held in the Institute of Philosophy of London University in 2006-7. These international contacts were made possible by exchange programmes between the British Academy of Sciences and the Georgian Academy of Sciences. The observations include discussions of the works of Anthony Savile (*Kant’s Aesthetic Theory*), Mark Kaplan (*Austin’s Way with Skepticism*), Jenefer Robinson (*Some Problems Relating to Emotion in Art*) and Christopher Coope (*The Doctor of Philosophy Will See You Now*).

The editors would like to take this opportunity to express their gratitude to philosophers taking an interest in the development of this journal and to those submitting papers for future issues.

* * *

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Old Tbilisi. Painter: Elene Akhvlediani

HOSPITABLE TBILISI

Tbilisi has been a source of inspiration for many generations of Georgians. The city's past is related to the great achievements of poetry and to the romantic tendency of music. Tbilisi bears all the tragic burden of the heroic history of the Georgian people. This terrifying story has left its impression on the appearance of the city, but it could not remove its optimistic striving for life. It only coloured this aspiration in various shades of repentance and regret. Tbilisi has been destroyed many times, but the invaders were never able to banish the spirit of the city, the very heart of Georgia.

Tbilisi saw in the twentieth century with a new flourishing of literature and art. Given the phenomenological profile of our journal, we may permit ourselves to view Tbilisi at the dawn of the twentieth century through various philosophical inquiries in poetry and the fine arts.

The famous school of Georgian philosophy of the last century had its roots a psycho-emotional bohemian mood among the artistic circles of the Old Town. We are eager to find some kind of phenomenological attitude in this all-powerful creativity, since those of a

philosophical bent, inclined to merge the emotional and intellectual ways of thinking, seem to have anticipated the esoteric experience of phenomenology to look for the subjective essence of an artistic world and to grasp the source of this researches. The space and time of Old Tbilisi were permeated with a mood of creative investigation in all spheres of bohemian life, from folk poems and songs to great masterpieces of philosophical poetry. A romantic vision of life enveloped the city like a mist, so that Old Tbilisi could exist as if it were a brilliant work of art by an anonymous genius.

In keeping with the phenomenological inclination of this journal, it is worth noting that the hurricane of historical events so fatal for our city has led the nation to a perception of reality as a phenomenological attitude. The major strive for the perfection of life deriving from the nature of Georgians had been kept through the confession of mankind because of the vanity of the world. Such a double, alternative vision of life, which was the result of the co-existence of the optimistic spirit of the nation with the nightmare of its bloody history, resonated with the viewpoint of existential phenomenology. The phenomenological approach is based on some stable system of human values and, at the same time, takes into account the instability of this system that leads eventually to not being. It therefore it takes the givenness of reality in brackets, in an alternative way of describing and at the same time a rejection of being. Here the rhythm of a Georgian folk poem would not be out of place:

ბინდისფერია სოფელი, უფრო და უფრო ბინდდება
რა არის ჩვენი სიცოცხლე, ჩიტივით გაგვიფრინდება.

This twilight-coloured world grows ever duskier.
What is our life? Like a bird it will slip away.

We can begin our story with a historical review of Tbilisi, which has been the capital of Georgia for the last 1,500 years. Ever since the fifth century when it took control of the Kingdom of Kartli, Tbilisi has had to disguise its face to resist whatever the current invading army decided to inflict. Despite the obstacles resulting from the heroic struggle of the Georgians against innumerable invasions, Tbilisi has always strived to enlarge its cultural contacts. The capital of Georgia was destroyed so many times, but the enemy was unable to break the will of a nation rooted in strong national traditions and in an inexhaustible thirst for creativity. The history of Tbilisi astonishes the reader by the remarkable architectural achievements against this background of bloody invasions.

Prior to soviet repressions, at the beginning of the twentieth century Tbilisi was rich in masterpieces of modern art and the brilliant fruits of poetry. A stream of creative life surmounted the anarchy of political crises, and during the short period of independence (1917-21) Tbilisi became a meeting point of Eastern and Western cultures. Such an interesting synthesis held the enchanting prospect of development, one which was ended by the soviet regime.

The appearance of the current journal could be considered as a sign of the revival of such cultural contacts. After the collapse of the soviet system there was a strong tendency towards realizing freedom, overstepping forbidden borders, opening the space of post-soviet culture and making a contribution to the development of the world. Our society has a calling for resolving political conflicts so that it can focus the will of the people on the problems of philosophy, science and art.

The tendency of our time – the globalization of cultures – does not mean striving for one super-national culture. Quite the contrary: it is the uniqueness and originality of national cultures that makes possible spiritual interactions among the countries leading to the process of globalization. The uniqueness and traditions of Georgian culture are the guarantee of its openness toward the cultural world. This is the phenomenological solution of the problem and the journal *Culture and Philosophy* follows the same vocation of inspiring the intellectual life of Tbilisi.

Three main philosophical contacts anticipated the emergence of this journal:

Tbilisi – Washington DC

Scientific interaction between the Institute of Philosophy of Georgia and the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy at the Catholic University of America.

Tbilisi – Hanover (New Hampshire, USA)

The establishment of the Georgian Phenomenological Society at Tbilisi State University (2004) which became part of the World Phenomenological Society (see *Phenomenological Inquiry* 28, 2004, p. 210).

Tbilisi – London

Scientific exchange programmes between the Georgian National Academy of Sciences and the British Academy of Sciences and between Tbilisi State University and the University of London.

The journal aims to enhance the philosophical spirit of the heart of Georgia so that Tbilisi can regain its status as a hospitable centre where contemporary Western and Eastern cultures meet.

In keeping with this spirit the journal was launched at the World Congress of Philosophy in Seoul in August 2008. This was an opportunity for scientific interaction between Western and Eastern philosophers. Eighteen international scholars from nine Eastern and Western countries volunteered to participate in preparing the second issue of the journal. They have been included in the project as authors and members of the editorial board.

During the Russo-Georgian armed conflict last year the same scholars sent letters of support for the Georgian people. These were published in *Sakartvelos respublika* newspaper (155, 20 August 2008).

A launch event was held in December 2008 at the Institute of Philosophy of London University to mark the journal's featuring of philosophical events at the University.

The University of Antwerp hosted the 59th International Congress of Phenomenology in July 2009. The current issue of the journal includes works by participants in this congress: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (President of World Phenomenological Society), Erkut Sezgin (Professor at Istanbul Culture University) and Mamuka Dolidze (Institute of Philosophy of Georgia).

Launch events for the journal in Georgia were held at the Georgian State Academy of Art (April 2008), at Tbilisi State University (May 2008) and at the Institute of Philosophy of Georgia (June 2008).

Copies of the first issue of the journal were widely distributed to various institutions, including the following:

- Catholic University of America (Washington, DC)
- Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington, DC)
- Culture University (Istanbul)
- Institute of Aesthetics (Chongqing)
- Institute of Philosophy and Political Science (Almaty)
- Institute of Philosophy, London University
- Ivan Franco Lviv National University
- Library of Congress (Washington, DC)
- National University (Madrid)
- National University (Seoul)
- People's Friendship University of Russia (Moscow)
- University of Antwerp
- University of Latvia (Riga)
- World Phenomenology Institute (Hanover, NH)

A copy of the journal was deposited in the National Library of Georgia.

An online version of the journal may be accessed at <[http:// www.crvp.org](http://www.crvp.org)>.

An initial aim was for *Culture and Philosophy* to help build cultural bridges between Tbilisi and Washington, Hanover and London. Now, owing to growing interest in this venture, we seek to reflect the cultural and philosophical life of the capital of Georgia so that Tbilisi may become a centre of modern interaction between Western and Eastern cultures.

PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY



PHENOMENOLOGICAL THINKING IN THE GEORGIAN PHILOSOPHY OF XX CENTURY

MAMUKA DOLIDZE

Institute of Philosophy of Georgia. Tbilisi

For a long time phenomenology has been a subject of thorough investigation in the Georgian school of philosophy. Suffice it to name Georgian philosophers like Kote Bakradze, Angia Bochorishvili, Zurab Kakabadze, Guram Tevzadze, Merab Mamardashvili and Givi Margvelashvi, whose works are devoted to this area. My objective is to review phenomenological studies in contemporary Georgian philosophy. Besides Husserl, this review concerns the problems of Hartmann's epistemology and existential ontology.

Professor Kote Bakradze was the first Georgian philosopher who focused on phenomenology. He spent part of his life in Germany attending Husserl's lectures. Later, his comments on the lectures served as a basis for his works in phenomenology¹. In particular, Bakradze investigated Husserl's anti-psychological position, leading him to the problem of objective truth. He believed that the anti-psychological attitude originated from Kantian philosophy, but Husserl offered a new solution to the problem, one different from that of the Kantian school.

The Georgian scholar considered issues like the object of consciousness, meaning and the truth, the relationship between the individual and general essence. He was interested in a new method designed to determine the general essence. Here the act of determination was directed toward the general essence, going beyond the similarity between individual things.

Kote Bakradze demonstrated the ability of phenomenology to bring into correspondence the internal and external aspects of consciousness. When identifying the general essence with the pure self, a phenomenologist assumes that the psychological level of consciousness has its existential basis. Therefore, he first emphasizes the self as the experience of being and then as the experience of - self. As an inner expression of absolute existence, the self has a phenomenological value for this component of cognition has a quality of being present always and everywhere. His work *Essays on New and Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy* highlights an important feature of phenomenological thinking – the appearance of a new relationship between consciousness and the existential world.

Angia Bochorishvili's contribution to phenomenological investigation and phenomenological aesthetics is especially worth noting here. This Georgian scholar notes that Husserl's phenomenology can be considered as one of the greatest achievements of

twentieth-century philosophy. Phenomenology is a method of investigation, a specific approach, an attitude applied to different fields of philosophy. This is also true for aesthetics. Application of phenomenology to aesthetics, resulted in phenomenological aesthetics which like phenomenology in general, is aimed at overcoming psychologism. Overcoming psychologism in aesthetics implies defining aesthetics without referring to psychological concepts. Phenomenological investigation by means of different categories should reveal the essence of aesthetics as an anti-phenomenon, Otherwise psychologism, as well as the resulting skepticism and agnosticism, is inevitable.

Thus, according to Bochorishvili phenomenological aesthetics should certainly be taken into consideration by modern Georgian aesthetics since a tendency to attribute cognitive functions to aesthetics can definitely be observed. The difference between them becomes evident only in terms of cognitive means. Appropriate development of aesthetics certainly requires the overcoming of the so-called gnoseologism, which threatens the autonomy of aesthetics.

Zurab Kakabadze belongs to the new generation of Georgian phenomenologists. His major work "The Problem of Existential Crisis and Edmund Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology"² is dedicated to this subject. He entered the international forum through the World Phenomenology Institute³.

This author presents a comprehensive and clear review of Husserl's approach with respect to its relationship with existentialism, and proceeding from this material he gives a unique understanding of phenomenological ontology. He notes that from the ontological perspective phenomenology is distinctive owing to a radical view of the problem of existence in accordance with which any statement about the existence of the world should be preceded by a determination of essential meaning, "indicator" of existence. For this purpose, phenomenology proposes that one perform "*epoche*", i.e., avoid any statements regarding the world's existence. In the context of the "phenomenological *epoche*", the world's existence transforms into a mere claim to existence and the essence/essential meaning/indicator of existence is represented in the form of this claim. Based on the "*epoche*" we ask the following question: what is existence in terms of its claim, in terms of its "idea", i.e., what is the essence, meaning, essential "indicator" of existence?

The relevant analysis points to the following: claiming to exist, the world at the same time claims to be perceived and to be perceivable, to be discovered and to be discoverable, to be revealed and to be "reveal able". Inability to be revealed or perceived is equal to non-being, but the ability to be perceived and to be perceivable, to be revealed and to be "reveal able" means the ability to be definite, to have a definite look, to have a definite meaning and a definite image, i.e., to be "formed", to be "constituted".

However, a thing may manifest itself, that is, have a definite meaning and image, be "formed" or "constituted" thanks to or through something else, or thanks to or through oneself. If something manifests itself, i.e., has its definite meaning and is formed exclusively

through something else, and if the latter also manifests itself and is also “formed” through something else and so on, infinitely, then “self-manifestation” and “formation” are lost in “infinity”, which is equal to indefiniteness, i.e., non-being. An object manifests itself and has a definite meaning, a definite image only in the case that it manifests and forms itself directly through oneself or manifests and forms itself through something manifesting and forming itself directly through itself.

When we limit ourselves to looking directly forward, in the direction of the external transcendent world, we do not find anything that would manifest itself or have its meaning, its definite image directly through itself.

As mere objects, as things, objects of the external world are related to each other in a definite way. Every object is surrounded by other things that are related to it in a certain way. When describing a thing, we describe, characterize it via these relations. A thing “is what it is in its relationship with circumstances”. A thing is inert and indifferent. It has the same meaning in the same circumstances and a different meaning in different circumstances. In other words a thing acquires its meaning, its image through circumstances. A thing is what the circumstances are. But what are the circumstances? They are the same as some other circumstances and so on, infinitely. Due to this, a thing, manifesting and “forming” itself exclusively through other things, through circumstances, does not manifest or “form” itself at all.

But if the world of things still manifests itself and has its definite image, it means that it belongs to something manifesting and “forming” itself through something that manifests and “forms” itself directly through itself. But what could be identified as a self-manifesting and “self-forming” instance?

I, manifesting myself in my “life of consciousness”, which is first of all characterized by “intentionality”, i.e., by “directedness” toward the world, toward “circumstances”, exist and determine, “form” myself in my relationships of “directedness” towards the world, towards the “circumstances”. However, by their essence “intentionality”, “directedness” imply “goal directedness”, which, on its part, implies freedom. I as a freely goal directed being, overcoming inertness and indifference, plan and realize something definite, something that has not been totally conditioned or “prompted” from outside, by external circumstances. I plan and realize something independently. I am still something more than what I am when depending on circumstances. As a freely goal directed being, I manifest and “form” myself through myself. I am something definite, irrespective of circumstances, and maybe in spite of circumstances, I exist and manifest myself within the mode “I, myself”.

Thanks to such an advantage of “self-manifestation” and “self-formation”, I represent an initial-final instance of “self-manifestation” and “self-formation”, i.e., of the existence of all the rest, of the existence of objects, of world existence. I manifest and form myself directly through myself, and objects related to me manifest and “form themselves”, that is, exist through myself. In me, as in “self-manifesting” and “self-forming” being, objects find

the necessary initial-final instance of “self-manifestation” and “self-formation”. By understanding and “forming” myself through myself, i.e., through my “intention” and “form”, objects stand in their relationship with myself; I understand and “form” them depending on how they meet my “intention”.

Consequently, having an advantage of self-manifestation and self-determination, I represent the orienting and determining centre of world relationships, and, in this sense, represent a fundamental, constituting factor of the world’s being. In this context it becomes obvious that according to phenomenology, the problem of the existence of my Self, as of a freely self-determining being, becomes a fundamental ontological problem, and that, therefore, the methods of self-reflection and self-analysis acquire the meaning of a fundamentally ontological method. (Of course, other subjects, other “selves” are also characterized by such an advantage of self-determination and for this reason represent “constituting factors” of the world’s being. However, I cannot discover another “Self” directly, only through my look directed forward. It is revealed to me through insight, based on self-analysis. Due to this, insight, based on self-analysis and opening the “inter-subjective” as a “constituting factor” of the world’s existence, belongs fundamentally to ontological method).

Kakabadze notes that by accepting the “intentional life of my consciousness”, i.e., freely-self determining action as a primary basis of world existence, phenomenology accepts existence in being. In this respect Husserl’s phenomenology differs from the classical tradition and is close to “life philosophy”, to the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, in particular.

A thing determines itself through external circumstances. It is inert, which means that not having its own “claim” or its own “initiative”, it does not change its relationship with circumstances on its part or on its initiative. It always maintains the same relationship with the same circumstances, exists for ever in this relationship, does not plan or realize new relationships. In this sense, in the being of an object, in the form of an object prevails the point of the monotonous repetition of a relationship. By its essence, the being of an object is a monotonous repetition. Just for this reason classical traditional philosophy, limiting itself to the look directed outwards, at the world of objects and searching, the primary factor of world formation, found it in the form of a “substance”.

Differently from objects, I form, determine myself through my self. I am freely active, which means that I change on my own initiative my relationship with circumstances and continually plan and realize new relationships. The essence of the “life of consciousness”, as of a “teleological” process, consists in the realization of something that has not been realized. From this perspective- in my being, in being in form of subject prevails the point of becoming, development. Monotonous repetition here has a subordinated secondary meaning. By its essence, being in the form of a subject is equal to becoming, creativity, development.

Thus, according to phenomenology, subjective being as the process of formation creativity, development and “history”, by its essence constitutes a fundamental layer of existence. In this connection, it becomes evident that according to phenomenology, induction

and deduction as methods based on belief in monotonous repetition cannot serve as fundamental ontological methods. The fundamentally ontological method is the analysis of the intentional life of consciousness as of an essentially teleological process, the opening of the potential horizons of history.

Subjective existence, being in the form of Self acquires the meaning of absolute existence. It is absolute in terms of “fundamentality” and due to the fact that, by revealing and determining itself through itself, it reveals and determines, “forms”, the existence of the world that depends on relationship with it. However, the problem of absolute existence in phenomenology requires further explanation.

Subjective being as an infinite process of becoming and transformation can serve as a “constituting” factor, i.e., as an orienting and determining world centre, if it is “focused” by nature rather than being absolutely dispersed or changeable. In other words, without having a stable or definite face, the “life of consciousness” cannot give the world a definite image, a definite face. As a continually infinite process, the “life of consciousness” cannot be absolutely individually different or discrete. It should combine the primacy of becoming of the individually different with some super-individual, stable, absolute aspect. According to Kakabadze, Husserl has the following understanding of such a combination.

Subjective existence naturally contains some super-individual aspect in itself. However, we should always keep in mind that the super-individual component of the intentional life of consciousness is radically different from the general structure of objects, from the law of object existence. The more monotonously an object repeats the structure and relationship of other objects, the more lawful it is in its existence. But this statement can not be applied to a subject. The more monotonously a subject repeats the life of others, the less lawful it is in its existence. The super-individual aspect of subjective being consists in some primary intention as in an infinite goal striving for realization. The infinite goal, which is never fully realized, requires realization at more and more new levels, and, due to this, requires the individualization of the realization process. A real subject that complies with its own super-individual law cannot monotonously repeat activity, or a relationship with other subjects, or its own past actions or relationships. It is natural that some relationships are repeated and should be repeated in people’s lives, but completely monotonous repetition in this area means the violation of the law. When we totally repeat ourselves and stop at an already realized level, we cease to further realize the infinite goal and by doing so, contradict the law of our existence, which is the tendency of realizing an infinite goal.

Realization of the infinite “*telos*” of the life of consciousness is never complete or absolute. Any realized formation, or any realized aspect of formation, is relative to the infinite “*telos*”. The constituted, formed world is relative to the constituting process of the life of consciousness, but any realized constituting process of the life of consciousness is relative to the primary fundamental intention, to the infinite “*telos*”. Absolute existence is existence that is being infinitely realized and also the partially-relatively realized “*telos*”.

Out of the different positions in Georgian phenomenological thinking, I would like to single out the works of Guram Tevzadze. Within the conception of Hartmann's epistemology, Tevzadze investigated the object of knowledge. We have the knowledge of things represented in our consciousness. Simultaneously, knowledge, as a cognitive act, implies the transcendence of its object. Due to this, for Hartmann, a cognitive theory cannot exist without ontology. The mentioned qualities of the object of knowledge contradict each other, but a cognitive act that forms a basis for the unity of such a contradiction does exist. Hence, since an object of cognition is represented in consciousness and at the same time transcends consciousness. The object of knowledge is consciousness itself and nothing more than that. This is the only way of identifying the given thing with a transcendent object. Thus, the existence of knowledge points to the fact that consciousness, as a given phenomenon, presents itself as a transcendent thing. As a result fact of the existence of consciousness is regarded as a phenomenon itself. Therefore, Hartmann defines knowledge as a pure phenomenon (the first stage of the new cognitive theory).

When analyzing epistemology, Guram Tevzadze states that the above definition is unacceptable since a cognitive act contaminates the purity of the phenomenon. Due to this, in Hartmann's theory, the phenomenology of knowledge has a methodological meaning only. According to Tevzadze the development of phenomenology into a conception requires a real transition from the immanent sphere of consciousness to its transcendental basis. To accomplish such a transition or find an absolute basis of consciousness, Tevzadze uses Descartes' methodological principle. In particular, as the absolute basis of cognition is inaccessible, there is only this way of attaching absolute meaning to the real content of consciousness. The act of attaching meaning is a real, unconditional act and it is just this act that presents an absolute basis for the phenomenology of knowledge. Thus, by applying Descartes' methodological principle to Hartmann's theory, Tevzadze elaborates phenomenology of knowledge as a conception.

When considering the problems of existential ontology, Givi Margvelashvili, a Georgian philosopher and writer was unable to avoid the issues of phenomenological philosophy. He, in particular, focused on the phenomenological modes of consciousness that gain their meaning thanks to some phenomenological effort. The latter is a way of revealing consciousness as a form of existence.

According to Margvelashvili, apart from methodological resemblance there is a deep conceptual similarity between the works of Heidegger and Husserl. Existential ontology is an absolutely modal theory. When defining existence through existential time Heidegger reveals being in its modal manifestation. On the other hand, Husserl considers consciousness as a field of vision. The present is the brightest point of the field. Brightness diminishes in the areas related to the past and the future, which creates a darker area in the field. Thus, consciousness in its existential dimension looks like a field with a brighter centre and darker borders.

Margvelashvili compares this ontological picture of consciousness with Heidegger's idea of existence, instead of referring to the field of consciousness, Heidegger views existence without any centre, as an ecstasy of time. The past, the present and the future are equal points of existence, but despite this equality existence keeps its centralized structure, since it has an ability to bring together past, present and future points of time.

Margvelashvili dedicated most of his works to Heidegger's ontology, but his later creations "Phenomenological Codes of Consciousness" and "The Problem of the Cultural World in the Existential Ontology of M. Heidegger"⁴ lead us to the depth of Husserl's transcendentalism. According to Margvelashvili, Heidegger did not inherit Husserl's phenomenology only in terms of methodology. As a result Margvelashvili obtains a theory throwing light on a deep unity between Heidegger and Husserl.

Another contemporary thinker revealing the phenomenological roots of aesthetic thinking was famous Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardashvili. In his lectures "Psychological Topology of the Way"⁵, Mamardashvili examines Marcel Proust's novel *The Remembrance of Things Past*. The past is an unreachable phenomenon, and when the French author thinks of his childhood he refers to a present state of his mind, which acquires the meaning of the past. This is a great miracle of time – way the present is designated as the past.

The problem leads us to a phenomenological problem: a phenomenon reveals itself and at the same time it represents a thing in itself. Similarly to this, the past exists separately, as a thing in itself and at the same time it is revealed as a phenomenon by the present, or the present, due to some necessity, turns into the past. The purpose of the author is to create conditions for such a transformation- *The Remembrance of Things past* is an aesthetic experiment using the phenomenological way of thinking in literature.

Mamardashvili examines the phenomenon of the past in greater detail. We are unable to control or recollect the first, marginal period of our childhood when the unconscious prevails in the mind. The unreachable experience abides in the dark. This is the period of first perceptions and at the same time the period when the intellectual organs of perception are created. This is an indivisible process. The creation of organs of perception and the act of perception totally merge with each other. Because of such unity the entire content of the first perception exists in the dark, for there is no organ of perception, separate from the object of cognition that could shed light on it. In other words, the remote past has an unconscious existence (as a thing in itself) because it merges with the process of the crystallization of a human being. In his work "Classical and Non-Classical Ideals of Rationality"⁶, Mamardashvili explains the difference between the classical understandings of the event and of the phenomenon. Differently from the event, the phenomenon has ontological existence or significance. The difference between a classical event and essence is that ontological characteristics belong to essence, whereas essence itself has no existence in a certain sense. Phenomenological reduction implies the differentiation of the content of consciousness

from the cognitive act, which recognizes in the content of consciousness the reflection of the objective, real world.

Mamardashvili's experience in revealing paradoxical situations and the construction of the cognitive picture of the world prove to be extremely interesting. The paradox consists in the fact that the more we consider events and objects of the world as movements and bodies deprived of a soul, i.e., without any inner life principle, the less we can free ourselves from absolutely mental conditions of understanding the external physical world. Physical events are coordinated and constructed in the integrally comprehended field of infinite intellect.

If objects are regarded as conscious objects, as phenomena having souls, i.e., as the source of existence in itself, the integral mental field of comprehension splits into numerous spatial-temporal real layers that ensure the independent existence of phenomena.

Consequently, Mamardashvili concludes that there exists the integrity of phenomena, on the one hand, and dualism in understanding them (understood as physical and conscious objects), on the other hand. This enables the author to draw a certain analogy between Descartes' dualism and Husserl's phenomenology, in spite of the contradictions observed between them.

This brief review of the phenomenological studies of Georgian authors reveals once again the enormous impact of Husserl's conception which, in spite of the obstacles thrown up in the Soviet era, is reflected in a distinctive and quite deep way, in twentieth-century Georgian philosophy.

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8. Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa (ed.). *Phenomenology in East Europe. Man in His Life-world (Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXVII, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1989).*

NOTES:

- ¹ See Kote Bakradze, "Essays on New and Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy" in his *Selected Philosophical Works* Vol. III. pp. 359-456 (in Georgian).
- ² Zurab Kakabadze, "The Problem of Existential Crisis and Edmund Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology", *Metsniereba*. 1985.
- ³ A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed). *Phenomenology in East Europe. Man in His Life –world (AnalectaHusserliana, Vol. XXVII Dordecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1989).*
- ⁴ Givi Margvelashvili, *Phenomenological Code's of Consciousness and the Problem of Cultural World in the existential Ontology of M. Heidegger* (Tbilisi: Caucasian House. 1998).
- ⁵ Merab Mamardashvili, lectures, "Psychological Topology of the Way".
- ⁶ Merab Mamardashvili, "Classical and Non-Classical Ideals of Rationality". *Metsniereba*. 1984. p. 26.

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

ფენომენოლოგიური აზროვნება მე-20 საუკუნის ქართულ ფილოსოფიაში

მამუკა დოლიძე

საქართველოს სავლელ წერეთლის ფილოსოფიის ინსტიტუტი

რეზიუმე

ავტორი განიხილავს მე-20 საუკუნის ქართველ ფილოსოფოსთა წვლილს ფენომენოლოგიური ფილოსოფიის განვითარებაში. ამ თვალსაზრისით გაშუქებულია ცნობილ ქართველ ფილოსოფოსთა – კოტე ბაქრაძის, ანგია ბოჭორიშვილის, ზურაბ კაკაბაძის, გურამ თევზაძის, გივი მარგველაშვილის და მერაბ მამარდაშვილის ფილოსოფიური კონცეფციები.

გერმანიაში ყოფნისას, კოტე ბაქრაძე უშუალოდ ესწრებოდა ედმუნდ ჰუსერლის ლექციებს. მიღებული შთაბეჭდილებები და თანდართული კომენტარები საფუძვლად დაედო მის ფუნდამენტურ ნაშრომს „ესეები ახალი და თანამედროვე ბურჟუაზიული ფილოსოფიიდან.“ კოტე ბაქრაძის მოსაზრებით, ფენომენოლოგიურმა მეთოდმა ანტი-ფსიქოლოგიზმის პოზიციიდან გადაწყვიტა კანტის პრობლემა ჭეშმარიტების ობიექტურობის შესახებ. იგი ხაზს უსვამს, რომ მე-ს განცდა, როგორც საკუთარი არსებობის განცდა, სცილდება ფსიქოლოგიური მოვლენის ფარგლებს. ეს თვითრეფლექსია კი არ ასახავს სუბიექტის არსებობას, როგორც შინაგანი გარეგანს, არამედ წვდება და ემთხვევა მას იმ ზღვრულ წერტილში, სადაც გარეგანი და შინაგანი ერთად არსებობს და სადაც გვეცხადება სუბიექტი და ობიექტი განუყოფელი ერთიანობის სახით.

ანგია ბოჭორიშვილი ანტი-ფსიქოლოგიზმის პოზიციას იცავს ესთეტიკური ფენომენოლოგიის სფეროში. ეს კონცეფცია გადმოცემულია მის წიგნში “ფსიქოლოგიის პრინციპული საკითხები” (2 ნაწილი, 1959, “მეცნიერება”). ანგია ბოჭორიშვილის აზრით, ესთეტიკური კატეგორიები ისე უნდა დავადგინოთ, რომ გვერდი აუაროთ ფსიქოლოგიურ ცნებებს. ფენომენოლოგიამ უნდა დასძლიოს გნოსეოლოგიზმი, ის, რაც ესთეტიკას ავტონომიურობას უკარგავს. ესთეტიკამ თავისთავად, ფსიქოლოგიისა და შემეცნების თეორიის

დახმარების გარეშე უნდა დაადგინოს საკუთარი ობიექტი, რომლის საფუძველია მე-ს, როგორც ეგზისტენციალური და შემოქმედებითი საწყისის განცდა.

ზურაბ კაკაბაძე ქართული ფენომენოლოგიური სკოლის ახალ თაობას განასახიერებს. მისი ცნობილი ნაშრომი – “ეგზისტენციალური კრიზისის პრობლემა და ედმუნდ ჰუსერლის ტრანსცენდენტალური ცნობიერება” ფენომენოლოგიის ონტოლოგიურ ვერსიას გვთავაზობს. ფილოსოფოსის აზრით, ინტერსუბიექტურობის გაგების და ფილოსოფიის, როგორც მკაცრი მეცნიერების დადგენის სირთულე არ წარმოადგენს ბრალდებას ფენომენოლოგიის მიმართ, არამედ გვიჩვენებს ჰუსერლის კონცეფციისა და მეთოდოლოგიის ღიაობას, მისი სუბიექტური არსის ამბობნებას სამყაროსა და ცოდნის ობიექტივაციის წინააღმდეგ. ფენომენოლოგიას არ აინტერესებს არც გარე სამყარო და არც გნოსეოლოგიური სუბიექტი; მისი საგანია ტრანსცენდენტალური სუბიექტის მიერ ობიექტური სამყაროს კონსტრუირების ონტოლოგიური პროცესი.

ასევე მნიშვნელოვანია გურამ თევზაძის თვალსაზრისი ედმუნდ ჰუსერლისა და მაქს შელერის შესახებ, რომელიც განვითარებულია მის წიგნში “XX საუკუნის ფილოსოფიის ისტორია“ და ფენომენოლოგიური კონცეფცია შემეცნების ობიექტის შესახებ, გადმოცემული მის ნაშრომში – “ნიკოლაი ჰარტმანის ონტოლოგიის კრიტიკა”.

გურამ თევზაძე შენიშნავს, რომ ჰარტმანის მიხედვით, შემეცნების საგანი ცნობიერებისთვის იმანენტურიც არის (რაკი აზრი მხოლოდ აზრისეულს შეიმეცნებს) და ტრანსცენდენტურიც (რადგან შემეცნებას დაეკარება აზრი, თუკი აზროვნება ვერ გასცდა თავის თავს). ეს, რა თქმა უნდა, წინააღმდეგობაა, მაგრამ ცნობიერებაში არსებობს მოცემულ წინააღმდეგობათა დაძლევის და გაერთიანების საფუძველი.

აღნიშნული ერთიანობა მიიღწევა იმ შემთხვევაში, თუკი შემეცნების ობიექტად იქცევა თვითონ ცნობიერება, როგორც წმინდა ფენომენი, მაგრამ წმინდა ცნობიერება რეალურად მიუწვდომელია, ამიტომ თევზაძე ფიქრობს, რომ ჰარტმანის თვალსაზრისს ააქვს მხოლოდ მეთოდოლოგიური მნიშვნელობა, რომ შემეცნება კა არ წვდება თავის ობიექტს, არამედ მიუწვდომლად სახავს მას და მიზნის ამ უსასრულო მისწრაფებაში ახორციელებს საკუთარ საზრისს.

ჰარტმანის მეთოდოლოგიის კონცეფციად ჩამოყალიბების მიზნით, ავტორი გვთავაზობს მივმართოდ დეკარტეს მეთოდს; რა თქმა უნდა, წმინდა ცნობიერება მიუწვდომელია, მაგრამ მე შემძლია ცნობიერების რეალური შინაარსი ჩავსვა ბრჭყალებში, ანუ მივანიჭო მას წმინდა ფენომენის მნიშვნელობა, რომლის სიწმინდეშიც, დეკარტეს მსგავსად, შემძლია შევიტანო ეჭვი, მაგრამ თვით მნიშვნელობის მიცემის აქტი აქ უეჭველია, რაც საფუძველს მაძლევს დავადგინო შემეცნების საგანი – ეს არის ფსიქიკური შინაარსისთვის არსისეული ფენომენის მნიშვნელობის მინიჭების აქტი. ამრიგად, საზრისის მიცემის ფენომენოლოგიური პროცესი ჰარტმანის მეთოდოლოგიას შემეცნების კონცეფციად აქცევს.

ქართველი მწერალი და მოაზროვნე გივი მარგველაშვილი თავის ფილოსოფიურ შემოქმედებას ჰაიდეგერის ონტოლოგიას უძღვნის, მაგრამ მისი ნაშრომი – “ცნობიერების ფენომენოლოგიური კოდები” წარმოადგენს ჰუსერლისა და ჰაიდეგერის კონცეფციათა შედარებით ანალიზს.

შეიძლება ითქვას, რომ ჰაიდეგერიც და ჰუსერლიც ერთი და იგივე მეთოდს იყენებენ, ოღონდ შებრუნებული ნიშნით;

ჰუსერლი აუქმებს არსებობის საზრისს არსის იდეაციის პროცესში.

ჰაიდეგერი ახდენს არსის რელუქციას არსებობის საზრისის დადგენის მიზნით.

მაგრამ ჰაიდეგერი არ არის ჰუსერლის მემკვიდრე და ოპონენტი მხოლოდ მეთოდოლოგიის თვალსაზრისით. გივი მარგველაშვილის კვლევები ნათელს ჰფენს ღრმად შინაარსობრივ მიმართებას XX საუკუნის ამ ორ დიდ მოაზროვნეს შორის. ორივე ფილოსოფოსს აერთიანებს ამბოხება ფილოსოფიური ტრადიციის მიმართ, ოღონდ, ჰუსერლი ახდენს გადატრიალებას ტრანსცენდენტალური ცნობიერების სფეროში, ჰაიდეგერი კი ქმნის ახალ ონტოლოგიას, სადაც ყოფიერება სტრუქტურირებულია დროის ექსტაზის მიხედვით.

მერაბ მამარდაშვილი ძირითადად ახალი, არაკლასიკური რაციონალიზმის პრობლემებს იკვლევდა, მაგრამ მისი წვლილი თანამედროვე ფენომენოლოგიაში მეტად საყურადღებოა თუნდაც მარსელ პრუსტის რომანის ორიგინალური ინტერპრეტაციის გამო.

კრებული “გზის ფსიქოლოგიური ტოპოლოგია” აღნიშნული რომანის – “დაკარგული დროის ძიებაში”, ფენომენოლოგიურ გააზრებას ეძღვნება.

დრო, როგორც ცხოვრების ერთხელ ჩავლილი მდინარე, განუმეორებელია; რაც იყო, ის აღარ არის, მაგრამ რაც არის, მას შეიძლება მივანიჭოთ გარდასულ მოვლენათა აზრი. მამარდაშვილის ინტერპრეტაციით, მარსელ პრუსტი მოგვითხრობს არა თავისი ცხოვრების შესახებ, არამედ ის გადმოგვცემს თავის ამჟამიერ შემოქმედებას; თუ როგორ იქმნება და იბადება ხელახლა ის, რაც სამუდამოდ ჩაბარდა წარსულს. საქმე გვაქვს აწმყოსთან, რომელიც მნიშვნელობს როგორც წარსული და არა გარდასულის მოგონებასთან. ახალი დროის გარდასახვა, ძველ, ბავშვობისდროინდელ პერიოდში, ფენომენოლოგიური აქტია, რომელიც წარსულის იდეალიზაციას ახდენს, მის ფაქტობრიობას, არსისეულ ფენომენად გარდაქმნის. ამიტომაც არსებობს ფრანგი მწერლის გონებაში წარსული ასეთი რომანტიული და ამაღლებული სახით.

მამარდაშვილი შენიშნავს, რომ უსაზღვროა მწერლის ნოსტალგია დაკარგული დროის მიმართ, მაგრამ შეუძლებელია მეხსიერებაში ასე წვრილად, ასე გაფაქიზებულად არსებობდეს მისი ბავშვობა. აქ მოგონება გამოგონებად იქცევა; მწერალი იგონებს არა თავის ბავშვობას, არამედ ქმნის წარსულის ეკვივალენტურ ახალ რეალობას. იქნებ, არც არასოდეს ყოფილა ის, რასაც მეხსიერება ასე მონდომებით გვიხატავს? წარსულს ხომ

აწმყოს გადასახედიდან ენიჭება განსაკუთრებული აზრი და ხიბლი, ის, მისი ძიების, მისკენ უკუქცევის ძალით იტვირთება ახალი, არსობრივი მნიშვნელობებით და თუ ეს ძიება დაუსრულებელია, მაშინ ბავშვობის სამყაროც უსასრულოდ ფართოვდება; მწერალი გადადის რეალობის ყოველგვარ საზღვარს, რათა დაკარგული დროის ამო ძიებაში, მოგონება გამოგონებად აქციოს, ცხოვრებით დამძიმებული ხსოვნა “ახალი წარსულის” თავისუფალ შემოქმედებად გარდაქმნას.

მარსელ პრუსტის რომანის ასეთი ინტერპრეტაცია გვიჩვენებს, თუ როგორ ესმის მერაბ მამარდაშვილს ფენომენოლოგია; ეს არის აზროვნების, როგორც შემოქმედებითი პროცესის რეალიზაციის აქტი.

დასასრულს, დასკვნის სახით შეიძლება ითქვას, რომ XX საუკუნის ქართული ფილოსოფია ფენომენოლოგიას გაიაზრებს ცნობიერებისა და ყოფიერების ერთიანობის შუქზე, რომელიც, ამავე დროს, მათ შორის არსებულ პრინციპულ განსხვავებასაც გულისხმობს. მეტიც შეიძლება ითქვას: სწორედ სუბიექტური არსისა და ობიექტური არსებობის ერთმანეთისგან განსხვავების მეთოდი წარმოადგენს მათი გაერთიანების და განუყოფელი შერწყმის ფენომენოლოგიურ გზას.

ჩატარებული მოკლე მიმოხილვა ქართველ ფილოსოფოსთა შემოქმედების შესახებ იმასაც ცხადყოფს, რომ დღეს, თანამედროვე ფილოსოფიური აზროვნება, წარმოუდგენელია ედმუნდ ჰუსერლის ფენომენოლოგიასთან მიმართების გარეშე. ავტორი გვიჩვენებს, რომ მიუხედავად სიძნელებისა, რომელსაც ქმნიდა საბჭოთა იდეოლოგია, ფენომენოლოგია ღრმად აისახა და შემოქმედებითად განვითარდა ქართველ ფილოსოფოსთა ორიგინალურ შრომებში.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN IMAGINATIVE FREEDOM AND VITAL CONSTRAINTS

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

President of World Phenomenological Society

I present in what follows an interdisciplinary inquiry following my theoretical/practical approach. I abandon, in fact the stereotypical classification of philosophical problems with their separated realms of inquiry, and in contrast approach their common ground-work which is life itself at its basic onto-metaphysical level. Phenomenology/ontopoiesis of life is a descending intuitively to the level of the pristine *logos of life* in which all the scientific and philosophical problems find their common roots. It is on this level that certain philosophical and scientific problems, which have remained unsolvable for centuries, find their natural setting and solution. Therefore, using the basic metaphysical-ontic platform, I will attempt to show how the question of “human development” may be treated profitably.

First of all, let us correct some of the classic preconceptions about our point of departure. As a matter of fact, the misunderstanding of the conception of what is “human” calls for transformation. Traditionally human being has been specified by its “nature” which is defined by the salient features that distinguish him/her from other living beings. With the penetrating progress of natural science, this approach cannot be upheld.

Biological, chemical, and medical sciences of today demand that we change this approach. The human being in its salient specific characteristics is not a once and forever established entity. On the contrary it is, first of all, the fruit of a long line of development within the natural unfolding of life as a type. Furthermore, each individual unfolds, grows and shrinks, remaining dependent throughout upon his/her natural milieu with its laws and rules. In agreement with concrete statements of science, our inquiry into the logos of life reveals that the human being cannot be defined by its specific nature but by the *entire complex* of the individualizing life of which it is vitally a part and parcel. That is, instead of talking about human nature we must switch to a conception of the Human Condition-within-the-unity-of-everything-there-is-alive.

However, this must be done with a very essential specification, namely the “HUMAN CREATIVE CONDITION”.

1. POINT OF DEPARTURE OF OUR ONTOPOIETIC INQUIRY: HUMAN CREATIVE CONDITION WITHIN THE UNITY OF LIFE

It is precisely by the human creative act— instead of the cognitive act - that we may enter into the innermost plane of the workings of the *logos of life*, which in its basic thread of vital force - *vis vitale* - brings individualizing life about, promotes its unfolding and controls its course.

It is the descent into the becoming of beings, living creatures and non-living objects in their origination, generative ties, existential connectedness, interactive unfolding - and this in their innermost logos which prompts them - that is indispensable to understanding the intricacies of existence. Following Periander, I usually say that to understand one thing you have to know them all. Logos of this origination and becoming is the crucial point of all our projects.

Human creative condition as a conception of the human being is the fruit of such ontic discovery. As a matter of fact, as much as this continuity of the living process/progress/regress is the basic question of epistemology as well as of the major part of our knowledge at large, it is by focusing upon the nature and extent of the human creative act that we discover Human Condition-within-the-unity-of-every thing- there-is-alive.

We thereby discover the ontologically basic plane of life's generation and becoming - a plane upon which, in contrast to classic ontologism focusing upon the structure of things and beings, we inquire and may follow the POIEIN, the making, the becoming, the unfolding of these structures themselves in their circumambient context of resources, forces, intergenerative energies in their basic *self-individualization* - in existence. In the onto-poietic level we find confirmation that life consists of constructive poiein, becoming, unfolding, development. That is to say that through the ontopoietic level of the logos of life, we uncover life's incipient forces, its directional law, its LOGOS.

To understand the Human Condition-within-the-unity-of-everything-there-is- alive we have to focus upon two of its basic features:

- (1) Discreet continuity or disruption of its unfolding, and
- (2) The ingrownness of the individual existence into its circumambient existential network.

Ingrownness is a paradoxical way of becoming. Establishing order to particularize, individualize itself and to unfold the incipient beingness existentially implies a radius of external conditions that are themselves suspended upon a system of life which subtends them in living beingness. No living element may be seen apart—never beyond its circumambient co generic radius or outside of its inscription within the network of the earth (its groundwork) and the cosmos with its rules and laws. These two spheres of existential dependencies co-determine the autonomy of the living/becoming individual

2. THE MATRIX OF BECOMING

In order to grow in selfhood from within the living beingness, this twofold inward/outward oriented existential route manifests by drawing upon forces and energies from the “outward” circumambient sphere. This sphere remains in the center of our attention, always asking how the direction can be found from “within,” how to find fulfillment within the sphere of their application. In this respect we have to differentiate within the stretch of life between the two essential matrixes of poiein, individualizing-becoming, and a third one “in between”.

1. The ontopoietic vital matrix of generation, unfolding, development of *organic/vital* significance of individualizing life.

2. The transformatory climax of the unfolding of living types which goes *in between* the vital and the creative, that is specifically human phase of unfolding life, with the advent of Imagination Creatrix.

3. The creative matrix of the specifically human development.

It is of primary importance to differentiate these three matrixes with their specific functional systems, yet see that inside they are fused in a collaborative variability, precisely from the differentiation of their guiding principles, on the one hand, and their innermost existential — ontopoietic discreet continuity of developmental advance, on the other hand. There lies the key to understanding human development with its autonomy on the one side and its existential dependencies on the other.

- I. Let us first of all come back to the incipient instance of life. It is in its self-individualization from the prompting *vis vitale (vis viva)* of the logos that beingness sets out its life-career, carrying with itself its entire initial endowment concentrated in its ontopoietic *sequence*. The ontopoietic sequence carries not only its germinal/ seminal endowment but simultaneously all the indispensable dynamic directional devices to make it unfold within favorable rudimentary circumstances in a way that using them according to their fitness with its own material it works out its unfolding. Simultaneously it transforms this circumambient groundwork, preparing it for further propitious conditions allowing further development of its sequential virtual ties. It initiates thereby a thread of unfolding developing its beingness according to the constructive design which it *brings with itself*. It is this constructive encounter of the inward virtual ties prompted by the forces of the logic tendencies with the propitious, fitting material that constitutes in tandem the individualizing beingness and its vital matrix. It is of crucial significance to recognize this doubly working dynamic matrix of individualizing life.

To summarize: the ontopoiesis of nature - vitally significant — progresses and promotes the flow of life, organizing it around the self-individualization of beingness flowing out of coalescing moves of becoming following the intrinsic line of the *directional sequence* in constituting a circumambient radius *in fitness* with appropriate favorable conditions. Its telos is set up by its *intrinsic logic sequence* transformed in the course of unfolding into a self-prompting agency to be followed.

II. With the perfecting of agency's progress in unfolding its organs of sharing-in-life, the phase of life's ontopoiesis enters into the play of imagination Creatrix.

In fact, this is the vitally significant ontopoietic matrix; which in this constructive unfolding leads to a more developed sharing-in-life matrix of communicative animalism. Upon its climatic constructive apex when the inward agency of the self-individualizing beingness acquires the basis for higher communicative sharing of life's necessities, one truly enters into the play of becoming.

Indeed when in the course of the progressive unfolding of the receptive/remitting organs of the living agency, the system is ready, there enters into the game of life a unique force, Imagination Creatrix, which dramatically converts the functional system of the ontopoietic/animal matrix with its directional program of an inwardly programmed and selective system into a self directed but autonomously imaginatively programmed projected and deliberately selected autonomy that is the creative matrix of the specifically human significance of life.

It is in this intermediary field of essential transformations that the metamorphosis of the animal/vital functions occurs. All the life-significant forces, the organic, vital, and psychic of the soul meet at this field with the essential constructive functional links that transform the living agent into a self conscious selective agency. This transformed functional field with the leading orientation of creativity opens a new theatrical stage for the logos of life.

3. THE HUMAN CONDITION COMING INTO ITS OWN: IMAGINATION CREATRIX BRINGING IN THE FREEDOM TO INTERROGATE AND THE POWERS OF CREATIVE INVENTION

When we stand back and ponder it, we are amazed at how the ontopoietic unfolding in self-individualizing life for so long "tacitly" and obscurely carried our various functional spheres and then how, all of a sudden, our beingness was extended into the sphere of feelings toward ideas, projects and community. The infinity of our circumstances became apparent. Life suddenly resonated with countless voices, shimmered with shades, assumed all manner of shapes. The life that sustains us became something we could configure. After submersion in the vegetative-vital-organic spheres, we surface into the glaring light of the spirit. Within the sphere of the spirit, we at last find ourselves *free* and *empowered*. In "our" body-flesh-psyche-consciousness we become the focus of cosmic forces, the center of the universe.

For us, "living" means being alive in the sphere of this empowerment. The living individual raises itself above the enactment of the virtual ties inherent in its ontopoietic sequence and acquires personal stature as a self. This is obviously a new phase in our condition. It is attained with the emergence in our constitutive system of *Imagination Creatrix*. Two major steps follow on that, the *genesis of the specifically human mind* and of the *human person*.

4. FROM THE LIVING AGENT'S VITAL CONSTITUTIVE SYSTEM (THE BRAIN) TO THE HUMAN MIND

We have been surveying those spheres of the human condition, how the feelers, hooks, antennae thrown out by living beings are accompanied by an ingrown self-individualizing beingness inscribing its autonomous selfhood within the cosmos. In the realm of universal law, living beings come to lay down their own basic rules of life enactment.

As we were summarizing the main knots or phases of metamorphosis marking the growth of autonomy in living beings, we dwelt on the body-flesh-psyche-spirit progression or are, on the continuity in this progression, and in particular on the fabric that tends toward the emergence of each and of specific *novum of sense* in each.

In the "brain" we have the great apparatus bringing together the entire functional network of the physical-organic-corporeal-psyche unity. This apparatus is intrinsically tied to the living agent and is for it a platform for the expansion of powers. In its performance the brain plays a preparatory role in establishing the fully autonomous living being that appears only with the emergence *sua sponte* of Imagination Creatrix. The highest level of animal development is the platform for the appearance of what we acknowledge to be human beings. For the last phase of the transformation-metamorphosis of life, the logos prepares its own transformation into the creative logos, which derives its dynamism and direction from the human being. At this juncture the human being is empowered by the creative logos to invent and forge, *which transforms the human condition itself*. All of this occurs, of course, in strict coordination with the givens of nature/life.

The course of life was from its incipient moment carried by individual living beings, each following its very own ontopoietic sequence. But now at this point, where life has attained a new functional platform, the constitutive apparatus of the organic brain is informed by Imagination Creatrix and myriad transformative devices are crystallized into the functional system of the mind so that this particular living being acquires the *power* of invention and the *power* to project lines of conduct.

That amounts to saying that the vitally operative logos of life is progressively preparing, through its diversification, just this radical step, the entrance into the game of life of *Imagination Creatrix*. Imagination Creatrix proceeds from the womb of life and depends on it, yet it lifts the logos, thus far subservient to meeting the needs of survival, to the level of autonomy, in which the living subject becomes endowed with a far-reaching range of conscious intellectual performance. We have the self-directing sphere of consciousness in a fully conscious human individual.

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the creative powers of the logos instrumental in the constitution of the human mind with all its faculties. What is here at stake is the differentiation of the logos of life in its specifically human constructive expressions and devices, that which characterizes the human being within his circumambient world and the commonly shared universe of life.

5. THE HUMAN WORLD OF LIFE: DEVELOPMENT IN A CONFLICTION SITUATION BETWEEN THE HUMAN INVENTIVE PROJECTIONS AND VITAL NECESSITIES

With the human creative mind we have entered the specifically human plane of existence, developing the human significance of life. Having laid down the onto-poietic cornerstones of such an investigation in which the fruits of the encounter between the vital-natural functions of animal life become unfolded further and further until their essential encounter with the rays of creative imagination (with the living agent being transformed through this metamorphosis into a human creative mind), it remains now only to review the main traits of this metamorphosis to bring out the specificity of the human constructive/destructive development in its multisided confliction and somewhat enigmatic features.

First of all, let us compare and emphasize the new directional lines in the development of the human being as well as the influx of new resources and forces. There is no need to emphasize the emergence of the individual personal will which conducts the specifically human progress/regress in contrast with the onto-poietic design which subtends the progress/regress of the living agent within the natural sphere of existence. Let us repeat that, while at the natural level the law of the fitness reigns according to which selection of food, shelter, pasture, and higher functions of the sharing-in-life (following a pretraceable line in beingness), with the emergence of the will also emerges an entire apparatus of intellectual interrogation, deliberation, selection and planning. While the existential progress/regress of the natural/vital development consists of instances of coalescing moves toward a constructive project laid out and fore traced in its essential virtuality by the intrinsic onto-poietic sequence, complex as they may be advancing in a quasi "linear" fashion of Chronos, in contrast, the human advance in moving and unfolding - proceeding from within the new prompting force of the will and through the mental network of deliberative power, the selective and decisive moves of the human mind— takes on a special form: the planning of the mind in which all the faculties take part. We now see a form of "achievement" being *planned*. No matter how simple the human act, it stems from an imaginative propulsion of the mind, it carries an aim of "achievement." This essential feature endows human self awareness with an inner conviction of being "free." Free to project, free to choose, but does it mean free to achieve?

Here we come back to our initial onto-poietic statement which confirms itself. Namely, as I have emphasized above, the individual existence within its existential unfolding remains part and parcel of its existential context - that is, it maintains a crucial interplay with the circumambient life network within which it is ingrown. The specifically human creative sphere of life — the human world of life — not only remains existentially/vitally founded within the natural sphere of life, dependent upon its fluctuating conditions, but the personal/individual unfolding and undertaking within the creative sphere of life is also essentially ingrown into the closer and further Intersubjective extending context - the network of vital existence -consisting of other human creative individuals planning their moves toward

achievements of their own aims, according to their inventive powers, but also according to their strictly subjective appetites, tastes, inclinations and deep elementary inclinations coming from natural strivings and drives.

Beyond the “rationally” calculable motives we have to work with the third *quasi* matrix of becoming: the in-between sphere in which the elementary functions of the natural-animal development encounter the specifically human imaginatively lifted powers. Here we come to a culminating point of our consideration. On the one hand, the creative/inventive swing and deliberative mind gives the human being an imaginatively expanded self awareness of his/her powers; it makes him/her feel an agent of his/her life course, and a master of “blind” forces which he/she may direct to his/her advantage. On the other side, he/she is grounded in them and subject to innumerable influences in his/her unfolding and acting from the co-existential circuits.

At present, with its capacities to calculate and cognitively encompass life, Life-world, cosmos, etc. human life appears to be expanding within the individual frame. As a matter of fact, we speak about the evolution of types having concentrated now upon the evolution of the human individual who appears to be already endowed with consciousness greatly enlarged compared to humans of one hundred years ago and appears also to have found the secret of further, seemingly infinite, expansion of human potential. Such expansion manifests itself not only within the individual but in the transformative progress of the entire life’s and world’s network. We see the expansion not only in the technological growth of the individual and societal existence but also in the growth of human consciousness and of spiritual dimensions of experience. Each day we are faced with new inventions and new turns of mind. We presume an infinite progress ahead. This progress creates new demands upon the individual and society as well as creating new problems which society will have to solve. Ever new sources of force emerge and the human being believes to be able — as master — to foresee and control their effects to lead their course. Yet, like the sorcerer’s apprentice, having found the key to release the current of power, human beings do not possess either the key to stop the course nor to entirely control its achievements. They remain always subject to the whims of natural, cosmic, and human forces.

This course involves not only individual natural endowment and inclinations but the entire network of sharing-in-life within the circumambient and further circles. It depends upon ontopoietic fitting directions, ontopoietic rules of the circumambient contexts, on the one hand, and the individual creative genius, on the other.

The question: “how to master the routes of the human development within the individual as well as within its interactive world, society, culture while navigating upon the stormy sea between and among conflicting forces without a compass” is beyond the scope of my presentation, which intends merely to trace its ontopoietic groundwork. We may, however, draw from it an essential indication. Human mastery being out of reach, there seems to be an indispensable measure for human conduct if you want to safeguard human existence upon earth. That

is, in order to control in some way the flux of human development for its existential advantage, human being has to assume a special frame of mind. Keeping in sight the onto-poietic ground-work sketched above, human calculation and balancing out of life's conditions should be handled according to it with measure, proportion and temperance.

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

ადამიანის განვითარება წარმოსახვის თავისუფლებასა და სასიცოცხლო აუცილებლობას შორის

ანა-ტერეზა ტიმიენიჩკა

მსოფლიო ფენომენოლოგიური ინსტიტუტის პრეზიდენტი

(**შეჯამება და კრიტიკული შეფასება**)

ავტორის მიერ შემოთავაზებული თემა, მისი მრავალწლიანი შემოქმედებითი ძიების სფეროს განეკუთვნება. საკითხი ეხება სიცოცხლის სამყაროს გააზრებას თანამედროვე ფენომენოლოგიური ფილოსოფიის შუქზე. უაღრესად საინტერესო და ღრმა მოაზროვნის თვალთ დახახული სიცოცხლე, მისი საფუძვლიანი და მეტად გაფაქიზებული დეტალიზაცია, მისი წარმოშობის ურთულესი მექანიზმის ჩვენება... ყოველივე ეს სცილდება მეცნიერულ-ფილოსოფიური ანალიზის ტრადიციულ ფარგლებს. ავტორს სიცოცხლე აინტერესებს არა მისი ფორმადარსებული და ბოლომდე დეტერმინირებული სტრუქტურის სახით, რომლის გამოვლენათა მიხედვით ტრადიციული ონტოლოგია განაზოგადებს სიცოცხლის არსს, არამედ მისი მიზანია ჩაწვდეს სიცოცხლის მაჯისცემას, ცოცხალი არსის წარმოშობისა და ქმნადობა-განახლების დაუსრულებელ მდინარებაში. სიცოცხლის განუმეორებელ ნაკადში შესვლა შესაძლებელია მხოლოდ ერთხელ, ამიტომ ფილოსოფიური განზოგადოება აქ ვერ გასცდება ცოცხალი არსის ჭვრეტას მის უნიკალურ და განუმეორებელ ხდომილებაში. კლასიკური რაციონალიზმის გზა, ერთეულთა მსგავსებიდან ზოგად-ლოგიკური ცნებისკენ, აქ ჩიხში შედის და ინტუიციის შემოქმედებით წიაღსვლაში გარდაისახება. ეს ფენომენოლოგიური ინტუიცია არ უარყოფს, პირიქით, აფართოებს და განაახლებს ძველ რაციონალიზმს, რომლის მარადიულ ნიშანსვეტად კვლავ გვეცხადება “ლოგოსის” იდეა, მაგრამ განსხვავებით ჰერაკლიტესგან, ავტორი სიცოცხლის ლოგოსს ხედავს არა შემეცნებითი გონების თვალთ, არამედ შემოქმედებითი ინტუიციით. “ლოგოსი” აქ გვევლინება სიცოცხლის უნიკალური ფენომენის შემოქმედებითი სტრუქტურირების მატრიცის სახით.

არანაკლებ საინტერესო და ორიგინალურია ავტორისეული მსჯელობის სტილი. აზრის ცოცხალი პულსაცია ლოგიკური სიცხადით და თანმიმდევრულად კი არ ვითარდება, არამედ მისწრაფის ერთბაშად და დესკრიფციულად მოიცვას ის უამრავი ფაქტორი და ნიუანსი, რაც არყოფნის წიაღიდან წარმოშობს და ააგორებს სიცოცხლის ტალღას. ყოველი წინადადება, თავისი რთული, სინტაქსური თანწყობითა და ქვეწყობით მისწრაფის სრულად გამოხატოს სიცოცხლის ფენომენოლოგიური კონცეფცია, რაც, რა თქმა უნდა, შეუძლებელია, მაგრამ სწორედ ამ შეუძლებლობასთან ჭიდელში იბადება მოვლენათა აღწერის ღია და

ძრავლისმეტყველი სტილი. მსჯელობა აზრის ძრავალგანზომილებიან მოძრაობათა გადაკვეთის, ზედღების და შერწყმის ინტეგრირებულ შედეგს შეადგენს, სადაც “არქეოლოგიური გათხრები” სიცოცხლის სხვადასხვა მნიშვნელობათა მოძიების მიზნით, ძრავალმხრივ შეიძლება ვაწარმოოთ. ტექსტის ასეთი გართულებული ფორმა შინაარსობრივ დატვირთვასაც იძენს; სიცოცხლე უნდა შეიცნო და შეეგრძნო არა მის კერძო შემთხვევათა განსაზღვრისა და მარტივი განზოგადების გზით, არამედ წინასწარ უნდა ჩაწვდეს მას იმ უზოგადესი და განუსაზღვრელი პროცესის წიაღში, რასაც ყოფიერების ინდივიდუალიზაცია ჰქვია. ყოფნა-არყოფნის მოძრაობაში არსებული სიცოცხლე უპირველესად არის შემოქმედების თავისთავადი აქტი, პროცესი, რომელშიც უამრავი ფაქტორი მონაწილეობს. სიცოცხლის სცენაზე მოთამაშე ეს ფაქტორები “ლოგოსის დრამატურგიის”, ანუ მოვლენათა ხდომილებისა და განვითარების მატრიცის მიხედვით ქმნიან ე.წ. “სიცოცხლის აგენტს”, რომელიც ემატება და ერწყმის ბიოფიზიკურ რეალობას, რათა შეიტანოს მატერიაში თავისუფლებისა და ავტონომიურობის პრინციპი. ეს პრინციპი ცოცხალი არსის სასიცოცხლო გარემოსთან თავისუფალ ურთიერთქმედებასა და ალბათურ მიზეზ-შედეგთა ურთიერთ თამაშით განისაზღვრება. აქ ფილოსოფოსის გაფაქიზებული თვალი ხედავს, თუ როგორ ეგუება ორგანული ნაერთი გარემოს, როგორ ჩნდება ამ ნებაყოფლობით შეგუებაში თავისუფალი ნება, როგორ ფუნქციონირებს თავის ტვინი და როგორ მალდება ცენტრალური ნერვიული სისტემა გონებისა და ცნობიერების დონემდე; როგორ ეგზისტირებს ადამიანის ცნობიერება სოციუმში, ინტერსუბიექტურობისკენ და საბოლოოდ, იღუმალი ზემოცანის მიხედვით, როგორ მისწრაფვის ყოველი არსი უსასრულო ტელოსისაკენ. იქმნება შთაბეჭდილება, რომ “სიცოცხლის აგენტი” მუდმივად გაურბის მატერიის დეტერმინიზმსა და ინერტულობას, სასიცოცხლო სინთეზის თავისუფალი თამაშის გზით. ამიტომ მატერიას, მიზეზობრივი და მიზნობრივი აუცილებლობის მიღმა, ახასიათებს თვითინტერპრეტაციის უნარიც, რაც მის თავისუფლებას მოასწავებს საკუთარი თავისგან.

სიცოცხლე თითქოს თავისუფლად, შემოქმედებითი ნახტომების გზით ვითარდება მარტივი შენაერთიდან რთული ორგანიზმისკენ, რაც ნიშნავს, რომ ჭეშმარიტად ეს პროცესი შებრუნებული სახით მნიშვნელობს და რომ ღმერთი, სამყაროს ინდივიდუაციის უმაღლესი და საბოლოო შედეგი, სინამდვილეში ამ პროცესის პირველსაწყისსა და საფუძველს შეადგენს.

ყოველი ცოცხალი არსი და უმთავრესად ადამიანი თავის შემოქმედებით თავისუფლებაში მიემართება იქით, საიდანაც ის აუცილებლობით მომდინარეობს. ამიტომ, თავისუფლება სულაც არ ნიშნავს თავისუფლებას. ავტორი შენიშნავს, რომ გვაქვს თავისუფლება რეალურ ძალთა მოქმედებაში, გვაქვს თავისუფლება შემოქმედების სფეროში, მაგრამ გვაქვს თუ არა თავისუფლება დასახული მიზნისა და მისწრაფების მიმართ?

პასუხი ამ შეკითხვაზე თავისუფლებისა და აუცილებლობის ერთიანობას გულისხმობს. ეს აუცილებლობა სხვა არაფერია, თუ არა სიცოცხლის სამყაროს ინტენციონალობა, მისი მეტაფიზიკური მიზანმიმართება, რომელიც არასოდეს ამოიწურება სიცოცხლის რეალიზაციის უკვე განხორციელებული და შემდგარი ფორმებით, არამედ გრძელდება ყველასა და ყველაფრის მიღმა, უსასრულოდ, ყოფიერების შემოქმედებითი ინდივიდუაციის თვალუწვდენელ პერსპექტივაში.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF QUANTUM THEORY AND THE POLYPHONY OF MODERN FICTION

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Preface

The problems under discussion refer to the following topic: the phenomenological way of thinking in various fields of human activity. The phenomenological conception of quantum theory, resulting from the analogy between Husserl's phenomenology and Bohr's interpretation of quantum theory is used as a basic conception here. We certainly realize that the hypotheses and results of our investigation go beyond Bohr's interpretation, but at the same time, they are a logical extension of Bohr's position to the field of existential phenomenology. By extending Bohr's interpretation through the complementarity principle, we link "orthodox" quantum theory with the stream of consciousness and polyphony in contemporary fiction. The basis of such an analogy is the fact that both fields (that of the atomic world and that of artistic reality) are committed to the same phenomenological method of object construction.

By treating the following assertions on the basis of existential phenomenology we try to reveal how consciousness, as a stream of existence, acts in both the physical and artistic realms. All this reflects modern scientific thinking and the art of fiction; it highlights an important feature of contemporary thinking - the appearance of polyphonic forms in the existential unity of human consciousness.

I. EXPANSION OF BOHR'S INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY

We expand Bohr's principle of complementarity and assert that it expresses not only a new situation in quantum physics, but the essence of contemporary thinking in science. For us the prime feature of this way of thinking is its rejection of a common basis of cognition, which is responsible for the grounding of consciousness in terms of the truth.

Thus, "complementary" acquires a meaning in a new context, that of the independent and self-existent layers of consciousness, which are mutually exclusive and imply non-existence beyond themselves. According to the principle of complementarity, we have in spite of the denial of the common world, a meaning of existence which comprehends the

mutually exclusive parts of the mind. Therefore, it is advisable to regard them as mutually complementary. We do not mean the existence of things surrounding us. Complementarity is a regular principle of subjective being, which is a process of the acquisition of meaning. This process creates existential meaning in the perspective of infinity.

By asserting that complementarity introduces the meaning of subjective being into the quantum realm, we also confirm the integrity of atomic experimentation, i.e., the observed interaction between micro particles and measurement instruments which are indivisible and cannot be subject to control, does not reflect the interaction between the classical and quantum object, but between the subject and object, or strictly speaking, between subjective and objective being. Otherwise, the uncontrolled character of the interaction would be impossible to explain. Only the assumption of subject-object interaction explains this. The subject can control this interaction, as it can objectify itself, but this act of objectification can not exhaust it. There is always a certain extant subjectivity which ensures objectification. In the classical approach, this subjective component is outside the picture of physical reality, but in a quantum realm this is an integral component of atomic action and the picture-of reality. Therefore, the interaction between particles and instruments has an uncontrolled nature.

Thus, we receive an important result: In contrast to classical physics, subjective existence is an integral part of quantum reality (we mean the picture of reality, but the denial of the basic world beyond quantum descriptions opens the possibility of identifying the picture of reality with the reality itself, by stating, that the act of description as an ontological act, reveals, and hence, creates the different aspects of quantum reality). But according to our suggestion, subjective being is an ontological act of the acquisition of meaning and no more than that. Therefore, the measurement and classical language applied to atomic events, by means of which the theory gains physical meaning, are not the components of knowledge (as it was in the case of classical physics), but the components of physical reality itself.

Bohr realized these difficulties. He understood that despite the non-existence of an individual subject in the quantum realm, atomic measurement involves more than the mere action between classical and quantum objects, for that alone cannot explain its integrity. Bohr assumed a new form of existence in the atomic world, one beyond that of physical being and its necessity in classical terms, one of inequity, of indeterminacy, and the principle of complementarity. We call that existence subjective being - the being of consciousness.

Another feature of subjective being is an aspiration for independence and self-existing status. In our opinion, this is expressed through the indeterminate and individual conduct of atomic particles (they are undetermined in so far as they are found by subjective existence). Therefore, quantum probability, in contrast to classical quantity, is a peculiar reality due to its irreducible nature.

Quantum probability is bound by the inequity of indeterminacy. Therefore, statistically it excludes any probable error, exactly maintaining its internal (determined by Schrödinger's equality) probable meanings. This peculiarity of quantum probability contradicts the general

classical concept of probability. Therefore, for that reason, basing themselves on quantum probability and using the theory, physicists could successfully solve physical problems and consider the quantum dualism and indeterminacy as non-physical, metaphysical problems. But their approach was not justified. The wave-particle dualism is, first of all, a physical problem; but the examination of wave and particles as mutually exclusive aspects is a classical abstraction which is far from atomic reality. A mutually exclusive relationship means that a particle is measured absolutely precisely, is located at a certain point while a wave spreads infinitely and the information on its location cannot be made available. But such a state of affairs cannot exist in quantum reality because the precision of measurement is limited to the integrity of h . In quantum reality the wave and the particle do not in fact exclude each other, but they can coexist, unless their exact values are lost. In short, instead of precise wave-particle parameters we have probability quantities.

Quantum probability (i.e., statistical exclusion of probable error) found a statistical theory contrary to the classical theory with its complete and full predictability; the non-exclusive actual correspondence and simultaneous preservation of wave-particle dualism requires fuller and deeper explanation.

Our explanatory model is the following: the wave-corpuseular atomic dualism echoes the total dualism of existence; the dualism between spirit and matter, physical being and spiritual reality, subjective and objective being. The great miracle of life and existence is the fact that in spite of the mutually exclusive dualism between matter and spirit and the non-existence of a logical bridge between them. Our consciousness as a living entity is permanently transformed from spirit into matter and vice versa. Simultaneously life keeps together the exclusive aspects of existence, even though this is logically impossible. How can it happen? This question has no answer. Since life is miraculous, we should not search for a solution but accept the dualism containing integrated reality, instead. Existence is an indivisible result of the interaction of mutually exclusive sides - subjective and objective being, which is obviously revealed in the atomic field. Microphysical reality is an integral result of the interaction between subjective and objective being, and wave-particle dualism is an unsolved phenomenon just like the miraculous exclusive integrity between matter and spirit. By eliminating dualism we destroy life in the atomic world. The principle of complementarity, on the contrary, helps us to maintain the dualism and liken it to the real wave-particle wholeness, just as living consciousness keeps the physical and mental aspects of existence together despite the dualism.

The fact that wave-particle dualism and irreducible quantum probability cannot prevent physicists from successfully solving various physical problems shows that there are some interconnecting wave-corpuseular sides of the atomic world maintaining the dualism simultaneously. Therefore, we can use the principle of complementarity with regard to the above dualism, and state that wave-particle dualism is an individual case of dualism between matter and spirit.

II. PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF QUANTUM THEORY

The interpretation of quantum reality as displaying the result of subject-object interaction creates an opportunity to connect quantum theory with Edmund Husserl's phenomenological concepts, Husserl aspired to discover the basis of existence. He thought that the way of traditional philosophy was wrong, for it used the concept of causality. Causality implies an infinite chain of reasons and results and is thus useless as a foundation. Another way of defining existence is to search its meaning. Phenomenology investigates the factors creating the meaning of existence. These factors exist in an ontological depth of intelligence. Thus, Husserl emphasized that consciousness forms reality.

Husserl criticized the natural position of science, which unreservedly assumed the existence of reality. He remarked that abstention from the assertion of existence is a way of revealing its meaning. Such an abstention is not the same as a doubt about or denial of the existence of reality, for these imply an understanding of the meaning of existence. The goal of this phenomenological abstention is to throw light on this meaning only. Therefore, the phenomenological method puts the assertion of reality in brackets, retaining it conditionally.

All this means that Husserl requires that we break the chain linking consciousness and external world, for being as an absolute, self-existing essence exists not outside of consciousness, but in the depth of its ontological level. Thus, in searching for the absolute source, Husserl turned his mind away from its relationship to the external world and toward the absolute clarity of consciousness. Such a difficult task requires a definite method, the method of so-called "phenomenological reduction". According to this method, the first step in the purification of consciousness from alien elements is the removal of any orientation toward the external things. Thus, consciousness gets rid of the actual world and the content of consciousness acquires a conditional nature, unrelated to reality, it lying beyond the issue of objective substantiation. This is called "putting consciousness in brackets", it is remarkable that the non-existence of the relationship between consciousness and existence is a way of revealing the meaning of existence and of presenting consciousness as the constructor, of reality.

The situation is the same with quantum theory. Because of the integrity of actions, there is a prohibition against representing the atomic object beyond the classical conditions of its measurement and cognition. These conditions do not apply to the subject as an individual. Nevertheless, they are not a mere system of objects, surrounding the atomic world. They acquire the meaning of cognitive conditions. The latter play the part of consciousness which attaches physical meaning to a quantum object and thus forms the atomic reality. Husserl turns his attention to pure consciousness by substantiating being through the existence of consciousness. Perceiving classical instruments as conditions for quantum cognition, Bohr substantiated atomic being by using these conditions, i.e., through subjective existence. Bohr brings classical terms into the quantum realm and at the same time limits their use in describing the inequity of uncertainty. In short, his non-classical

description is composed of classical elements. This means that he breaks the link between classical terms and classical reality, putting the classical picture in brackets.

Let us compare this manner of substantiation with the first step of phenomenological reduction. According to Husserl, while putting in brackets the actual givenness of being, we then consider it as the content of consciousness and raise the issue of the conditions of their emergence. This means that we consider it not as the only reliable picture of the world, but as one out of many probable pictures, which appear in various conditions. Thus, each reflection of being is surrounded by various pictures, the possible reflection of the same object in other cognitive conditions. Husserl denotes this as “unrevealing the horizon of possibilities”. Here, he implies that possibilities are not an outcome of the actual picture, but precede it instead. Therefore, “The science of pure possibilities precedes the science of reality and makes the latter possible as a science” (1). Here we observe the resemblance to a quantum situation: the classical experimental picture of the atom is the empirical givenness of quantum reality, Quantum theory, as a microstate theory, is a theory of possibilities, but not of the reality. The theory is not a result of generalization made on the basis of atomic experiments conducted in the terms of the classical language. Therefore, the latter, in particular the continuity of classical terms, contradicts quantum theory.

Quantum theory, the theory of quantum possibilities, precedes the classical description of quantum reality and substantiates it, but there is no agreement between them; the formalism of quantum theory and the classical picture of atomic reality are mutually exclusive and are complementary ways of describing the atomic world. Hence, as is the case with phenomenology, Bohr considers the actual quantum picture to be a probable picture, one which is surrounded by the pure quantum possibilities that arise in different experimental conditions. This is reflected in the following inequity of uncertainty:

$$dpdx > h$$

Opening the horizon of possibilities, Husserl intends to reveal some stable and constant value which is maintained through all these changes. He considers every actual state of mind as probable, putting it in brackets. Passing from one kind of possibility to another, he gradually pulls free from the actual givenness and tackles the pure form of it, which is nothing more than the experience of the pure self as a form of absolute being, for this subjective component is present in all cases. Thus, according to Husserl, the fundamental being that constructs the world is a subjective being, which is given through the experience of the pure self the invariant value in the various possible pictures of reality. To continue our analogy with quantum physics, it should be noted that while passing from one picture to another (in particular we have in mind the wave-particle pictures of the atomic world) everything changes, for, according to quantum theory, while there is no common ground beneath, there is an unchangeable point, maintaining itself through the mutually exclusive

states - the integrity of the quantum experiment based on the indivisible measurement process, i.e. on the interaction between a measurement tool and the quantum object. This interaction maintains its uncontrollable integrity through all quantum states. It is remarkable that tool-object integration is a result of quantum theory, the theory of pure quantum possibilities while it is also a result of applying Bohr's principle (Bohr insists on the classical description of measurement tools).

Consequently, we have on the one hand a classical picture of atomic measurement and, on the other hand, pure quantum possibilities expressed in terms of quantum theory. The actual atomic state somewhat agrees with probabilistic quantum theory, even though, because we use mutually exclusive languages, there is no functional dependence between them. This situation bears a strong resemblance to phenomenology, which implies that the classical picture of atomic experimentation is open to the horizon of quantum possibilities. Therefore, it is not surprising that we obtain an indivisible (instrument-object) system thanks to a phenomenological approach to the quantum realm. The integrity of quantum experimentation as an unchangeable point maintained through all quantum states is comparable with the phenomenological invariant of the pure self.

As shown above, the invariant is indeed the pure self - the subjective point that reveals itself through various states of mind. This self exists only as an orientation toward the object. This orientation means that pure self has an idea of the object and simultaneously some relationship with this idea. The self is readiness to fulfil the idea, hence it is more than an idea only; it can be considered as a possibility and motion towards the fulfilment of an idea. Such a definition agrees with the thesis that the source of being (the subjective point) is the act of attaching meaning.

Let us trace the link between the phenomenological self and the integrity of the instrument object interaction in the quantum area. Our analogy leads to a subjective understanding of this interaction. Otherwise, it would not correspond to the phenomenological self or would not play the part of the invariant in quantum states. The integrity of instrument-object systems reveals itself in the process of quantum measurement. Hence, it is a system which attaches to the quantum object a physical meaning. Thanks to its resemblance to the phenomenological self, we can consider this system as a subjective being, creating the meaning of quantum reality. But despite the resemblance, there is a difference there: Husserl distinguishes the pure self as an integral component of experience, whereas the quantum invariant is the external integrity of the instrument-object interaction.

Phenomenology makes it possible to bring into correspondence these inner and external aspects of cognition. When considering the pure self, a phenomenologist implies the existential basis of consciousness beyond its psychological level. Therefore, he first emphasizes the self as an experience of being and then as an experience of self. The self has a phenomenological value as an inner expression of absolute existence, for this component of cognition has a quality of being present always and everywhere.

Phenomenological analysis shows, that the sense of self-being is given through perception of the actual world. I perceive the world, and thanks to phenomenological analysis I realize that my self participates in the construction of the given world. Here we do not try to find out whether the self really creates the picture of the world or not; we only assert, that the creation of the meaning of existence is a way to reveal the self as a motion of being. When creating the meaning of something, I experience my own existence. Hence, existence expresses itself through the pure self, which constructs the meaning of the existence. The identity of self-consciousness and existence is possible, if consciousness presents itself as an act of attaching meaning. Thus, there is a constant entity - pure self - which is the act of attaching meaning. Totally comprising the subject's self, it presents itself as a dynamic form of self-existence, as an indivisible and incognizable act, for there is no subject beyond this, that differentiates or cognizes such an integral act.

The similarity with quantum physics is obvious here: although instrument-object integrity presents an external fact, it corresponds to my internal self - both are subjective beings. When creating a physical meaning for quantum particles, the instrument-object action plays the part of self-existence in relation to the atomic world. Just as in case of phenomenology, we also encounter an indivisible and incognizable act of attachment of meaning - expressed through the uncontrollable integrity of quantum measurement. Niels Bohr wrote that it was senseless to speak of the atomic object without referring to the act of measurement (the latter being an indispensable and existential component of the former). The above shows, that in the quantum realm the concept of physical value is replaced by a symbol for integral action; this action, jointly with quantum theory, acts as consciousness does by transforming the formal structure of the quantum state into the elements of physical reality.

We intend to extend our analogy from quantum phenomenology to the art of fiction. It clear to us that the quantum situation is comparable to Joyce's stream of consciousness technique, for the writer using it shows the miraculous unity of formal and objective-realistic layers of consciousness. Therefore, Robert Humphrey remarks: "I should like at least to suggest one important achievement of Joyce's in 'Ulysses' which is central to his whole purpose and which is greatly dependent on stream of consciousness techniques. This is the marvellous degree of objectivity which he achieves. Joyce, more than any other novelist, gains what Joseph Warren Beach terms 'dramatic immediacy'". (2) We see that Joyce achieves objectivity through the stream of consciousness technique which has a formal nature. In a similar way Niels Bohr arrives at the objectivity of quantum particles (gives them physical meaning) through the integrity of quantum measurement, which acts as consciousness and stems from formal quantum theory. Later we will come back to this similarity between quantum theory and fiction, but before that we would like to define the principles of quantum phenomenology once again:

- I a. Criticizing the natural outlook of science (i.e., the unreserved assumption of the world's existence), Husserl brings up the issue of the limits and conditions of correspondence between scientific description and the world.
- I b. Considering the quantum theory, the inequity of uncertainty prompts, Bohr bring up the issue of the limits and conditions of the correspondence between our picture of physical reality and the atomic world.
- 2 a. Husserl considers the picture of the world to be a phenomenon of consciousness without any relation to objective reality, i.e., to use phenomenological language, he puts the picture in brackets,
- 2 b. Bohr considers the wave-particle pictures of the atomic world as phenomena in themselves for he implies the existence of a non-objective reality beyond them. Thus, he puts the wave-particle picture in brackets.
- 3a. According to Husserl, every actual picture of the world, as a phenomenon of consciousness, is surrounded by various pictures which are possible in other cognitive conditions. This means that the phenomenon is opened to a horizon of possibilities.
- 3 b. According to Bohr, the actual picture of the atomic world is surrounded by possible pictures, which arise in other conditions of measurement. Quantum theory anticipates these possible states. The latter create a horizon of possibilities, preceding the actual quantum picture.
- 4 a. Passing from one phenomenon to another, through conjuring various possibilities, Husserl gradually frees himself from the phenomenon's content and reaches a stable and invariant component - the pure self as the ground for the construction of the picture of the world.
- 4 b. In passing from wave to particle pictures, through mutually exclusive atomic states, we distinguish a stable and invariant component - the integrity of the instrument-object interaction as a ground for the construction of the atomic world picture.
- 5 a. We assert that the pure self, in its existential dimension, is the act of the attachment of meaning. The latter is an indivisible and undifferentiated act, since it exists as a subject-object whole and there is no subject beyond it serving as a basis determining the act. Thus, the pure self, as mind orientation to an object, exists as the undifferentiated act of the attachment of meaning.
- 5 b. We assert that quantum measurement is the act of attaching physical meaning to quantum particles. This is an uncontrollable and undifferentiated act for it presents a subject-object whole and there is no subject beyond it serving as a basis determining the act. Consequently, the indeterminism and uncertainty in the quantum realm have the nature of a principle.

As we see, the methodological structure of "orthodox" quantum theory resembles the phenomenological method used by Husserl. Moreover, we think that Bohr unconsciously

used the phenomenological method when framing quantum theory. Used in various fields of human activity, phenomenology provides a strong basis for contemporary thinking and shows that consciousness, as a motion of existence (as the act of the attachment of meaning), is the factor giving form to objective reality.

III. QUANTUM PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE POLYPHONY OF FICTION

Edmund Husserl's phenomenology has greatly influenced different spheres of contemporary thought. This new viewpoint establishes a polyphonic style of thinking in philosophy, science and art. Our objective is to investigate this way of thinking, particularly as displayed in literary works. However, besides applying the phenomenological method, it is advisable to use several components of Bohr's conception of quantum theory, for, despite the crucial difference, the same effects of phenomenological approach have occurred in both above-mentioned spheres.

Thus, the aim of our investigation is to use the phenomenological approach and Bohr's quantum theory to explain the polyphonic style of literary works. Besides Joyce and Proust, we will consider Dostoevsky's novels and intend to research William Faulkner's works. It was these great writers, in our opinion, who developed the polyphonic prose in modern literature.

We assert that the occurrence of a parallel between Bohr's quantum theory and the "polyphonic style" in literature was not coincidental, for this parallel had a philosophical ground: i.e., in both fields the same phenomenological approach was used - one just deals with the construction of the object of science and the other with the creation of an artistic form.

The phenomenological approach shows that reflection on the premise of the mind anticipates reflection on the objects and events of the cognizable world. The premise of the mind includes the possibility of knowledge, i.e., the possibility of there being correspondence between external things and the nature of thinking. Accordingly, a physical object is to be considered in a whole with the conditions of its cognition, which determines the possibility of such a correspondence. Therefore, a physical object apprehended in this whole is unique, since it is determined by irreversibly changing consciousness.

Bohr's understanding of quantum theory meets this phenomenological requirement. The famous scholar emphasized the indivisible coexistence of subject and object when speaking about the impossibility of considering an atomic object apart from its measurement conditions. Consequently, and very differently from how matters are grasped in classical physics, we observe the subject's penetration into the quantum realm. Therefore, the description of the atomic world disintegrates into two independent (wave-particle) parts and instead of a single, integrated form we obtain polyphonic pictures of physical events.

When moving from one to the other picture, subjective conditions irreversibly change with no common integrating ground standing beneath; the subject takes part in the construction of the quantum object not as a transparent, immaterial mirror, reflecting the atomic world, but as a special form of existence, one which gives quantum particles physical meaning. The subject's consciousness is regarded as a vital essence but not as an absolute, all-powerful mind, the determining basis of classical physics.

Now, let us trace the link between the construction of a picture of physical forms and forms of fiction. When the scientific subject is substituted by the author of fiction, two different forms of the subject-object relation arise. A literary work implies an author who is an omnipotent subject, that is one who controls and fully determines his work, solving every conflict within it. Here the author acts as a narrator who knows everything about the story and tells the facts as if they have happened in reality. Therefore, such an impartial author is beyond the story and his work acquires the objective form, a reflection of actual events. We denote such literary works as "single base forms".

This subject-object relation reminds us of the picture of classical physics, where physical objects and interactions are depicted as objective forms of being, as if they were independent from the subjective conditions determining the physical objects. These conditions are considered to be beyond the physical picture.

Unlike classical physics, the quantum theory picture of the reality is constructed according to the phenomenological method. That is why the mind participates as a subjective existence here and instead of a physical object we have the concept of a quantum phenomenon, which is an indivisible result of subject-object interaction.

If a writer is in a position to apply the phenomenological method to fiction, a situation similar to that found in the quantum realm occurs. The phenomenological approach considers a literary work as a phenomenon, which implies in itself the process of its creation. This work involves the author's stream of consciousness. The author, neither personally, nor objectively, but as a subjective process of creation penetrates into the story and the work loses its strictly objective form. The author does not intend to present facts in such a way, as if they had really taken place. All this results in an impression that actually the stream of the author's consciousness runs through his creation, causing the erasure of the borders between the characters and the author.

Thus, on entering his creation, the author destroys its objective form and the work acquires the conditional nature of invention. Strictly speaking, the story unfolds itself in an undetermined area lying between the forms of reality and invention, for no act of objectification takes place with regard to the external world, or in the inner world of the author. On the whole, the subject's penetration implies the loss of the certainty and clarity of the objective content of a fiction. Absurdity and uncertainty become features of artistic reality just as is the case with quantum reality. Absurdity reflects not a chaotic state of external world, but the uncertainty of our consciousness. Thus, the subject's penetration disintegrates the single-

base form of fiction, the mutually independent parts of which organize a polyphonic structure of creation, wherein the author's single consistent position is never revealed. The creator neglects the verisimilitude of the story or, to use phenomenological language, place its objectivity in brackets, and the literary work, instead of reflecting the "real facts", shows itself to be a phenomenon of consciousness in its existential dimension.

Before considering individual writers, we would like to explain once more how we understand the author's penetration into his novel.

As for prose, a phenomenologist should raise here the issue of correspondence between reality and invention. When bringing up the correspondence issue, he is, at the same time, posing the question of the limits of such a relationship and assuming the possibility of non-correspondence between art and reality beyond those limits.

Finally, the phenomenologist evaluates creative work as being independent of the external world.

But such an evaluation is somewhat dangerous. The thing is that while freeing itself from the external reality, the work of fiction may find itself in the field of the author's psycho-emotional gravity. The existence of the creative work as an independent phenomenon means its "non-inclination" to either external objects or the author's subjective world. Therefore, the writer has created an area of uncertainty and lack of clarity within his story to maintain the independent position of his work midway between the external world and the psychological subject. This effort means subject-object phenomenological integrity, for due to the uncertainty, there is no distinct border between the subject and the object, between the author and the object of his imagination. This is what an author's subtle penetration into the fiction involves.

Now, to illustrate our way of conceiving matters, we will consider Dostoevsky's novels (*Demons*, first of all). The writer creates an impression that he knows no more about his story than the characters do. The author's voice is one voice among others. In denying omnipotence to the author and absorbing him as one of its voices, the work seems to be "hanging in the air". Therefore, the dispute among the voices is endless; it may be interrupted, but not completed, for there is no common position by which to resolve the conflicts. This fact shapes the polyphonic structure of novels, and due to that fact a literary work acquires the nature of an independent artistic phenomenon.

The same effect of author's penetration can be found in Joyce's prose. Therefore, there is no distinct border between the characters of *Ulysses*. One character sometimes speaks as another, the voice of whom intermingles with the voices of the others and so on. ... We think, then, that it is a phenomenological approach that was used by Joyce.

The stream of the author's consciousness seems to penetrate his work. Because of this penetration the writer manages to move in a subtle way from one to another character, and by doing so, he gives to his work the conditional nature of invention.

The subject's penetration into the story was a main principle followed by Marcel Proust. The author for him is a sequence of mutually independent selves. Therefore, the

past is unreachable for the memory, for it (i.e., the past) existed with a unique, irreversible self, which is lost forever. Because of this loss of self we cannot reproduce past events. We are only able to give the meaning of the past to our present condition. Thus, the writer does not imply a common ground of consciousness beyond the novel, which determines the mutually independent and irreducible nature of the selves involved, that of the author and those of the characters.

Further development of this hypothesis calls for intensive research into William Faulkner's works, as the polyphonic style seems to be the main principle of his creative activity. We focus on the following question: how is the polyphonic style connected-with the stream-of-consciousness in Faulkner's novels (*As I Lay Dying* and *The Sound and the Fury*). Our analysis shows that both the polyphonic style and stream-of-consciousness are based on the same ground, i.e., the non-existence of any absolute, omnipotent author and the author's penetration into the novel. As a result, the writer creates a work which seems to move and develop spontaneously and independently from the author. Despite the difference between Joyce and Faulkner (the first used stream-of-consciousness as a formal structure, whereas the latter strove for and achieved the effect of verisimilitude of consciousness). Faulkner, like Joyce, considered stream-of-consciousness to be a primary and independent phenomenon of being in itself. Our own thinking is that instead of holding the determining role of external reality, Faulkner assumed the existence of a correlation between the world and consciousness. Such 'an understanding implies a dualism that eventually results in polyphony, since consciousness and the external world are represented as mutually independent parts of being.

Had stream of consciousness been based on the external world, no polyphony would have existed.

Only the assumption of the independence of the stream-of-consciousness from the external world makes it possible to explain the polyphonic style of Faulkner's prose. Stream-of-consciousness acquires the features of external being, since the writer aspires to comprehend consciousness not on the level of reflection, but through its ontological ground, as a stream of being. Faulkner's stream-of-consciousness is a stream of being in itself, which implies a correlation between consciousness and the external world.

Finally let us establish an analogy between "orthodox" quantum theory and the polyphony of modern fiction.

- I a. The picture of the world of classical physics appeals to the external position of the omniscient subject; classical concepts are determined at the level of absolute knowledge. Therefore, as there is a common ground of determination, classical physics espouses a type of monologue, a completely determined picture. This picture excludes the subject and has an objective form of description - as if events were independent from the subject.

- I b. The single-based form of fiction appeals to the external position of the omniscient author. The author creates a common ground of determination and thus resolves every conflict within the story. Artistic reality assumes an objective form of expression, then as if artistic events were independent of the author and took place objectively. Here the author acts as a narrator who retells the story as if it happened in reality.
- 2 a. The picture of the world of quantum physics destroys the external position of the omniscient subject. The subject, as a special form of existence penetrates into the picture of quantum reality and destroys the object-single basis for the expression of physical events. Introducing polyphonic forms (wave-particle dualism), the subject creates an area of uncertainty, the area of the indivisible subject-object whole, where no distinct border between subject and object appears.
- 2 b. The polyphony of modern fiction destroys the external position of the omniscient author. The author as a special form of existence, as a stream of consciousness penetrates into the story and the latter loses its objective way of expressing artistic events. To maintain the middle position between the external world and the author's psychological sphere, the author creates an area of uncertainty within the story, where no distinct border between hero and author exists.

Thus, the analogy between quantum theory and polyphony in fiction is not coincidental, for it has a philosophical ground – both endeavours use the same phenomenological method. One deals with the construction of the objects of science and the other with the creation of artistic form.

As we see, in modern science as well as in modern literature there exist similar forms of polyphonic thinking, which reject the omniscient subject as a common ground of determination and are based on the phenomenological principle of subject-object integration.

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

კვანტური ფიზიკის ფენომენოლოგიური კონცეფცია და თანამედროვე პროზის პოლიფონიურობა

მამუკა დოლიძე

საქართველოს საელე წერეთლის ფილოსოფიის ინსტიტუტი

ბაზართომბული რეზიუმე

ავტორის აზრით, კვანტური თეორიის ფენომენოლოგიური ინტერპრეტაცია მიკროსამყაროში სუბიექტის შეყვანას გულისხმობს. ეს, რა თქმა უნდა, სულაც არ ნიშნავს, რომ დამკვირვებელი სუბიექტი ქმნის მიკროსამყაროს რეალობას. ფიზიკური რეალობა არსებობს თავისთავად, მიუხედავად იმისა, აკვირდება მას ადამიანი თუ არა და მაინც, დაკვირვების, ანუ გაზომვის სიტუაცია ატომურ სამყაროში პრინციპულად განსხვავდება კლასიკურ-ფიზიკური შემეცნების სიტუაციისგან. იგი არ დაიყვანება მხოლოდ ფიზიკურ ურთიერთქმედებაზე გამზომ ხელსაწყოსა და ატომურ ობიექტს შორის. ატომური სიტუაციის “უცნაურობა” ავტორის აზრით იმაში მდგომარეობს, რომ აღნიშნული სიტუაცია ერთგვარად “სუბიექტივირებულია”. გამზომი ხელსაწყო აქ არ წარმოადგენს ჩვეულებრივ ფიზიკურ სისტემას, იგი თამაშობს სუბიექტის ცნობიერების როლს ატომური ობიექტის მიმართ, უფრო სწორედ წარმოადგენს სუბიექტის ექსტრაპოლაციას ადამიანის გარეთ, ფიზიკურ რეალობაში. ასეთი რამ სავსებით დასაშვებია, ფიქრობს ავტორი, რადგან არათუ ადამიანის ცნობიერებაში, მთელ ობიექტურ სინამდვილეში მიმდინარეობს იდეათა რეალიზაციისა და საზრისების წარმოშობა – ცვალებადობის “სუბიექტური” პროცესი, რის გამოც ფიზიკური მოვლენები არ დაიყვანება ცალსახა მიზეზ-შედეგობრივ კავშირებზე, არამედ გვაქვს მათი გარკვეული თავისუფლება, რაც მიკროსამყაროში, ატომური პროცესების ინდეტერმინიზმსა და ალბათურ ხასიათში გამოიხატება.

ნილს ბორი გვეუბნება, რომ აზრი არა აქვს ვილაპარაკოთ ატომური ობიექტის არსებობაზე გამზომ ხელსაწყოსთან მიმართების გარეშე, რაც ნიშნავს, რომ მიკრო-ობიექტი განუყოფლად არის შერწყმული მისი შემეცნებისა და გაზომვის სიტუაციასთან. ეს მოსაზრება სუბიექტ-ობიექტის ერთიანობას გამოხატავს მიკროსამყაროში. ავტორის მსჯელობა ცხადყოფს, რომ ბორის აღნიშნული პრინციპიდან გამომდინარეობს კვანტური

მექანიკის ინდეტერმინისტული ინტერპრეტაცია, ფიზიკურ სიდიდეთა განუზღვრელობა, ალბათობა და კორპუსკულარულ-ტალღურ დუალიზმი, ანუ მიკროსამყაროს სურათის გახლეჩვა ტალღურ და კორპუსკულარულ წარმოდგენებად.

1927 წელს, კოპენჰაგენში, აინშტაინისა და ბორის ცნობილი დისკუსია ფაქტობრივად იყო ბრძოლა კვანტური მექანიკის დეტერმინისტულ და ინდეტერმინისტულ ინტერპრეტაციებს შორის. ავტორის, აზრით ამ ბრძოლაში გამარჯვებული არ გამოვლენილა. ორივე ინტერპრეტაცია თანაბრად მისაღებია კვანტური მექანიკის მიმართ. თუკი გავითვალისწინებთ წარმოდგენილი კვლევის პერსპექტივას თანამედროვე ფენომენოლოგიის შუქზე, შეიძლება ითქვას, რომ ბორის პრინციპი კვანტური ობიექტისა და ხელსაწყოს ერთიანობის შესახებ აუცილებელია, მაგრამ საკმარისი არ არის მიკროსიტუაციის სრული დახასიათებისთვის. მას უნდა დაემატოს, ავტორის აზრით, სიცოცხლის ფენომენოლოგიის იდეა, მატერიის თვითინტერპრეტაციის უნარის შესახებ:

სუბიექტური ყოფიერების შეჭრა ობიექტურ რეალობაში იმას ნიშნავს, რომ მატერიას (ფიზიკურ რეალობას) გააჩნია უნარი თავისთავად, ადამიანის ჩარევის გარეშე მოახდინოს საკუთარი შემეცნებითი სიტუაციის ინტერპრეტაცია. ამიტომ, კონკრეტულ კვანტურ სიტუაციაში ობიექტურად გვეძლევა არა მხოლოდ სუბიექტ-ხელსაწყოს სისტემა, არამედ ის გზაც, რა გზითაც ეს სიტუაცია თავის თავს გვიჩვენებს დეტერმინისტული ან ინდეტერმინისტული ინტერპრეტაციის სახით. მართალი იყო აინშტაინიც და ბორიც, რადგან მატერიის აღნიშნული თვითინტერპრეტაცია ყოველთვის ახდენს კონკრეტულ არჩევანს და გამორიცხავს ერთი, საერთო ჭეშმარიტების მოცემულობას კვანტური დეტერმინიზმის არსებობის ან არარსებობის შესახებ.

ნაშრომის მეორე თავი ეძღვნება ურთიერთობის გარკვევას “ორთოდოქსალურ” კვანტურ თეორიასა და ედმუნდ ჰუსერლის ფენომენოლოგიურ ფილოსოფიას შორის. სიძნელე აქ იმაში მდგომარეობს, რომ კვანტური თეორია შეეხება მიკროსამყაროს, რომელიც ცნობიერების გარეშე, ობიექტურად არსებობს, ჰუსერლის ინტერესის საგანს კი შეადგენს სუბიექტის ცნობიერება, როგორც ცოდნის კონსტრუქციის შინაგანი წყარო. ავტორის აზრით, ეს სიძნელე, კვლევის განსხვავებულ საგანთა გამო მოჩვენებითია. ისევე, როგორც ჰუსერლის ინტენციონალური ცნობიერება არის ღია ობიექტური სამყაროს მიმართ, კვანტურ-ფიზიკური სიტუაციის ობიექტურობაც არის გახსნილი სუბიექტური ყოფიერების წინაშე. ეს ორმხრივი ღიაობა საშუალებას გვაძლევს დავსახოთ კვანტური ფიზიკისა და ფენომენოლოგიური ფილოსოფიის ერთმანეთთან შეხვედრის სასაზღვრო სფერო, სადაც სუბიექტის და ობიექტის ერთიანობა თავისუფლებისა და ინდეტერმინიზმის სამყაროს შექმნის.

ავტორი გვიჩვენებს, რომ განუზღვრელობის ინტერვალში, ალბათურ მიკრომოვლენათა თამაშის სცენა ტრიალებს ერთადერთი ინვარიანტის გარშემო; ეს არის კვანტურ-

მექანიკური ექსპერიმენტის მთლიანობა, ანუ ხელსაწყოთა და მიკროობიექტის ერთიანობა, რაც შეიძლება შევადაროთ არსობრივ ინვარიანტს ფენომენოლოგიური რედუქციის სფეროში, ჰუსერლის ინტენციონალურ ცნობიერებას.

ისევე, როგორც ინტენციონალური ცნობიერება მიზანდასახულია გარე ობიექტის მიმართ და მისი არსებობის ობიექტური საზრისის გაუქმებით (ბრჭყალებში ჩასმით) დაადგენს თავის თავს, როგორც ამ საზრისის ქმნადობის სუბიექტურ პროცესს, კვანტური გაზომვის პროცესიც, ფიზიკური რედუქციის გზითა და ბორის პრინციპის მიხედვით, აუქმებს ხელსაწყოთა დამოუკიდებელი მიკროობიექტის არსებობას, რათა გადმოიტანოს ეს არსებობა იმ სუბიექტური ყოფიერების წიაღში, სადაც გვაქვს სუბიექტ-ობიექტის დინამიკური ერთიანობა, კვანტური ექსპერიმენტის მთლიანობის სახით.

ამიტომ, თუკი ინტენციონალური ცნობიერება, ფენომენოლოგიური რედუქციის გზით, ისევე დაადგენს ობიექტის არსებობის საზრისს, კვანტური გაზომვაც, ფიზიკური რედუქციის გზით, ქმნის ატომური ობიექტის ფიზიკურ აზრს.

ყოველივე ეს კიდევ ერთხელ ადასტურებს ავტორის მოსაზრებას, რომ კვანტური სიტუაცია ონტოლოგიურად “სუბიექტივირებულია” და რომ გამზომი ხელსაწყო ამ სიტუაციაში თამაშობს ინტენციონალური ცნობიერების როლს მიკრომოდულენტათა მიმართ.

კვანტური ფიზიკის ფენომენოლოგიური ინტერპრეტაცია ავტორს საშუალებას აძლევს გააფართოვოს თავისი თვალსაზრისი და დაადგინოს ერთგვარი ანალოგია კვანტურ-მექანიკურ შემეცნებასა და თანამედროვე პოლიფონიურ პროზას შორის, რომლის არსებით სახეობას “ცნობიერების ნაკადის” ლიტერატურა შეადგენს. ასეთი ანალოგია არ არის შემთხვევითი, გვეუბნება ავტორი, რადგან ერთი და იგივე ფენომენოლოგიური მეთოდი ინტუიციურად გამოიყენება როგორც კვანტურ ფიზიკაში, ატომური ობიექტის მოდელირების მიზნით, ასევე თანამედროვე პროზაში, მხატვრულ სახეთა შემოქმედების დროს.

ანალოგია კიდევ უფრო გამჭვირვალე ხდება კლასიკური და კვანტური ფიზიკის დაპირისპირების ფონზე:

კლასიკურ ფიზიკაში სიდიდეები, კანონები და პრინციპები დადგენილია ობიექტური ცოდნის უზოგადესი და აბსტრაქტული სისტემის მიმართ, რომელიც აბსოლუტური სუბიექტის იდეით საზრდობს. მთელი კლასიკურ-ფიზიკური სამყარო შემეცნების ობიექტად არის ქცეული ძველი რაციონალიზმის ამ აბსოლუტური კერპის წინაშე. ამიტომ, ცოდნა ფიზიკური რეალობის შესახებ მთლიანად ობიექტივირებული და ჩაკეტილია მატერიალური სინამდვილის ფარგლებში. ცდის მონაცემები, სათანადო სიდიდეები და კანონები პრეტენზიას აცხადებენ ასახონ ცდისგან დამოუკიდებელი ობიექტები და თავისთავად მიმდინარე პროცესები.

კლასიკურ რაციონალიზმთან თანაზიარ ლიტერატურაშიც, მხატვრული რეალობა ობიექტივირებული და ფსიქოლოგიური რეალიზმის ფარგლებშია ჩაკეტილი. შემოქმედი

გარეშე მომენტია საკუთარი ქმნილების მიმართ. მას აბსოლუტური და ყოვლისშემძლე სუბიექტის გვირგვინი აშშვენებს, რაც იმას ნიშნავს, რომ ავტორი მთლიანად აკონტროლებს თავის ნაწარმოებს და ქმნის გმირის მორალური შეფასებისა და სიუჟეტის წარმართვის ერთიან პოზიციას, რათა თავის ნებაზე განავითაროს ყოველი სახე და მოაგვაროს ნებისმიერი კონფლიქტი თხრობის დრამატურგიაში. მხატვრული ობიექტივაციის შედეგად, ნაწარმოები სინამდვილეზე ორიენტირებული, რაციონალური და ერთიანი სისტემის ფორმას იძენს, სახეები და გმირები ბაძავენ რეალურ პირებს, ხოლო ამბავი ისე ვითარდება, თითქოს ის ნამდვილად ხდებოდეს. ავტორი ამ შემთხვევაში უბრალოდ მოგვითხრობს ნამდვილად მომხდარი ისტორიის შესახებ.

აბსოლუტური სუბიექტისა და ყოვლისშემძლე ავტორის სწორედ ასეთ კერპს ამსხვრევს ფენომენოლოგია კვანტურ მექანიკაშიც და პოლიფონიურ პროზაშიც. აბსოლუტის ტახტიდან ჩამოგდებული სუბიექტი, მიკროსამყაროში შედის გაზომვის პროცესის სახით. იგი აღარ უბრუნდება რაციონალიზმის კლასიკურ ქიმერას, ამიტომ შეუძლებელია მისი განყენება და გატანა კვანტური რეალობის მიღმა, რათა სუბიექტმა გარედან, მთლიანობაში განჭვრიტოს ეს რეალობა და დაიკავოს ატომურ მოვლენათა განზოგადებისა და ცოდნის სისტემატიზაციის ერთიანი პოზიცია. განსხვავებით კლასიკური ფიზიკისგან, მიკროსამყაროში აღარა გვაქვს ფიზიკური რეალობის ობიექტური, ერთიანი და მკაცრად დეტერმინირებული სურათი, გვაქვს განუზღვრელობა, გვაქვს ალბათობა, გვაქვს ინდეტერმინიზმი, რის გამოც ფიზიკური აღწერა იხლიჩება მიკრომოვლენათა ურთიერთგამომრიცხავ, კორპუსკულარულ და ტალღურ წარმოდგენებად.

იგივე სიტუაციას ვაკვირდებით თანამედროვე პოლიფონიურ პროზაშიც. სუბიექტი-ავტორი ჩართულია თავის ნაწარმოებში ცნობიერების ნაკადის სახით. ავტორის ხმა იმდენად შერწყმულია პერსონაჟის ხმასთან, რომ შეუძლებელია ავტორის ხმის გამორჩევა, მისი შემოქმედებითი პროცესის დიფერენცირება და გატანა მხატვრული რეალობის მიღმა, რათა მწერალმა გარედან დაინახოს თავისი ნაწარმოები და დაიკავოს მხატვრულ სახეთა განვითარებისა და სიუჟეტის წარმართვის ერთიანი, ავტორისეული პოზიცია. სუბიექტის შეჭრა მხატვრულ რეალობაში იმას ნიშნავს, რომ ნაწარმოები არ წარმოადგენს მხოლოდ შემოქმედების შედეგს, იგი საკუთარი ქმნადობის სუბიექტურ პროცესსაც მოიცავს თავის თავში. ფენომენოლოგიური ინტუიციით შთაგონებული ქმნილება შერწყმულია იმ სულიერ აქტივობასთან, ცნობიერების იმ ინტენციასთან, საიდანაც ის აღმოცენდება, როგორც წარმოსახვის ნაყოფი. ფანტაზიის ამ წარმონაქმნის გენეზისში ხორციელდება ფენომენოლოგიური რედუქცია. ნაწარმოების შინაარსი თავსდება ბრჭყალებში. ამიერიდან გაუქმებულია მისი პრეტენზია ობიექტურ არსებობაზე, როგორც გარე სამყაროს მიბაძვის, ასევე გმირის შინაგანი, ფსიქოლოგიური რეალობის ჩვენების თვალსაზრისით. ამიტომ, შექმნილია განუზღვრელობის სივრცე, აბსურდის სიტუაცია, სადაც ნაწარმოები თავის

თავს აჩვენებს როგორც პირობითობას, როგორც თამაშს. განცდა ისეთია, თითქოს ბოლომდე ახდლია ნაწარმოების ფარდა და ცნობიერების სცენაზე ნაჩვენებია თამაშის ის ქვეცნობიერი, ფარული წესები, რომლებიც მის ლიტერატურულ პირობითობას ქმნიან.

ყოველივე ეს აშკარად მოგვაგონებს ფენომენოლოგიური სუბიექტის შეჭრას კვანტურ მექანიკაში, რაც იწვევს ფიზიკურ სიდიდეთა ალბათობას და განუზღვრელობას მიკრომოვლენათა თამაშის სცენაზე. მსგავსად კვანტური ფიზიკისა, აქაც ირღვევა მხატვრული რეალობის ობიექტური ფორმა, ჩნდება შემოქმედებითი თავისუფლება, ჩნდება ინდეტერმინიზმი, ჩნდება განუზღვრელობა და პერსონაჟთა მრავალხმიანი კამათი პოლიფონიურ ჟღერადობას იძენს.

საგულისხმოა, რომ თანამედროვე ლიტერატურის ანალოგია კვანტურ მექანიკასთან გარკვეულად ეხმიანება კვლევის ახალ შედეგებს სიტყვიერ ხელოვნებაშიც: კერძოდ, “ავტორის სიკვდილის” ფაქტსა და მხატვრული ტექსტის თვითმოძრაობის პრინციპს.

დასკვნის სახით შეიძლება ითქვას, რომ თანამედროვე მეცნიერებასა და ლიტერატურულ ხელოვნებაში, შემეცნების და შემოქმედების საგნები ემსგავსებიან ერთმანეთს. სუბიექტისა და ობიექტის ერთიანობის ძალით მათ ენიჭებათ თავისუფალი ნება. ამ ნებაყოფლობით მისწრაფებაში ისინი გადადიან მატერიალური სამყაროს საზღვრებს და ქმნიან ახალ, “არაკლასიკურ” რეალობას, რომელიც ყოველთვის ღიაა ცნობიერების წინაშე და როგორც ინტენციონალური ფენომენი, არც არსებობს თავის შემოქმედებით პროცესთან, თავის სუბიექტურ ყოფიერებასთან ერთიანობის გარეშე.

HUSSERL'S REDUCTIONS AS METHOD

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Abstract

The founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl was convinced that he worked out a method the creation of which completed Kant's task of making philosophy a rigorous science. This meant getting beyond metaphysics and reaching the realm of phenomenology. This realm can be reached by applying the eidetic reduction, the transcendental reduction and combining them into the phenomenological reduction. Dagfinn Føllesdal has presented an analytically clear description of the three reductions. However, as Husserl has not been consistent in addressing the order of reductions, we cannot be sure about his understanding of the method and subject-matter of phenomenology. The analysis of Wolfgang Huemer does not help us to resolve the issue, although the author claims to be presenting analytic clarity. It is still the more traditional approach of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that helps us to elaborate on Husserl's ideas concerning the phenomenological reduction. However, it still remains an open question, whether and to what extent we can speak about a method in phenomenology.

INTRODUCTION. THE NEED FOR THE METHOD

It is widely known that the term "phenomenology" has been in common use in philosophy since Hegel's monumental work, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (1807) (Wrathall, Dreyfus 2007:2). As a discernible movement, however, phenomenology starts from Edmund Husserl. "The Oxford Companion to Philosophy" (1995) calls phenomenology a powerful movement in philosophy and links it directly with the twentieth century. Moritz Geiger, Aleksander Pfaender, Max Scheler and Oscar Becker are mentioned as the followers of Husserl in the Oxford Companion (1995: 658). Today, it is just Scheler, whom we still often discuss of this group. Therefore, phenomenology definitely has a history and the movement today is quite different of what was witnessed in early twentieth century. "The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy" (1996), however, leaves just a marginal role to phenomenology, addressing it briefly only in the chapter dedicated to Modern European philosophy. The author of the chapter David E. Cooper uses the theme of anti-scientism for explaining the main thoughts of several continental thinkers, including

Husserl. Nevertheless, he gives a hint about there being a method present without any further explanation (Cooper 1996: 702).

Often, phenomenology has been compared to the other influential movement in philosophy in the twentieth century, namely analytic philosophy. The analytic tradition definitely has a method. Therefore, it is normal to look for a method in phenomenology as well. The method ought to be different of the analytic one, but still appropriate to qualify as a method. Quite often, phenomenology is really taken not just as a new philosophical view about old epistemological problems, but as a new method of doing philosophy, the phenomenological method. As we know, there are even talks about the science of phenomenology, which has not just its own method but subject-matter as well (The Oxford ... 1995: 659). Below, we shall take a look at the problem of the method from different angles, not paying special attention to the subject-matter.

Edmund Husserl's basic demand for philosophy was fulfilling the task of describing the structures of experience as they present themselves to our consciousness. It is generally accepted that Husserl began using the term 'phenomenology' in the 1890-s in his lectures "Phänomenologie: ein Abschnitt in Brentanos Metaphysik (Klärung von Grundbegriffen)". Husserl firmly believed that he had a method in phenomenology, which could be systematically applied. The essence of the method concerned the so-called "bracketing" of the objects outside of our consciousness itself. Doing so, it should be possible to proceed to reflect and systematically describe the contents of the conscious mind. According to Husserl this method "could ground our knowledge of the world to our lived experience, without in the process reducing the content of that knowledge to the contingent and subjective features of that experience" (Wrathall, Dreyfus 2007: 2). Husserl believed that this method enabled him to complete the task set by Immanuel Kant, namely establish philosophy as a rigorous science, because it could discover the structures common to all mental acts.

Intentionality, object-directedness, became the mark of the mental, the central issue of the approach. It is the idea of Franz Brentano, which Husserl eagerly borrowed. For Husserl, intentionality had a meaningful structure through which the mind can be directed toward objects under aspects. Therefore, Husserl recognized both features of intentionality addressed by contemporary philosophy of mind, object-directedness and aspectual shape. Temporality became another essential structural feature of the mental highly regarded by Husserl. Both could be most efficiently studied if there was a method at our disposal.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM

It is an ongoing debate in contemporary metaphilosophy, whether phenomenology and existentialism are two distinct branches of philosophy or they belong together. Here, we shall address this issue only very briefly, not willing to make it central. Both belong to the

so-called continental tradition in the twentieth century philosophy. However, this term is hardly appropriate any more as analytic philosophy is being extensively developed on the continent of Europe. At the same time, phenomenology and existentialism are important topics for many contemporary thinkers, who work outside the boundaries of the 'old world'.

Recently, the term "phenomenological paradigm" has sometimes been used as a supposedly more appropriate synonym to "continental philosophy". This could be accepted if existentialism and the works of the French postmodernists could be fully included into phenomenology. Such approach should probably raise some doubts. In the end, however, it is a matter of deciding the formal borders of phenomenology. As we are looking for a method here, this question cannot be central for us. In the end, it is at least their not belonging to the analytic tradition that unites the branches of philosophy, which were initially developed on the 'continent'.

HUSSERL'S REDUCTIONS

Getting to the heart of the matter, let us remember that Husserl really did believe in his method. Next, we shall take a closer look at what he was presenting as his method, attempting to be as analytically clear as possible. "Bracketing" is definitely not a clearly defined concept, but rather a metaphor. Therefore, Husserl elaborated his idea through the conception of reductions.

It is interesting to note that Husserl first used the word "reduction" in his first work, *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, in 1891. There, however, he meant reducing one mathematical representation to another, something very widespread in mathematical thought. Still, this fact may be of significance to our survey. It shows that Husserl probably took mathematics as the basic example of systematic and rigorous thinking and attempted to adhere to the same kind of rigor in his philosophy.

Reductions in the new sense were introduced by Husserl as part of his transcendental turn that took place around the year 1905. As we know, the main reductions he used were the eidetic, the transcendental and the phenomenological reduction.

There is no agreement between Husserl scholars about what the reductions really mean and how do they relate to each other. It is obvious, however, that the reductions are the basic methodological tools for Husserl. It is a pity that he failed to apply these tools in a systematic manner. However, if the reductions are meant to present a method or at least a framework of a method, it has to be possible to make sense of its essence. That's exactly what we intend to do next in the current analysis. In order to achieve analytic clarity, we are going to dwell on the approach of Dagfinn Føllesdal, one of the outstanding contemporary analytic thinkers, the Stanford philosopher of Norwegian background (Føllesdal 2007).

The Eidetic Reduction

The name derives from the idea that it brings us to the *eidos*, or essences, of things. What does that mean? For instance, driving into a big modern city, we anticipate seeing tall buildings. In each particular city the buildings are somewhat different concerning their outlook and positioning. However, if I anticipate seeing a city, my anticipations will not be violated, unless I don't see any buildings that rise above surface at all. "The object of my act in a given situation need therefore not be a concrete physical object, it can be an *eidos*" (Føllesdal 2007: 109). The definite examples of essences, *eide*, can be very different. They may range from mathematical objects to colours or even "humanity" as such. Each eidetic discipline would study an essence or a group of essences. "One of the methods they would use would be *eidetic variation*: one will focus on an essence and go through a number of examples that instantiate that essence" (Føllesdal 2007: 110). The examples need not be physical objects. Since the focus is on essences and not on the objects, it does not matter whether these objects exist in the regular sense of the term or not. "The *eidetic reduction* is the transition from the *natural* attitude, where we are directed toward particular material objects, to the *eidetic* attitude, where we are directed toward essences" (Føllesdal 2007: 110).

The Transcendental Reduction

The transcendental reduction consists in our reflecting on the act itself rather than on its object. Here our being directed upon the object consists of a complicated interplay of three elements: the structuring experiences in the act, *noeses*, the correlated structure given in the act, the *noema*, and the filling and constraining experiences, *hyle* (Føllesdal 2007: 111).¹ According to Husserl, with some training we can concentrate on the above structure by *bracketing* of the object. We will simply not be concerned with the object, but study the act's noesis, noema and hyle. The *transcendental reduction* is the change of focus from our object-directed attitude to an act-directed attitude. One will disregard the object of the act, will not doubt whether it is there or check out about the object by applying the scientific research method on it. Husserl compares this mental change to the ancient Greek concept of *epoché*, abstaining from judgment. On the other hand, this is the very spot, where Husserl introduces the concept of *bracketing*. Obviously, this is the object as well as the *eidos* that we are bracketing. We don't forget about it, but shift it away from the focus. By the transcendental reduction we become aware of our *transcendental ego* that is hidden from us until we consider ourselves just as physical bodies in the material world.

The Phenomenological Reduction

This should be a combination of the former two reductions. "It leads us from the natural attitude, where we are directed toward individual, physical objects, to an eidetic transcendental attitude, where we are studying the noemata, noeses, and hyle of acts directed toward essential traits of acts directed toward essences" (Føllesdal 2007: 112).

Dagfinn Føllesdal has presented a clear generalization of the picture that derives from Husserl's treatment of the reductions. The reductions separate the objects of acts into four realms as four main disciplines. The first realm is that of physical objects studied by natural science. The eidetic reduction leads us to the general features of objects, which are studied by mathematics and other eidetic sciences. The transcendental reduction brings us to acts directed toward physical objects enabling us to study the noemata, noeses, and hyle of such acts. Husserl has proposed to call this realm metaphysics. The fourth realm contains the noemata, noeses and hyle of acts directed toward essences. This is finally phenomenology, the final goal for Husserl's studies and the main focus for us here.

Obviously, Husserl did present a method that explained, how we are meant to reach phenomenology, the realm we are supposed to perform our thinking in. It is not clear, however, what is the 'method of action' for us in phenomenology. The clarity of the method becomes even more questioned when we look at the order of applying the reductions. Normally, Husserl applies the eidetic reduction before the transcendental one. However, sometimes he seems to permit either order. The problem is that the result, namely what do we really mean by phenomenology, depends on the order of application of the reductions. By reversing the order, we arrive at the essential features of noemata, noeses and hyle of acts directed toward individual objects. Does that mean that phenomenology should also include the latter, i.e. that it should still be studying the physical world as well probably as a special case of a more general approach? This is an open question so far.

HUSSERL'S REDUCTIONS AND ANALYTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

One of the characteristic traditions in philosophy today concerns attempts to address different traditional branches of philosophy from the point of view of the analytic method. This has happened to phenomenology as well. Can we have some help from here in securing the method?

For instance, Wolfgang Huemer writes: "... by developing an account that combines Husserlian phenomenology with analytic philosophy, I will show that these two traditions are not two opposite and mutually repellent poles in the history of twentieth century philosophy; they should rather be seen as allies when it comes to systematically address problems in the philosophy of mind" (Huemer 2005: 1). Obviously, it is a fruitless try to oppose the two main traditions of the twentieth century philosophy to each other. However, it is not so easy to find the common ground. Clearly, in general terms philosophy of mind is a common ground where both traditions can meet and work together. But how could we manage to specify?

From the historical point of view we know that Husserl's ideas had many parallels with Frege's and early analytic philosophers took serious interest in phenomenology. Today, however, history is taking a new turn and attempts to do analytic philosophy using

Husserl's terminology and results have started. In the course of this activity, it is more than natural to focus on the method of Husserl exhibited most clearly by his reductions.

An attempt to discuss phenomenology in the analytic style has been performed by Wolfgang Huemer in his book "The Constitution of Consciousness" (Huemer 2005). However, then Huemer explains the essence of phenomenological reduction (Huemer 2005: 23), it is difficult to realize, what is really analytic about it. For instance, compared to the approach of Dagfinn Føllesdal addressed above.

As the title of his book suggests, Huemer concentrates rather on the problem of constitution of consciousness, which enables him to address the problematic issue of the existence of the intentional objects. Some of the objects our mind is directed to, do not really exist. For Husserl, this is not a problem. The method of phenomenological reduction enables him to bracket all the physical characteristics anyway. However, if we study perception, existence of external objects becomes relevant as in that case we are obviously directed towards physical rather than mental objects. According to Huemer, Husserl's use of the notion of constitution might help us here.

Looking for the unfolding of the use of the notion of constitution by Husserl, we once again need to look back as far as his first philosophical work, *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. The notion is really there, but as some Husserl scholars suggest, is not operative yet. There is no doubt, however, that it is operative in the *Logical Investigations*. "It is developed in three contexts, the constitution of meaning, the constitution of perception, and the categorical constitution" (Huemer 2005: 20). Obviously, one can find some parallel here with the initial analytic approach of Frege. Still, without a clear linkage to the reductions, we do not progress any further in establishing the phenomenological method with the help of the analysis of the constitutions of consciousness.

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY AND A NEW PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

After looking at some analytical attempts to make sense of the method of reductions, we turn to a more traditional elaboration of the method. Simon Glendinning has recently presented a new look at Maurice Merleau-Ponty's treatment of the phenomenological reduction (Glendinning 2007).

Merleau-Ponty finds the methodology of phenomenology in describing rather than in explaining or analyzing (Merleau-Ponty 1962: viii). According to Glendinning, Merleau-Ponty is seeking for a return to perception as it is immediately enjoyed (Glendinning 2007: 124). Next, we are going to take a closer look at 'the new phenomenological reduction' as understood by Merleau-Ponty with the help of Simon Glendinning. Obviously, our basic interest is in answering the question, whether we have a method here?

Let us note that in the next part of our search for a method in phenomenology, we are dealing with phenomenology of perception. In case of Husserl we can speak about phenomenology requiring a forswearing of all factual and in the world of sciences because its proper things themselves are intuited ideal essences to be reached by the reductions. Merleau-Ponty, however, demands a shift away from scientific investigations. Therefore, the return striven for by Merleau-Ponty is rather directed by Heidegger's than Husserl's ideas. We seem to be drifting away from any possibility for rigorous method. Still, Merleau-Ponty's return to the immediately perceived world is neither Heideggerian nor Husserlian. For Merleau-Ponty, it is particularly important to understand what takes place when 'I exist'. This problem calls for an enquiry which is not scientific in the sense that it would grasp the who that I am as 'the outcome or the meeting-point of numerous causal agencies which determine my bodily and psychological make-up' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: viii). As the so-called priority argument states: the terms of the sciences, including the so-called sciences of man, presuppose, as a condition of their intelligibility, a more basic experience of that which the sciences are the second order expression.

At this point, we need to address Merleau-Ponty's *priority argument*. First, we have to recall Brentano's claims that the genetic studies which would show the dependence of our mental lives on occurrences in the brain must be founded on a prior descriptive inquiry. "The problematic oddness of this priority is that the phenomena identified in the founding inquiry are held to *depend* on states and processes studied by the founded discipline" (Glendinning 2007: 127). The idea of Merleau-Ponty seems to be that a genetic inquiry has and can have no genuinely adequate idea what it is investigating without the prior descriptive one. This sounds like we are in the need for a prior empirical experience in order to proceed with a general theoretical study. It would be more appropriate to say, however, that this is just a common sense idea we are in need of and not a direct personal empirical experience. Merleau-Ponty's 'primordial faith' could rather be compared to Wittgenstein's 'primitive trust', a non-empiricist conception developed in *On Certainty*. According to this idea, there are propositions that 'stand fast' for us 'prior to any reflective method we have for justifying our beliefs'.

Obviously, the primary interest for any phenomenological thinker should be scientific research not into any empirical object but rather into any *me*. Any understanding of 'my existence' should presuppose a pre-theoretical disclosure of myself to myself. Here we get in touch with the second moment of Merleau-Ponty's first methodological slogan. The demand for pure description excludes scientific explanations, but does so with 'the procedure of analytic reflection' as well. Here we come to the conception of the *true cogito*. The true cogito of Merleau-Ponty does away with any kind of idealism revealing me as "Being-in-the-world". It is a true blow to the 'scientific conception' as the latter, at least in the classical sense, does not like to deal with the subject at all. Therefore, realism is not so naturally connected to the idea of the subject being in the world as it may seem. However, according

to Merleau-Ponty, the same attitude applies to idealism as well. From this angle we always are already situated within an ongoing historical-cultural drama-without-end (Glendinning 2007: 131). On such view, we cannot regard the 'who' that I am the constituting maker of the world in its Being as well as I cannot be the constituting maker of the world in its meaning. "I do not have the power to make the meaning of things *ex nihilo*, and I cannot radically escape or suspend their historical meanings either" (Glendinning 2007: 131). There is an irreducible *thrownness* into a meaningful historical world of things. This cannot be grasped in the impersonal terms of scientific explanation or the idealistic terms of analytic reflection.

Now, we need to address the question of 'phenomenological reduction' as being newly elaborated. According to Merleau-Ponty, what is *bracketed* is not the facticity of my Being-in-the-world, but 'the idea of "the world"' embraced by traditional philosophical theory. What we are left with after the reduction is a reformed understanding.

"In Merleau-Ponty's hands, then, the project of a phenomenological reduction is displaced: it no longer aims to reveal a universal constituting consciousness underlying the formation of experience, but, still certainly in the spirit of Husserl, to enable a new beginning for philosophy: to engage in *unprejudiced reflection* on a mode of worldly existence which is prior to all reflection and makes it possible" (Glendinning 2007: 134). According to the conception of the true cogito, the re-elaboration of the phenomenological reduction, the analysis of 'self experience' begins not with self-consciousness, nor even with Da-sein in the sense of Heidegger, but with the factual existence of the living human body.

Does such result mean that the new phenomenological reduction has brought us to a trivial result that precedes all philosophy altogether, namely, that 'the objectification of the living body' is massively foreclosing the possibility of achieving a satisfactory conception of ourselves as an irreducibly worldly existence? Simon Glendinning replies: "... the resources needed for coming to terms with the facticity of one's existence are totally lacking, totally invisible to philosophical theorizing which regards the living body as a psychological case, every thought and judgment that belongs to such theorizing emerges precisely from 'incarnate subject' given immediately to itself in a 'true *cogito*' that gives the lie to every objectifying word of the theory" (Glendinning 2007: 135). There is a conflict here. No psychology has ever been able to proceed by treating the body as an object pure and simple. Philosophical phenomenology is needed here, the first imperative for it being to rethink the sense of our worldly existence.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this paper we have been taking the analytic method as a model for any method in philosophy. However, in the Blackwell Companion we can find a nice explanation, which is much more general: "Philosophical methods are combinations of rules, procedures

and examples determining the scope and limits of philosophy and establishing acceptable ways of working within those limits" (The Blackwell ... 1996: 753). Obviously, Husserl's understanding of doing philosophy in the sense of phenomenology meet the above requirement. We can say so with even greater confidence if we remember that the question of philosophical method is itself a matter for philosophy, about which philosophers themselves often tend to disagree. There would be nothing wrong in considering the method of reductions in phenomenology just a method for the phenomenologists themselves and for no-one else. However, as the debate continues, there is hope for even more general agreement.

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NOTES:

- ¹ We shall remain with this brief explanation of Husserl's *noesis*, *noema* and *hyle* here and keep a detailed analysis into the proper meaning of these concepts for another paper.

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

ჰუსერლის რედუქციათა მეთოდი

კატერინ მიურჟევი

ტალინის ტექნოლოგიის უნივერსიტეტი

რეზიუმე

ავტორი ფიქრობს, რომ ანალიტიური ტრადიციისაგან განსხვავებით, სადაც აზროვნების მეთოდი გამოიყენება გარკვეული, წინასწარ მოცემული შინაარსის მიმართ, ფენომენოლოგიური მეთოდი წარმოადგენს შინაარსის შექმნის, გარკვევისა და ფილოსოფიური კონცეფციის ჩამოყალიბების გზას. ამ აზრით, ფენომენოლოგია ენათესავება ეგზისტენციალიზმსა და ფრანგულ პოსტ-მოდერნიზმს, რაკი ეს მიმდინარეობანი და მათი მეთოდოლოგია არ განეკუთვნება ანალიტიური ფილოსოფიის ტრადიციას.

ნაშრომში განხილულია ჰუსერლის რედუქციათა სამი ნაირსახეობა:

ეიდეტური რედუქცია – არსებობის საზრისის გაუქმება არსის თემატიზაციის მიზნით.

ტრანსცენდენტალური რედუქცია – ობიექტის ბრჭყალებში ჩასმა და ყურადღების გამახვილება მისი შემეცნების აქტზე, რათა განხორციელდეს ცნობიერების სტრუქტურის ანალიზი.

ფენომენოლოგიური რედუქცია, რომელიც წარმოადგენს აღნიშნულ სახეობათა სინთეზს.

მეტად საინტერესოა ავტორის და სხვა თანამედროვე ფილოსოფოსთა შეხედულება მერლო-პონტის ფენომენოლოგიური რედუქციის შესახებ; განსხვავებით ჰუსერლისგან, გვიმტკიცებს ავტორი, მერლო-პონტის ფენომენოლოგიაში ხდება განყენება არა საგანთა და მოვლენათა ფაქტიური არსებობისგან, არამედ აქ ხდება სამყაროს არსებობის კლასიკური იდეის გაუქმება, რომლის მიხედვით შესაძლებელი იყო ცნობიერებასა და ყოფიერების ერთმანეთისგან გათიშვა და მათი ცალ-ცალკე მოაზრება.

LANGUAGE AND WORLD. THE HUMAN ASPECT THAT'S MISSING FROM SCIENTIFIC REALITY

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to point out the logical priority of the existential grounds of picturing reality by means of scientific representations, hypotheses as such. Also, to clarify the meaning of the inscribing and reading of the picture in terms of the existential conditions and facts of the human being who acts and reacts for survival, and who interprets its surroundings in connection with the train of consequences that connects up with this human action. The surrounding world thus is recognized and interpreted in terms of playing and operating with signs, the significations of which make up the horizons of the world of the human being. This clarification is needed to throw light on how concepts mean in the application of words in language. And the clarity reached at this stage helps for us to clarify further the meaning of thinking and its relation to language-use in terms of playing and operating with signs in the conditions of the surrounding world, the action of the human body in its existential situation. Hence, the logical priority of the human condition in terms of the use and application of signs in the existential world of human being differs from the analytical representations of the world in science for scientific purposes. Which means that the representations of science are tools of the language, and that they are to be treated and interpreted as signs used to represent reality only in the scientific contexts, for the purposes of the language of science and scientific culture. Without such clarity, representations of science, scientific descriptions of reality are open to misinterpretation even by scientists and philosophers, let alone layman, to be so generalized to extend the bounds of its meaningful application in the scientific context of explaining or describing phenomena experimented, or observed under certain experimental conditions.

Science as a language activity: the facts of language and life presupposed by scientific description of reality. The world of life as the surroundings of the operations with signs, the use of words as such, which is inseparable from the phenomenon of signification; language use as a move and human action in the language-game, which is part of the "Life-world" (Lebenswelt, Heidegger)

The purpose of the paper is to draw attention to the facts of language, which are presupposed together with its *play-ground* as the *rules* of the language-game - the language-

game of playing and operating with signs. The facts in question require a certain level of awareness about the phenomena of signification. This is connected with seeing human activity along with its surroundings, as the playground where human thinking *expresses* or displays itself, by means of the performances, actions of the human beings, while using or operating signs as tools of living so to speak. This is where the use of words, in the form of thinking, remembering, saying something, etc., cannot be thought intelligibly in isolation from human actions and reactions that express significations. Human behaviour under this aspect is an animal action in contact with its field of living, organizing and reorganizing its attitude in the form of actions and reactions within its horizons of life. Its main purpose being the *survival* of the animal, it is an action and reaction which is expressing itself in the form of an attitude of awareness within the surrounding space of life. Hence it is an action which structures its surroundings as *horizons of signs*, while its awareness is structured by the objects of its actions and reactions. The objects thus are noticed and found by means of human being's learning to use and structure its train of actions and reactions, its motor actions so to speak, which are originated by the contact of the surroundings and human body.(1) Hence the objects are noticed and found to be "there" relative to one another's space of action, which is the distance implied by the appearances within the horizon of the human being. They are therefore signs in origin, as they are found and interpreted to be there by means of train of actions and reactions of the human being. The surroundings thus first appear to the human being, as a horizon of signs, originating through a contact of human action and its field of living. Connected with this fact, we cannot meaningfully and intelligibly speak of the use of signs, words as such, *in isolation* from the context of human situations; from the surroundings, whereby a human being acts or reacts under the effects, requirements, or calls of the conditions of the situation, surroundings of the living being as such. In other words, the use of words, meaningful application of signs and the surroundings of human beings which we describe as "environment", "situation", or "world", depending on the context, are *internally* (logically) dependent on each other.

In the normal use of language which is mostly developed to meet the pragmatic instrumental requirements, the human being seems to remain indifferent to that aspect of its surroundings, unless it strikes its attention from the standpoint of its pragmatic instrumental concerns. This indicates that the field of attention of the animal being is apt to be conditioned and bounded with the field of its animal and instrumental concerns. On the other hand, that aspect of the surroundings which eschews attention is part of the conditions of the meaningful use and application of signs. It is about seeing the use of words, such as saying something meaningful, as being combined with what happens before or after the saying of words. What we need to see clearly is that the human being acts or reacts by saying, by using signs as tools to deal with the surroundings, where the language situation forms the context, the system structure, in which the application of words fulfils a function, hence expressing a significance by their use in speech and language. Words are such tools and techniques

developed by the human beings to deal with the surrounding world, along with many others tools of interpretation. But without having been noticed in their internal connexions with their surroundings, they are apt to be described on the level of analytical representations of language, as if they are signs **standing for** thoughts or perceptions, of a thinking entity called "mind". In fact, from such analytical standpoint, the analysis of a meaningful sign is likely to take many pseudo forms, such as the analysis of it into the introspective awareness of a person who associates it with other representations of which he is introspectively aware.(2) The introspective awareness here asserts itself as if it's a truism. One thinks of one's images of thoughts, intentions, the images one associates with the appearances of the surrounding things, as if it's a *primary recognition*,(3) or understanding, before one's use of signs in language. It's as if such a person's language, the use of signs, is an outward, public tool and technique of carrying and sharing these private perceptions of thinking (or "contents of the mind" as sometimes referred) among human beings.

It is not necessary that we should explicitly believe these suppositions. It is good enough that we hold on to our commonsense beliefs about the relation of thinking and language without really questioning them deeply.

The point here is to see the contrast and what is wrongly supposed when we think, as if it's a commonsense truth, that saying something meaningful depends upon *thinking something meaningful before expressing it in words*. Or, when we think: "*to mean something with its name depends upon thinking and imagining its representing image before applying the name to what it names.*" (As if the representing image is a substitute image **standing for** (4) the original perception.) "*Shouldn't I know what I mean, before I mean it with the use of words!*" expresses and strengthens our inclination in favour of such suppositions, without necessarily or explicitly holding or asserting them. In other words, one is inclined to hold these beliefs, without explicitly asserting them. Indeed sometimes one is inclined to reject them in explicit form, while maintaining them implicitly (i.e. without a deeper awareness about the implications of doing so) in the form of commonsense expressions, convictions and beliefs about the relation of thinking and language use. For example, no one seems to believe that one can think without the activity of one's body, that thinking is possible without one's body as Descartes thought. In this sense, common sense is against Cartesianism. But on the other hand, no one is able to see, by means of this common sense belief in the connexion of body and mind, the internal connexion between the activities of human body and the operation with signs in language. This level of awareness requires a deeper questioning, a mediation that considers not the next move as against this or that in the stream of the moves of the game, but the rules that make the moves and the game possible. Therefore, anti-cartesianism, on the basis of commonsense beliefs, hides inconsistencies, which hide such cartesian suppositions as Ayer's 'primary recognition' held and asserted on the basis of logic and its self-evident, or self-required premises. This

inconsistency, although natural, indicates a confusion in our thoughts which requires clarity. Hence, the point is to see what is wrongly supposed and missed from attention when we describe the use of words as separate actions and performances from thinking and meaning, which we may be inclined to hypothesize as different processes, and which we may speculate its identity as hidden in the brain processes, or as spiritual in substance interacting with body in external relation, in the manner Descartes supposed.

We may i.e., think and say that “a” is a sign of the alphabet designated to represent a certain sound, forgetting meanwhile that this analysis presupposes that we learnt them by learning to perform inscribing and reading them and not vice versa.

In the normal use of language, we make as a matter of fact distinctions between words and things; between thinking and what is thought or represented by means of the application of signs. That is to say, our habitual learning the use of signs, misleads us to assume an understanding about how we express meaning. Our automatic making of distinctions between thinking and the use of signs is in a way an expression of such habitual thinking and understanding. The use or application of signs takes many forms, from simple saying or reading a word, to naming something; from recognizing a thing as something, to remembering the name of a thing; making calculations with numbers; thinking with geometrical forms; representing logical properties and logical relations by means of models, etc. In all these cases, we habitually make a distinction between things and the signs by means of which we represent our understanding or meaning about these things. Thus, we are habitually presupposing a *division* between language and world; between thinking, meaning, perceiving process and the doings of the human body acting with the use of tools.

LANGUAGE AND WORLD FROM THE STANDPOINT OF CARTESIANISM

Such at any rate, have been almost traditionally maintained presuppositions of western philosophy about the relation of language and world, words and objects, language and thinking. For example, Cartesian epistemology founded true beliefs, knowledge as such, on the clear and distinct perceptions of thinking substance (*res cogitans*) and regarded the use of language only as a means of conveying these perceptions - thoughts of the thinking subject. As Wittgenstein deeply questioned and clarified the matter how thinking and language are *internally* connected with each other, it seems now more clearly that, in the light of his clarifications, the relations between them have been taken in the epistemological theories as if it's an *external relation*. Which means treating and representing the activity of language use on one hand, and thinking, meaning, perceiving on the other, as substantially separate processes; as if, saying or acting with the use of words is not logically, but causally connected with thinking and meaning. These are the presuppositions characterizing what we call the Cartesian standpoint.

Descartes in fact expressed this external relation between thinking and human situations by extending his method of doubt so far as to obliterate the conceptual distinction between dream and awake life. He pointed out that the use of words as instruments of bodily activity may be illusion as in a dream, that while one thinks one is sitting, or speaking, one may not be doing so, generalizing his point under his method of doubt to the extent that the contrast or difference between correct and incorrect application of words is obliterated. That is to say, to the extent that a form of expression, such as "I am now sitting" (where one can correctly say, or teach the use of the word "sitting" to a child) would not have a correct application under his generalized method of doubt - for it suspends all cases of correct application under the method of doubt. This kind of application of logic forgets that the differences and contrasts between true and false, correct and incorrect, doubtful and certain show themselves in the application of words, in the different consequences and functions that follow from their application.

Such *forgetfulness*, which is cutting the internal relation between operating with signs and thinking, is implicitly or explicitly contained in the suppositions that *separate* thinking and perceiving from the human acting and reacting in its own life surroundings. Whereby doing and playing of the human being with the things of the surrounding world takes very many different cultural forms.

Descartes' methodical doubt seeking certainty is an example *par excellence* of such a reasoning that contains the forgetfulness which is dividing the internal relations between thinking and the use of signs, and which is connected to the facts of language that express these internal relations in the surroundings whereby the signs of language are learnt, or applied. Descartes' doubt, methodical as it may be, is a doubt that destroys its own possibility, as it is a doubt of such thinking that is forgetful of the conditions of the application of words. Because, we cannot doubt so far, without doubting the meaning of words, for the application of the word and the rule governing its correct application are internally related in the context of language where the application signifies its sense.

If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.

If you tried to doubt everything you would not go as far as doubting anything.

The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty. (5)

Wittgenstein rightly points out to the logical priority of the conditions where signs cannot be taken in separation from their significances, from the consequences that follow upon operating or acting with them, and where true application differs from false in sense - in the difference it makes in the life of the players. And people learn what they mean by learning what consequences and differences follow in the language game.

“What sometimes happens might always happen.” — What kind of proposition is that? It is like the following: If “F(a) makes sense “(x). F(x)” makes sense.

“If it is possible for someone to make a false move in some game, then it might be possible for everybody to make nothing but false moves in every game.”—Thus we are under a temptation to misunderstand the logic of our expression here, to give an incorrect account of the use of our words.

Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were ever obeyed? The concept ‘order’ would have lost its purpose.(1)

A game allows for borderline cases—a rule for exceptions. But the exception and the rule could not change place without destroying the game.(6)

THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL CLARITY TO EVERYDAY LIFE AND CULTURE

Why has this model of the relation between thinking and language seemed to be so convincing to western philosophical tradition, as we can now characterize its mainstream as Cartesianism, whose unquestioned deep rooted presuppositions, so deep as to dominate a whole tradition despite the different theories involved in it? Thanks to Wittgenstein, they are exposed now with their hidden logical impossibilities in contrast with the logical functioning of the facts of language. This question can be instructive, if we inquire into our own suppositions, and question what we think about the relation of thinking to language, rather than blaming the division and the conceptual confusions involved in it on the epistemological theories of philosophers. For we may be prone to the very same motives and inclinations that misled them to separate thinking and perceiving about reality as different processes from the use of signs; to posit substantial differences between thinking — being, (in the manner of cartesianism) or brain processes (in the manner of materialism) and the use of signs; and hence to theorize explanations between them, such as by means of hypothesizing an external relation, a causal hypothesis as such between thinking, the use of signs, and reality.

In fact, it seems to me nowadays, despite the level of clarity reached owing to the efforts of Wittgenstein and others in the philosophy of language from the phenomenological standpoint, people trained in the scientific and technological culture, scientists, specialists of social, economic, or physical sciences are more prone than philosophers to misunderstand the nature of reality pictured and represented by language, in sciences and in everyday use. Such misunderstandings and forgetfulness of the human situation, the cultural consequences of which was once pointed out ably by José Ortega y Gasset,(2) may be the

real cause behind the actions of so many people that have led to the miserable developments in the money and power seeking values of culture now underway and strengthening in the name of globalizm.

NOTES:

* W.W. Norton, N.Y. 1932. ÝKÜ (Ýstanbul Kültür Üniv.)& Ý.T.Ü.(Ýst. Technical Univ.)

1. Here the contact is part of the life of the whole nature, it is action of the nature, *Natura Naturans*, in contrast to analytical differentiation of body and its environment and the description of their interrelation by such concepts as “contact”, “action” etc. which presuppose the life of the body within nature. It is an ancient philosophical insight, and one which is elaborated by Spinoza though, still in need to be reminded against the forgetfulness of it due to the dominance of analytical thinking habits. It’s an insight shared by the philosophies of existence and language of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, and expressed and articulated in an original way by the philosophical work of Merleau-Ponty. However, the insight in question still needs clarification and emphasis, as its forgetfulness doesn’t simply mean a forgetfulness of a point, but it means a different *stance* about life and nature on the whole; it means a divided view of world of life in general; divided as a result of the presentation of the world by means of the analytical representations of scientific theories, without taking a deeper notice of the play-ground of the application of these representations as signs in the life of the language users.
2. Such analysis is involved in the epistemological theories of empiricist philosophers as well as in the theories of Russell and Ayer in such a manner that, its presuppositions are so deep that such theorists are not even aware that their analysis are presupposing them. On the contrary, it seems to these theorists, that i.e. the analysis of the physical object into sense-data and its perceptual awareness is a logical requirement of presuppositionless thinking. As if they are more directly and clearly perceived by thinking, involving no hidden mediation and presupposition, whereas a theory starting from the actions and reactions of a human body in a physical field of living seemed to them presupposed too much, and therefore dogmatic. Here, not different theories are in conflict, the real issue is about the description of thinking, and the conditions and facts which make logical analyses and the analytical descriptions of facts possible in the language (of thinking). In other words, the real issue for the human being is to get self-understanding about the facts of thinking along with the facts of language, about how thinking and language operates. This is what Wittgenstein ably shows, with such contrasts to the facts of language in terms of human beings operating with signs as tools of language in human life, to display the logical contradictions of supposing a thinking subject, mind, a primary perceptual awareness, independently of the application, or use of signs in language.
3. I.e. A.J. Ayer, in his book, *Ludwig Wittgenstein*, Pelican Books, 1986, argues that a *primary recognition* is the precondition for human beings to operate with signs, hence to use them in language. For he thinks that it is necessary for someone to remember and recognize correctly the signs for their identification as letters, signposts, timetables, etc. He argues against Wittgenstein’s point that private recognition or remembering is a supposition similar to an idle wheel which rotates no other wheel with it in the language. Ayer says: “The crucial fact which it seems to me that Wittgenstein is persistently overlooks is that anyone’s significant use of language must depend sooner or later on his performing what I call an act of *primary recognition*.” (My emphasis, p.76) Ayer’s supposition of primary recognition differs from the ordinary fact of recognition which Wittgenstein considers in that the latter is taken and indicated as an expression which is surrounded

with other people's expressions of recognition, or remembering in the use of signs. Which, therefore, can be compared and matched to be found similar, correct, or incorrect by the shared memory reaction as the basis of learning the rules of the language-game. It is apparent from Ayer's consequent remarks that his disagreement is mainly due to his insistence on reading such facts of expression as remembering, recognition etc. as analyzed and divided in the Cartesian manner of thinking, as analyzed into one's private introspective awareness or remembering which he asserts by the description "primary recognition", and public use of signs. But does he really distinguish the facts of recognition, remembering etc. here, or assert a fictive mental occurrence instead, which is not even a meaningful hypothesis, but a supposition in contradiction with the facts of language and their actual functioning! Wittgenstein's private language argument clarifies the contradiction in contrast with the functioning of the facts language. Ayer's introduction of "primary recognition" is therefore instructive, as it shows how our analytical thinking habits with its analytical form of expressions and tools of analysis exercise as a misleading grip in the correct recognition of the facts of language as they are, which need to be distinguished and described accordingly. I have discussed the issue raised by Ayer in more detail in my essay: "Anlam Doğruluk Bağlamı ve Oyunun Kuralları", *Felsefe Tartışmaları*, 9. Kitap. The essay is also published in the edition by Betül Çotuksöken, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye'de Öğretim ve Araştırma Olarak Felsefe*, Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu Y. Ankara 2001.

4. The typical term coined by Russell which expresses his presuppositions about the relation of a naming sign to what it names, rather than the understanding about the facts of language that express the internal relations of signs to what they signify.
5. If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.
If you tried to doubt everything you would not go as far as doubting anything.
The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty. See Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (Blackwell, 1969) p. 114, 115.
6. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R.Rhees (Blackwell, 1968) p. 345.
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, ed. G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, Vol. II, (Blackwell, 1980) p. 145.
José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, ("La Rebellion de las Masas", 1930

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

ენა და სამყარო. ადამიანური ასპექტი, რომელსაც მოკლებულია მეცნიერული რეალობა

ერკუტ სეზბინი

სტამბოლის კულტურის უნივერსიტეტი


რეზიუმე და კომენტარი

წარმოდგენილი ნაშრომის მიზანია აჩვენოს სიცოცხლისა და ენის ფენომენის უპირატესობა სამყაროს მეცნიერული შემეცნების მიმართ. არსებობა, სიცოცხლის განცდა წინ უსწრებს შემეცნებას და ენა, როგორც ცოცხალი ფენომენი, ადამიანის ყოფიერების გამოვლენას შეადგენს. სამყაროში ადამიანის ყოფნა-არყოფნის, მისი გადარჩენისა და ცხოვრებაში ორიენტაციის ამოცანა სახეს უცვლის მეცნიერულ ჭეშმარიტებას და აღვიძებს ინტერესს იმ საზრისებისა და ნიშანსვეტების მიმართ, რომელთა თამაშიც ქმნის ჩვენს სამეტყველო ენას.

ენა ყოვლისმომცველი ფენომენია. არც მეცნიერული შემეცნებაა მოკლებული სპეციფიკურ ენას, მაგრამ ამ შემთხვევაში დაკარგულია სიტყვის ეგზისტენციალური ძირი – ფესვებამჯდარი ადამიანის არსებობაში. თვითმიზანს მოწყვეტილი, მეცნიერების სამსახურში ჩამდგარი ენა ძირფესვიანად ობიექტივირებულია და მხოლოდ რეალობის აღწერის საშუალებადაა ქცეული.

შემეცნებამ, სადაც ადამიანი, როგორც სუბიექტი ვერ ხედავს თავის თავს უნდა დაიხიოს უკან, რათა ადგილი დაუთმოს სამყაროს აღწერას, სადაც ლოგიკური ცნებები, პრინციპები და ზოგადი საზრისები ისე განთავსდებიან, რომ სიტყვამ, როგორც ჭეშმარიტი სიცოცხლის წყარომ აჩვენოს თავისი შემოქმედება და კვლავ დააბრუნოს ადამიანი საკუთარ სახლში; სიცოცხლის სამყაროს ფენომენოლოგიურ მთლიანობაში.

EPISTEMOLOGY



SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE¹

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It is obvious that a man who can see knows things which a blind man cannot know; but a blind man can know the whole of physics. Thus the knowledge which other men have and he has not is not a part of physics.

Bertrand Russell²

1. INTRODUCTION

Our knowledge depends on context in various ways. Some contextualists about knowledge, for example, believe that knowledge claims should be assessed relative to certain kinds of dialectical contexts³. Here I am concerned with another kind of contextual dependence: the way in which the knowledge we have is only *accessible* or *available* from within certain contexts. These contexts are the contexts of a subject's own experience and position in the world; for this reason, I call the kind of knowledge which is dependent on context in this way, *subjective knowledge*. I shall argue here that part of the abiding interest of Frank Jackson's famous 'knowledge argument' lies in its defence of the idea that there is such knowledge⁴. Much has been written about Jackson's argument; my hesitation in adding another discussion to the pile has been overcome by my sense that this proper lesson of the argument has yet to be grasped...

The knowledge argument is officially designed to show, from apparently uncontroversial premises and simple reasoning, that the physicalist conception of the world is false. D.H. Mellor rightly points out that if sound, the argument would show more than that: it would show that some *facts* are *subjective*, and thus that a view which says that all facts are *objective* would be false⁵. Therefore, the view that objective science can state all the facts *is* false too, if the knowledge argument succeeds. Mellor, along with many others, thinks he has to show that the knowledge argument is unsound, since he thinks he can't accept its conclusion. He therefore adopts the ability hypothesis of Lewis and Nemirow, which is intended to show that the knowledge argument is fallacious, resting on an equivocation on 'knowledge'⁶.

I shall argue here, against Lewis, Nemirow and Mellor, that the ability hypothesis is mistaken and that all the other physicalist attempts to reject the argument (either as invalid

or as unsound) are equally mistaken. The knowledge argument is a sound argument for the conclusion that there are subjective facts: facts about the subjective character of experience. However, unlike some defenders of the argument⁷, I do not think that this conclusion threatens any plausible version of physicalism. Physicalists should accept that there are subjective facts and they should deny, therefore, that all facts are objective, in the sense I shall explain. Neither physical science, nor any other objective science, can state all the facts; but this should not be the basis for a critique of physicalism.

2. THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT

Jackson's famous argument does not move from a claim about the existence of experience to the denial of physicalism; it moves from a claim about how we *know* about experience to the denial of physicalism; hence its name⁸. The argument starts with a thought-experiment about Mary, who has spent all her life in a black-and-white room, has never seen any colors other than black and white. Now imagine that Mary has made an intensive study of the science of color in all its aspects—physics, physiology, psychology and so on. In fact, let's suppose that she knows all the physical facts about color. Now suppose that one day Mary leaves her black-and-white room, and the first thing she sees is a red tomato. It is natural to say that she now knows something which she did not know in the black-and-white room: what it is like to see red. Yet this thing she now knows is not a physical fact, since by hypothesis she knew all the physical facts in the black-and-white room. So if a new piece of knowledge is a new fact, then Mary learns a new fact when she leaves the black-and-white room. If physicalism is (as seems plausible enough) the view that *all facts are physical facts*, then it appears that physicalism is false.

The knowledge argument does not beg the question against physicalism. This is clear if we represent its premises and conclusions as follows:

- (1) In the room, Mary knows all the physical facts about color.
- (2) Having left the room, Mary learns something new about color.

(3) Therefore: not all facts are physical facts. That, in essence, is the argument—though some extra assumptions are needed to demonstrate its validity properly. But it is clear that neither premise (1) nor premise (2) obviously beg any questions against physicalism. A physicalist could hardly object that the idea of someone learning all the physical facts begs the question against physicalism and (2) seems an irresistible and simple thing to say about the story as described above. Maybe, when these premises are scrutinized, they will come to show some deep incoherence - but the argument as stated does not obviously beg the question.

Physicalists have tried to resist the conclusion by impugning either the validity of the argument, or the truth of the premises. I think they are wrong. I think that the argument is valid, and that physicalists should accept its premises. So they should accept its conclusion. Yet I shall argue too that they should not worry about this conclusion; so this conclusion cannot be that physicalism, properly understood, is false.

In §3, I will put to one side the idea that the knowledge argument either depends on, or entails the existence of *qualia* — in the sense in which the existence of *qualia* is a matter of dispute. In §4, I will assess the objection that the argument is invalid, and in §5, I will assess the objections to the premises. In §6 I will bring out what I think the argument really shows: that there are subjective facts. In §7 I shall examine the consequences of this conclusion for physicalism.

3. THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT AND QUALIA

It is sometimes said that (a) the knowledge argument assumes the existence of *qualia*, considered as ‘intrinsic, non-representational, introspectible’ qualities of experiences (mental states or events); or that (b) the knowledge argument establishes that there are such *qualia*. Neither of these claims seems to me correct. In fact, it seems to me that the question of *qualia* is *irrelevant* to the knowledge argument, in the sense that to accept the argument, one need neither assume the existence of *qualia* nor need one accept that the argument shows there are *qualia* — even if the argument is wholly successful. Assumptions (a) and (b) are false. (Of course, sometimes ‘*qualia*’ is taken simply as a term for conscious mental state; in this sense, the argument does assume *qualia*. But this is not the sense of ‘*qualia*’ in which there is a debate over the existence of *qualia*⁹.)

The simplest way to see that (a) is false is to observe that if one were an intentionalist about phenomenal consciousness and therefore one were to deny *qualia*, one would not have any easy route out of the knowledge argument¹⁰. Intentionalists about phenomenal consciousness do not think that their intentionalism as such provides them with a solution to the knowledge argument; they still think they need to refute the argument (if they want to defend physicalism, as understood by the argument).

But nor should we accept (b): that the knowledge argument *establishes* that there are *qualia* in the above sense. It would only establish that there are *qualia* if (i) the only way to interpret the new knowledge Mary has is knowledge about experiences, and (ii) the only way to interpret this knowledge about experience is in terms of knowledge of *qualia*. But neither of these moves are obligatory. Taking them in reverse order: (ii) an intentionalist can say that the knowledge Mary gains is knowledge about the nature of some of her intentional

states. Having seen red for the first time, Mary now knows what it is like to be in an intentional state of a certain special kind (seeing red). On intentionalist views, this state does not involve qualia and nothing in the story so described requires one to say that it does. (i) A more unusual, but still coherent, response is that Mary learns something about the world when she sees red for the first time. She learns about some properties of red things, namely, those properties which can only be known by *looking* at red things. One apparently coherent response to the knowledge argument, then, is to say that Mary learns something about colors, about physical properties in the world. I am not trying to argue that one or other of these views is correct; I just want to point out that one could accept the conclusion of the knowledge argument without accepting that there are qualia.

What is true is that if one had some independent reason for believing in qualia -say, for example, one were persuaded by Ned Block's 'inverted earth' argument - then one might wish to use an appeal to qualia in trying to understand what the lesson of the knowledge argument is: Mary learns facts about qualia (what it is like to have experiences involving them). Now I don't think this is the right thing to say, but all I need to emphasize at the moment is that *whether or not it is true*, this view does not follow from the argument as I present it.

I conclude that the knowledge argument is independent of the question of qualia.

4. CHALLENGING THE ARGUMENT'S VALIDITY: THE 'ABILITY HYPOTHESIS'

Those who challenge the argument's validity normally claim that it involves an equivocation on 'know'¹¹. In the first premise, 'know' is used to express propositional knowledge, but (they say) in the second premise it is used to express knowledge-how or ability knowledge. We should agree that Mary learns something new, but what she learns when she first sees red is how to recognize red, to imagine red and remember experiences of red things¹². Having seen something red, she can now recognize the color of fire engines, she can consider whether she wants to paint her bedroom red and she can remember this decisive encounter with a tomato. These are cognitive abilities, not pieces of propositional knowledge and it is a widely-held view that there is no reduction of ability knowledge to propositional knowledge. So Mary can learn something new—in the sense of gaining an ability—but it is not a new piece of propositional knowledge. Knowing what it is like to see red is know-how. So the knowledge argument is invalid because it involves a fallacy of equivocation: 'know' means something different in the two premises. Since it is only in the case of propositional knowledge that the objects of knowledge are facts—if I know how to ride a bicycle, *how to ride a bicycle* is not a fact—it is concluded that Mary does not come to know any new facts and physicalism is saved.

This response, known as 'the ability hypothesis', presupposes two things: (i) that know-how is ability knowledge and it is completely different from, and irreducible to, propositional knowledge; and (ii) that regardless of the abilities she acquires, Mary does not come to know any new propositions whatsoever. The first claim (i) is a general theoretical claim about the relation between know-how, abilities and propositional knowledge. This claim is actually more dubious than is normally assumed; but space does not permit me to examine it here¹³. I shall concentrate rather on the second claim, (ii).

The defenders of the ability hypothesis say that Mary learns no new propositional knowledge at all. But this claim is really very implausible. For there is a very natural way for Mary to express her knowledge of what it is like to see red: 'Aha! Red looks like this!'. (Let's suppose, for simplicity, that Mary knows that tomatoes are red, and she knows that she is seeing a tomato; these are innocuous assumptions.) Now 'Red looks like this' is an indicative sentence; in a given context, it surely expresses a proposition; and in the context described, the proposition is true. (It could have been false. Suppose Mary were shown a joke tomato, painted blue; the proposition expressed by 'Red looks like this' would be false; red doesn't look like that.) And it is a proposition that Mary did not know before. This all assumes that a sentence containing a demonstrative can be used to express a proposition; but this assumption is innocuous and should be accepted by all participants in the debate (we shall see its full relevance later). So *even* if Mary did acquire lots of know-how, and *even* if know-how is essentially different from propositional knowledge, then there is still something that she learns which she couldn't have known before. And that is enough for the argument to succeed.

Further support for the view that there is a proposition which is learned is provided by Brian Loar's observation that someone can reason using the sentence 'Red looks like this': they could embed it in a conditional, for example, 'If red looks like this, then either it looks like this to dogs or it doesn't'. On the face of it, this is a conditional of the form 'If P then Q'; the substituends for P and Q are bearers of truth-values and therefore possible objects of propositional knowledge¹⁴. The ability hypothesis has to explain this away if it is to support its conclusion that nothing propositional is learned. I doubt whether this can be done. For all these reasons, I reject the ability hypothesis.

An alternative way to question the validity of the argument is to say that the knowledge gained is knowledge by acquaintance¹⁵. *Mary* is acquainted *with* some feature of redness (what it looks like) or with some feature other experience (qualia, as it may be). Acquaintance knowledge is not reducible to propositional knowledge; but these features (of redness, or of experiences) may nonetheless be physical. To this objection, my response is essentially the same as my response to the ability hypothesis: unless the objector can show that Mary does *not* learn any propositional knowledge too, then the fact that she does gain

acquaintance knowledge is irrelevant to the argument's conclusion and we have a perfectly clear example of the kind of proposition Mary learns: the proposition expressed by the sentence 'red looks like this'.

Mellor thinks that the Ability Hypothesis refutes the knowledge argument; he also says it explains why Nagel is wrong about the limits of objective knowledge:

These are not the only otherwise mysterious facts which the know-how theory explains. It also explains science's mysterious inability, which so impresses Nagel, to tell us what a bat's sonar experiences are like. But on the know-how theory this is no mystery, nor a limitation on the factual scope of objective science. For the only knowledge any science ever gives us is knowledge of facts. And even if many abilities depend on knowing facts, there is always more to having those abilities than knowing those facts¹⁶.

But if the ability hypothesis is false, then it cannot explain why Nagel is wrong about the 'factual scope of objective science'. Indeed, it seems rather that there are facts about the bat's experience (assuming it has experiences) which are beyond the scope of objective science: the facts which would be truly expressed (*per impossibile* by saying 'Experiencing the world from a sonar point of view is like *this*'. Or to take a more everyday example, the fact that I can express when I say 'red looks like this' is a fact that a blind person cannot know. Yet, as Russell points out, a blind person can know the whole of physics. And there is nothing relevant to this debate which stops the blind person learning the whole of objective science. True enough, the sighted person has abilities which the blind has not, and Mellor is right that no amount of science can give you these abilities. But this is irrelevant. The important point is not that there are these abilities which someone who knows what it is like has; the important point is that someone who knows what it is like knows *that certain things are the case*. This is the propositional knowledge which the sighted have and the blind lack, in addition to whatever abilities they may also have.

5. CHALLENGING THE PREMISES

I therefore reject these attempts to dispute the validity of the argument; the argument is valid. But what about the premises? Few physicalists wish to challenge the first premise, that in the story as told, Mary knows all the physical facts about color vision¹⁷. For suppose a physicalist did deny this. Then they would have to accept that there are some *physical facts* which in principle cannot be known without having certain experiences. Physics, the science which states the *physical facts*, is in principle *incompletable* until certain very specific experiences are had. Now it may be true that having knowledge in general requires

having experiences of some kind. Yet how can physicalism, which bases its epistemological outlook on physical science, require that science demands us to have certain *specific* experiences? The suggestion has little plausibility.

So most responses to the argument have challenged the second premise instead, and claimed that Mary does not learn any new fact. In a recent survey, Guven Guzeldere describes this character of this dominant response as follows:

The pivotal issue here is whether the having of an experience constitutes a special class of irreducible ‘first-person facts’ or whether what is lacking in Mary has to do with her experiential ‘mode of access’ to facts that she is already acquainted with¹⁸.

The idea seems to be that Mary already knows all the facts in question, she simply gains a new ‘mode of access’ (whatever that is) to a fact she already knew. If this response were right, then certainly the argument would be undermined. But it seems to me that, despite its popularity, the response cannot be correct.

The central idea is that Mary apprehends or encounters in a new way something she already knew. The phrase ‘mode of access’ is often used to describe what this encountering in a new way is. But what are ‘modes of access’? One way to understand them is in terms of new *Fregean mode of presentation* of the objects and properties already known under other modes of presentation. On this interpretation, the puzzle about the argument is of a piece with other puzzles about intentionality and many authors have explicitly drawn this comparison. Vladimir might know that Hesperus shines in the evening but not know that Phosphorus shines in the evening. We do not conclude from this that Hesperus is not Phosphorus since as is well known ‘X knows that p’ is not an extensional context. On this view, the fact that Hesperus shines in the evening is the same fact as the fact that Phosphorus shines in the evening—after all, they are the same star, the same shining, the same evening! So although Mary knows that red looks like this, this is not a new fact that she has learned but, analogously, a new mode of presentation of a fact she knew before.

But which fact is this? We need to identify something which can be referred to in more than one way, the relevant fact concerning which can be learned about in the black and white room. One way of putting it might be like this. When she leaves the black and white room, Mary judges that *seeing red is like this*. The physicalist says that seeing red is being in brain state B, so let’s suppose Mary knew this in the black and white room. Mary can therefore infer that being in brain state B is like this. We therefore have two terms, ‘seeing red’, ‘being in brain state B’ which pick out the same thing and a predicate ‘like this’ which can only be used when one is having the experience. But nonetheless, the experience is the brain state for all that.

So far so good. But remember that the distinction between different modes of presentation of the same thing is supposed to show that the second premise of the argument is false:

Mary does not learn anything new. But it cannot show this. For if this construal of Mary's case and the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus are really parallel, then this entails that someone who comes to believe that Phosphorus shines in the evening because of their belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus does not learn anything new, but only comes to appreciate a previously known fact under a new mode of presentation. And this cannot be right: the original point of the distinction between sense and reference was to do justice to the fact that the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus can be a significant advance in someone's knowledge. It was a *discovery* about the heavens that Hesperus is Phosphorus, it was a new piece of knowledge that the ancients gained. So similarly the knowledge that Phosphorus shines in the evening is a new piece of knowledge. If facts are what you learn when you gain knowledge, then the normal approach to the distinction between sense and reference entails that what the Ancient astronomers learned when they learned that Hesperus is Phosphorus is a new fact.

Of course, there is *something* which is the same before and after this particular discovery: how things are in the world, the reference of the terms, the entities. No-one disputes this about the Hesperus /Phosphorus case. So one could say: 'in a sense the facts are the same, in a sense they are different'. But the relevant question is whether anything is *learned* when someone acquires the belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus, whether there is any new knowledge at all. And if there is a sense in which the fact learned *is* a new fact (even if there is a sense in which things are the same too) then there is new knowledge. This surely cannot be denied. Note that if you do deny this, you have to deny *at the very least* that there is new knowledge in the following sense: the knowledge that the two modes of presentation are modes of presentation of the same thing¹⁹. But this makes it impossible to even state what it is that the ancients learned.

Since they introduced the parallel, it would be fruitless for physicalists to try and draw some principled difference between the Mary case and the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus. So either physicalism says that nothing new is learned in either case—which is a hopeless thing to say—or it says that something is learned in both cases. This is the .only plausible thing to say. But then Mary does learn something new, the argument's premises are true, and we already decided it was valid. So is physicalism refuted?

6. PHYSICAL FACTS AND SUBJECTIVE FACTS

This depends, of course, on what physicalism is. What is refuted is the doctrine that all facts are physical facts - given a certain understanding of 'physical' and 'fact'. The argument assumes a certain understanding of what 'physical facts' are.

What are facts? Philosophers have disagreed over the nature of facts and over whether there are such things. Some say that facts are true propositions, others that they correspond one-one with true propositions, and others say that since they are what make true propositions true (they are ‘truth-makers’) they need not correspond one-to-one with true propositions²⁰. What conception of fact does the knowledge argument assume? It is obvious, I think, that the knowledge argument has to assume that facts are *objects of propositional knowledge*—where a state of propositional knowledge is one described in claims of the form ‘X knows that P’ where X is a knower and ‘p’ is replaced by a sentence. So for something to be a new fact is at least for it to be a new piece of knowledge, an advance in someone’s knowledge, some piece of knowledge that they did not have before.

Does this mean that the knowledge argument covertly begs the question against physicalism by assuming a conception of *fact* which physicalism would reject? No. Whether or not physicalism decides to call objects of propositional knowledge ‘facts’, physicalism should certainly accept that there are objects of propositional knowledge, and that knowledge state are individuated partly by their objects. Everyone accepts that there are such objects of propositional knowledge, *whether or not* they also accept that there are facts in some other sense. So I think it is a mistake to say that we need to establish which theory of facts is correct before settling whether the knowledge argument works. This would be to claim that the argument had to have as a hidden premise that one particular theory of facts is the right one. But this is not so; everyone has to accept that there are objects of propositional knowledge.

The knowledge argument’s conception of fact does not beg any questions. What it says is that a distinct piece of propositional knowledge is knowledge of a distinct fact. This is surely a very natural and uncontroversial idea. We can learn skills or pieces of information; when we learn pieces of information what we learn are facts. But it is sometimes said that there are two notions of pieces of information (or fact): a coarse-grained notion and a fine-grained notion²¹. According to the fine-grained notion, facts are individuated at the level of sense; for the coarse-grained notion, facts are individuated at the level of reference. Note that this point is sometimes put in service of the mistaken idea (dismissed above) that Mary learns nothing new, but only gains a new ‘mode of access’ to what she knew already. If one uses the distinction between coarse and fine-grained facts to support this mistaken idea, then one is forced to say that *only* the coarse-grained notion is relevant to the individuation of knowledge. But this is clearly false, and not something a physicalist should appeal to, for all the reasons given in the previous section.

In *The Facts of Causation* (1995), Mellor makes a distinction between facts and what he calls *facta*. Facts are the ‘shadows’ of truths – ‘if it is true that P it is a fact that P. Facta are the truth-makers for truths; it is an empirical question which facts there are, just as it is an empirical question which properties there are. So we should not infer difference of facta

from difference of facts; *facta* and facts do not stand in one-one correspondence. For present purposes this distinction corresponds to the distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained facts. I think we should agree with Mellor that both notions of fact (or the notions of fact and *factum*) have their place. This is consistent with saying what I said above, namely that the objects of knowledge are normally individuated in a fine-grained way. Maybe sometimes we individuate the objects of knowledge in a coarse-grained way. That's perfectly acceptable too. But so long as we do also individuate objects of knowledge in a fine-grained way, then we should accept the conclusion that Mary learns a new fact.

Having said what the argument means by 'fact' we can now turn to 'physical'. What we are asked to imagine is that the knowledge which one acquires about colors inside Jackson's black-and-white room is stated in the language of physics. But it would not help Mary if she learned things in the room which were in the language of psychology and physiology. Not would it help her if she learned a fully developed dualist psychology (if there were such a thing) talking about states of consciousness while explicitly acknowledging their utterly non-physical nature. None of these theories would help tell her what it is like to see red. The point is not that the land of knowledge she gains in the black-and-white room is physical knowledge; rather, the point is that it is the sort of knowledge that can be stated in some form or another: it's 'book-learning'. As David Lewis puts it, the 'intuitive starting point wasn't just that *physics lessons* couldn't help the inexperienced to know what it is like. It was that *lessons* couldn't help'²².

So although physicalism—understood as the view that all facts are physical facts—is one of the targets of the argument, it is really an instance of a more general target: the view that all knowledge of the world is the kind that can be imparted in lessons, without presupposing any particular kind of experience. Thus any view which was committed to this view of knowledge would come within the knowledge argument's range. Likewise with Cartesian dualism—one could not know what it is like to see red, the argument implies, even if one learned the complete Cartesian theory of the mind.

Paul Churchland has argued that this feature of the argument shows that it proves too much²³. He dunks that Jackson's argument involves a 'logical pathology': it 'makes any scientific account of our sensory experience entirely impossible, no matter what the ontology employed'. But this is plainly a non-sequitur: all that follows from the knowledge argument is that if one *knew* the full scientific account of our sensory experience, it would not follow that one knew what it was like to have the experience. This entails nothing about whether such a full scientific account of the workings of our senses can be given. Now Churchland himself identifies this as the main issue at one point:

If it works at all, Jackson's argument works against physicalism not because of some defect that is unique to physicalism; *it works because no amount of*

*discursive knowledge on any topic, will constitute the nondiscursive knowledge that Mary lacks*²⁴.

But he takes this to be connected to the claim that any scientific account of experience must be impossible. This, I think, is a mistake, for the reason just given. (Note that since I think Mary gains propositional knowledge, I would not identify 'discursive' with 'propositional'.)

It is true that what Mellor (in the quotation above) calls 'the factual scope of objective science' is shown to be restricted by the knowledge argument. For no scientific account of vision will tell the blind what it is like to see, and I have argued that what the blind lack here is (in addition to ability-knowledge and acquaintance knowledge) propositional knowledge. These pieces of propositional knowledge — these kinds of fact — are what objective science cannot express. But no-one should expect it to; this should not be seen as a mysterious 'restriction' on the powers of science.

I conclude that there is no fallacy in the knowledge argument; but perhaps now we are beginning to see that *its* conclusion is stated rather misleadingly, i.e. as an objection to *physicalism*. For even if physicalism is the view that all facts are physical facts, the knowledge argument is an objection to more than this (so far, Churchland is right). It is really an objection to the view that all facts are, so to speak, 'book-learning' facts: *facts the learning of which do not require you to have a certain kind of experience or occupy a certain position in the world*. (As Jackson says, 'you do not need color television to learn physics or functionalist psychology'²⁵.) 'Objective' would be a good name for these facts. And 'subjective' would therefore be a good name for *those facts the learning of which requires that one has certain kinds of experience, or occupies a certain position in the world*, etc. This why I say that the knowledge argument is an argument for the view that there are *subjective facts*. It is an argument which shows that in order to gain new knowledge of a certain sort - to learn new facts - you have to have experiences of a certain sort.

That there are subjective facts in this sense should not really come as a surprise. For another example of a fact whose apprehension depends on the subject's specific location in space and time, consider the case of indexical knowledge. Consider, for example, Vladimir lost in the forest; he consults his compass and a map and remarks with relief 'I am here!' pointing to a place on the map. When Vladimir exclaims 'I am here!' pointing at the map, this is something he learned. He now knows where he is, and he didn't before. In a classic paper, John Perry describes himself following a trail of sugar around a supermarket, intending to tell the shopper from whom it came that he was making a mess. When Perry realized that *he* was making a mess he learned something, that he expresses by saying 'It's me! I am making a mess'²⁶. And this piece of knowledge is distinct from the knowledge he would express by saying 'The shopper with the leaking sugar bag is making a mess'. Both examples of new pieces of knowledge require one to have a certain position in the world:

Vladimir and Perry cannot learn what they learn without occupying certain positions, or being the person that they are. In particular, they cannot learn these pieces of knowledge, these facts, from books. How could they? (Some writers have noted here the analogy with the knowledge argument. I will discuss this further below)²⁷. What Mary, Vladimir and Perry have all learned are *subjective facts*.

Someone might try to neutralize this conclusion at this point by appealing to the distinction between facts as *truths* and facts as *truth-makers*. Perhaps such a theorist may admit that there are subjective facts in the sense of subjective *truths*, or in the sense of objects of knowledge (so long as objects of knowledge are individuated by sense rather than solely by reference). That is, even if this theorist were persuaded by my argument that Mary does learn a new fact, and that her situation is relevantly like the indexical case, they may nonetheless say that this is just another way of saying that there are subjective *truths*. What really matters is the denial of subjective *truth-makers* (or in Mellor's terminology, *facta*). And this, as the indexical analogy shows, is untouched by the knowledge argument.

But what would a subjective truth-maker be? A subjective fact, as I defined it above, is a fact the learning of which requires that the learner has a certain kind of experience or occupies a certain position in the world. Truth-makers, by contrast, are not learned: they are what *make true* the truths that are learned. So maybe we could say this: a subjective truth-maker is the truth-maker for a subjective truth or fact. Or: a subjective truth-maker is what has to exist in order for a subjective fact to be learned. (This is rough, but nothing here depends on its being more precise.) So what needs to be the case for Mary to learn that red looks like this? An obvious part of the answer is: a visual experience of red. Mary's visual experience of red needs to exist if she is to learn that red looks like this. Now if a subjective truth-maker is an experience, then no-one should deny the existence of subjective truth-makers; for the issue is not about the existence of *experiences*. Experiences are subjective in the sense that they depend on the existence of experiencing *subjects*; but no-one in this debate denies the existence of experiencing subjects (e.g. Mary) either. So what could someone be denying if he were to deny that there are subjective truth-maker?

The objective/subjective distinction I drew above was between different kinds of knowledge. Admittedly, it is hard to see how it clearly applies to kinds of entity. The physicalist should certainly say that one of the entities which constitute the truth-maker for Mary's knowledge that *red looks like this* is: Mary's experience of the tomato. And this experience might be called a subjective entity in the sense that it is an entity which is dependent on a subject of experience. The experience could be called a subjective truth-maker, then. So it seems that everyone must accept that there are subjective facts (truths) and that (in so far as the idea makes sense) there are subjective truth-makers too, since there are experiences. The truth/truth-maker distinction does not help the physicalist escape the conclusion of the knowledge argument.

I have argued that the physicalist should accept that there are subjective facts. The question now is how this can be made compatible with more plausible versions of physicalism; that is, versions which do not say that all facts are physical or objective.

7. PHYSICALISM REVISITED AND RE-DESCRIBED

The knowledge argument takes physicalism to be the view that all facts are physical. Given what it means by ‘fact’, this means that all propositional knowledge is physical. And given what is meant by ‘physical’, this means that all knowledge is the kind of knowledge which can be learned inside a scenario like the black and white room—that is, without having to have any particular kind of experience. So the target of the argument is that all facts are ‘objective facts’ and this is the view that the knowledge argument refutes. Conclusively.

But: why should physicalists have to say that all *knowledge* is physical in this sense? Indeed, why should physicalism be a thesis about knowledge at all? Physicalism is a view about what there is and only derivatively about how we know it. The strongest and clearest motivation for physicalism, I have argued, comes from its claim to explain mental causation²⁸. In order to do this, physicalism need not be committed to the view that all knowledge must be expressible without the expresser having to have any particular experiences. It just needs to be committed to the idea that physics is *causally closed*, not even to the view that physics is *explanatorily adequate*²⁹. Therefore, physicalism does not need to say that *physics must state all the facts*. (The idea that it must may derive from the image of the book of the world, with all the truths written down in the one true story of reality. But the image is misleading; if what I say here is right, there could never be such a book. For the book cannot express the proposition that Vladimir expresses when he says ‘I am here!’ and that Mary expresses when she says ‘red looks like this!’.)

It is at this point - rather than in the mistaken attempt to dispute the argument’s second premise - that the physicalist should appeal to the parallel with indexicality. The idea that Vladimir and Perry gain new knowledge — knowledge of new facts — is compatible with every object and property involved in these stories being physical, in the sense of *the subject matter of physical science*. And it is compatible with every object and property being objective, in the following sense: *the subject matter of objective science*. The fact that these pieces of knowledge are only available from certain perspectives does not entail that there are some further non-physical/non-objective objects and properties involved in these situations. What is subjective are the facts.

Now many have made the connection between indexicality and the knowledge argument. But it is important to emphasize that to appreciate it, we do not need to enter the

debate about what is the correct theory of facts or resolve the question of how to individuate propositions³⁰. And we do not have to make the implausible move that Mary learns nothing that is really new. All we need is to recognize that there is knowledge which can only be had from certain points of view: knowledge of subjective facts. This knowledge will not be physical knowledge in the knowledge argument's sense. But this should not worry the physicalist. Surprising as it may seem, a physicalist can (and should) sensibly deny that all knowledge is (in the relevant sense) physical knowledge³¹. And they should therefore deny that all facts are physical facts. This is because not all knowledge is (in the relevant sense) objective knowledge - that is, knowledge of objective facts. Therefore not all facts are objective facts.

A number of writers have drawn attention to the fact that the argument moves from epistemological premises to a metaphysical conclusion³². Mellor says that the existence of subjective facts has 'been falsely inferred from certain kinds of knowledge³³. In so considering the matter, these philosophers have tried to find something wrong with the argument. But as I have tried to show, there is nothing wrong with the argument, there is no false inference. Indeed, demonstrating exactly what the argument achieves should in itself tell us why we should not be worried by it. So long as physicalists do not hold that all knowledge is physical or objective, that all facts are physical or objective, or that physics must be 'explanatorily adequate' — or that objective science can state all the facts - then the knowledge argument poses no objection to the physicalist. It tells us, rather, something important about our knowledge, something even physicalists must accept.

NOTES:

¹ This paper was published in Hungarian translation as 'Szubjektív tudás' in *Ervek es kontextusok* edited by Marta Ujvari (Budapest: Gondolat 2003); some of the material was previously published as 'Subjective facts' in *Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor* edited by H. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (London: Routledge 2003) 68-83. A talk based on the present paper, under the title 'Can science explain everything about consciousness?', was presented to the Russellian Society of Sydney University in August 2004. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the Philosophy of Science seminar at the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, at the Universities of Birmingham, Kent, Oslo and Wales (Swansea), and at the conference *Mind and Action III* at the Institute for Philosophy of Language, Lisbon. Many thanks to Brian McLaughlin, my commentator at the Lisbon conference, for his comments there (and for the Russell quote); and to Katalin Farkas, Carsten Hansen, Penelope Mackie, Greg McCulloch, Harold Noonan, Alex Oliver and James Tartaglia for discussion and criticism. I would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of my friend Greg McCulloch (1951-2001).

² *The Analysis of Matter* (London: George Allen and Unwin 1927) p.389

³ See, for example, David Lewis, 'Elusive knowledge' in his *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999)

- ⁴ Frank Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia' *Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (1982) 127-36
- ⁵ 'Nothing like experience' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 93 (1992-3) 1-16. Since a lot of what follows depends on what 'objective' and 'subjective' mean, the reader will have to wait for a more precise statement than I have given here. I am indebted to Mellor for first alerting me to the generality of the knowledge argument's conclusion; I discuss his own views in more detail in 'Subjective facts' in H. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) *Real Metaphysics* (London; Routledge 2003).
- ⁶ See David Lewis, 'What experience teaches', who acknowledges a debt to Lawrence Nemirow, 'Physicalism and the subjective quality of experience'. Both papers are reprinted in W.G. Lycan (ed.) *Mind and Cognition* (Oxford: Blackwell 1990).
- ⁷ See Howard Robinson, *Matter and Sense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982) and Jackson's original paper, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia'. It should be noted that Jackson has changed his mind about what the knowledge argument shows. See his 'Postscript' to 'What Mary did not know' in Paul Moser and J.D. Trout (eds.) *Contemporary Materialism* (London: Routledge 1995); for Jackson's physicalism, see *from Metaphysics to Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998) chapters 1 and 2. If I am right in what I say here, he did not need to change his mind about the soundness of the argument, even after his conversion to physicalism; he just needed to re-describe the conclusion. Of the many discussions of Jackson to which I am indebted, I must single out Terence Horgan, 'Jackson on physical information and qualia' *Philosophical Quarterly* 34 (1984) 147-152.
- ⁸ See the references to the statements of the argument by Jackson and Robinson in footnote 6. In its essence, the argument has a longer history than this, of course. Earlier 20th century sources are Herbert Feigl's *The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'* (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press 1958) p.68; and in Broad's *The Mind and its Place in Nature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1926) p.71
- ⁹ See my paper. The origins of qualia' in T. Crane and Sarah Patterson (eds.) *History of the Mind-Body Problem* (London: Routledge 2000) for a discussion of the senses of 'qualia'
- ¹⁰ For intentionalism about consciousness, see Michael Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness* (Cambridge mass.: MIT Press 1,995)
- ¹¹ For a useful catalogue of responses to the knowledge argument, see Robert Van Gulick, 'Understanding the phenomenal mind', in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Guven Guzeldere (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1997) pp.559-563
- ¹² See David Lewis, 'What experience teaches', Lawrence Nemirow, 'Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance', D.H. Mellor, 'Nothing like experience'
- ¹³ For excellent discussion of this, see A.W. Moore, *Points of View* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997) chapter 8 (esp. p. 171) and Paul Snowdon, 'Knowing how and knowing that: a distinction and its uses reconsidered' (forthcoming in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*)
- ¹⁴ Brian Loar, 'Phenomenal states' in Block *et al* (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness*, p. 607.1 must ignore here the bearing this point has on the famous 'Frege-Geach' problem
- ¹⁵ This is the line taken by Paul Churchland in 'Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states' *Journal of Philosophy* 82 (1985) 8-28
- ¹⁶ Mellor, 'Nothing like experience' p.7
- ¹⁷ But see Churchland, 'Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain States'. In *Consciousness Explained* (London: Alien Lane 1991), Deonett launches a general attack on the methodology of thought-experiments as a way of learning about consciousness.
- ¹⁸ Guven Guzeldere, 'Approaching consciousness' in Block *et al* (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness*, p-38.
- ¹⁹ See David Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (Oxford: OUP 1996).
- ²⁰ For these views, see G. Frege, 'The thought: a logical inquiry' in P.F. Strawson (ed.) *Philosophical Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1967); D-H. Mellor, *The facts of Causation* (London; Routledge 1995); J.L Austin, 'Unfair to facts' in Austin, *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford; Clarendon Press 1961); and Donald Davidson, 'True to the facts' in Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1984)
- ²¹ See, e.g.. Van Gulick, 'Understanding the phenomenal mind' pp.562-3

- ²² See David Lewis, 'What experience teaches' p.281; see also D.H. Mellor, 'Nothing like experience'
- ²³ Churchland, 'Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states'; see also 'Knowing qualia; a reply to Jackson' in Block et. al (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness*. p. 574. Jackson attempts to answer this criticism in 'What Mary did not know' (in Block et al (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness*, but on the implausible grounds that there is a difference between the kind of knowledge a dualist psychology would give and the kind a physicalist theory would give.
- ²⁴ 'Knowing qualia: a reply to Jackson' p.574
- ²⁵ 'What Mary did not know' p.569.
- ²⁶ See John Perry, 'The problem of the essential indexical' *Naus* 13 (1979) 3-21.
- ²⁷ For the use of the parallel with indexicals as a response to the knowledge argument, see Georges Rey, 'Sensational sentences' in Block et al (eds.) *The Nature of Consciousness*
- ²⁸ See David Papineau, 'The rise of physicalism' and Barry Loewer, 'From physics to physicalism' both in Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer (eds.) *Physicalism and its Discontents* (Cambridge: CUP 2001).
- ²⁹ Lewis argues that physics has 'explanatory adequacy' in 'An argument for the identity theory'; but the argument from mental causation to physicalism only needs the claim that physics is *causally closed*, not that it is explanatorily adequate; see my *Elements of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001) §12.
- ³⁰ So I disagree with Van Gulick ('Understanding the phenomenal mind' pp.562-563) that this is the most fruitful line to pursue
- ³¹ Here I agree with Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press 1995)
- ³² See Frank Jackson, 'Postscript' to 'What Mary did not know'; and David Lewis, "What experience teaches"; Joseph Levine, 'On leaving out what it's like' in M. Davies and G. Humphreys (eds.) *Consciousness* (Oxford: Blackwell 1993) Hvirgan, 'Jackson on physical information and qualia'; among many others
- ³³ 'Nothing like experience' 1992 p.I.

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

სუბიექტური ცოდნა

ტიმ კრეინი

ლონდონის უნივერსიტეტის ფილოსოფიის ინსტიტუტი

რეზიუმე და კომენტარი

სუბიექტური ცოდნის გამოვლენის მიზნით, ავტორი განიხილავს სუბიექტური ფაქტის არსებობის შესაძლებლობას ლოგიკური ექსპერიმენტის საფუძველზე. ეს ექსპერიმენტი შემდეგში მდგომარეობს: წარმოვიდგინოთ, რომ ქალბატონი მერი ცხოვრებას ატარებს გარეთ გაუსვლელად, თავის ოროთახიან ბინაში. ერთი ოთახი მთლიანად შავია, მეორე თეთრი, ანუ ეს ქალი, თავისი კარჩაკეტილი ცხოვრების გამო, მხოლოდ შავსა და თეთრ ფერს აღიქვამს; მაგრამ ადამიანს აქვს გონება, აქვს წარმოსახვისა და განზოგადების უნარი და აღქმის ამ მწირი მონაცემების საფუძველზეც, სათანადო ანალიზის გზით, მას შეუძლია ააგოს სრული ცოდნა ფერთა ნაირსახეობის შესახებ.

ახლა წარმოვიდგინოთ, რომ მერი გამოდის გარეთ, ბაღში და ხედავს წითელ ვარდს. თუკი აღქმის ეს უცხო ფენომენი, წითელი ფერი, ახალი შინაარსით გაამდიდრებს მის ცოდნას, მაშინ მის მიერ დადგენილი ფერთა თეორია არ ყოფილა სრული ცოდნა და ირღვევა ლოგიკური ამოცანის საწყისი პირობა, მაგრამ, მეორე მხრივ, თუკი ახალი არაფერი ხდება, გამოდის, რომ წითელი ფერიც მის წარსულ გამოცდილებას ეკუთვნის და მამასადამე, თავისი კარჩაკეტილი ცხოვრების მანძილზე, ქალი ყველაფერს არ აღიქვამდა მხოლოდ შავად ან თეთრად, რაც ისევ ეწინააღმდეგება საწყის დაშვებას.

აქ, როგორც ირკვევა, თავს იჩენს წინააღმდეგობა თეორიიდან განჭვრეტილ და ლოგიკურად დადგენილ ცდის შინაარსსა და ცოცხალ აღქმაში, ამ შინაარსის ფაქტობრივ რეალიზაციას შორის. ავტორი ფიქრობს, რომ საქმე გვაქვს ერთი და იგივე ფაქტთან, რომელიც სხვადასხვა ვითარებაში, სხვადასხვა კონტექსტში, გასხვავებული სახით არსებობს; როგორც სუბიექტური, ან როგორც ობიექტური ფაქტი. პარადოქსი მოიხსნება, თუკი დაუშვებთ, რომ რაიმე ფაქტი შეიძლება განსხვავდებოდეს თავისი თავისგან იმის მიხედვით, თუ რა ვითარებაში არსებობს იგი – როგორც აღქმისეული, განუმეორებელი მოვლენა, თუ როგორც ლოგიკურად განმეორებადი ცდის მონაცემი. ამ განსხვავებაზეა აგებული სხვაობა სუბიექტურ და ობიექტურ ცოდნას შორის.

ავტორი ვრცლად განიხილავს თავის თანამოაზრეთა და ოპონენტთა შეხედულებებს აღნიშნული პრობლემის გარშემო. თუკი გონებას ძალუძს ლოგიკურად აავოს ობიექტური ცოდნა ფიზიკურ მოვლენათა შესახებ, მაშინ ეს ცოდნა არ საჭიროებს პრაქტიკულ გამოცდილებას და ეს უკანასკნელი ახალი, სუბიექტური ცოდნის წყაროდ შეიძლება იქცეს. ცოდნა სუბიექტურია არა იმის გამო, რომ იგი სუბიექტის პრაქტიკულ ქმედებას ემყარება, არამედ იმიტომ, რომ მას საქმე აქვს სუბიექტურ ფაქტებთან, ანუ აღქმისეულ, ინდივიდუალურ და განუმეორებელ მოვლენებთან, რომლებიც არ ექვემდებარებიან პერიოდიზაციის პრინციპს, რაც ობიექტური ცოდნის საფუძველს შეადგენს.

ავტორი გამოთქვამს ვარაუდს, რომ მისი თვალსაზრისის წინააღმდეგ შეიძლება წამოიჭრას შემდეგი არგუმენტი; ობიექტური და სუბიექტური ფაქტების ნაცვლად იქნებ სჯობდეს ვილაპარაკოთ ფაქტებზე, რომლებიც ასახავენ ჭეშმარიტებას და ფაქტებზე, რომლებიც ქმნიან ჭეშმარიტებას. ცნებათა ასეთი ჩანაცვლება საქმის ვითარებას არ ცვლის, ფიქრობს ავტორი, რადგან ჭეშმარიტების ამსახველი ფაქტი, იგივე ობიექტური ფაქტია, ხოლო რამდენადაც ქმნადობის პროცესი სუბიექტს გულისხმობს, ჭეშმარიტების შემქმნელი ფაქტი არის სწორედ სუბიექტური ფაქტი. ეს ფაქტი ვით შემოქმედების სუბიექტი, არის ერთჯერადი, განუმეორებელი; იგი ქმნის ჭეშმარიტებას, ანუ დაადგენს ცოცხალ მიმართებას ცნობიერებასა და სამყაროს შორის.

აქედან გამომდინარე, სუბიექტური ცოდნა, ადამიანის პრაქტიკული გამოცდილების ცოდნაა და არ ეწინააღმდეგება ფიზიკალიზმის პრინციპს, რომლის მიხედვით ყოველივე, რაც არსებობს არის ფიზიკური ფაქტი და შეადგენს ფიზიკური (ობიექტური) ცოდნის საფუძველს. სუბიექტურობა აღნიშნული ცოდნისა და შესაბამისი ფაქტების ინტერპრეტაციის გზაა, როცა ეს ფაქტები განიხილება ცოდნის ჩამოყალიბებისა და ჭეშმარიტების ქმნადობის ცოცხალ და განუმეორებელ დინამიკაში.

AESTHETICS



DEWESTERNIZATION AND RESINICIZATION. ISSUES AND METHODS OF CHINESE AESTHETICS IN THE GLOBAL ERA

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Abstract

Since the 1990s, contemporary Chinese aesthetics has gradually fallen into depressions and became silence after the two heated domestic debates in the 1950s and 1980s. Nowadays it is high time for Chinese scholars to make reflections on these setbacks and frustrations. Firstly we need to clarify what are the real problems that contemporary Chinese aesthetics encounters. To be short, that is, the arrival of globalization has caused a series of profound turns from aesthetics to arts. With the further expansion and penetration of globalization, theoretical aesthetic subjects and relevant problems are more salient, including the shift of contemporary aesthetic research paradigm, the basic method that we borrow western theories to interpret Chinese art works and aesthetic phenomena, the constant advancing interdisciplinary research, etc. The author's main aim in this paper will be to explore some workable methods, which are significant to the development of the present Chinese aesthetics in this new century.

Key words: dewesternization, resinicization, globalization, Chinese aesthetics, issue, method

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s contemporary Chinese aesthetics has gradually fallen into depressions and became silence after the two heated domestic debate in the 1950s and 1980s. Nowadays it is high time for our scholars to make reflections on these setbacks and frustrations. Firstly we need to clarify what are the real problems that contemporary Chinese aesthetics is faced with.

In the 1950s, the main task for Chinese scholars was to reconstruct the fundamental theories of Chinese aesthetics in new ideological discourse according to Marxism; in

the 1980s we mainly turned to acquaint with and digest contemporary western aesthetics to promote the level of Chinese aesthetic research. But nowadays what are the fundamental problems for Chinese aestheticians? It is known to all of us that globalization has brought a series of profound changes in aesthetics and arts. With the further expansion and penetration of globalization, the theoretical aesthetic subjects and the relevant problems are more salient. My main aim in this paper will be to explore some workable methods, which are significant to the development of the present Chinese aesthetics in this new century.

UNIVERSALISM OR PARTICULARISM: THE SHIFT OF CONTEMPORARY AESTHETIC PARADIGM

Globalization derived from western countries and expanded to all over the world. Under these circumstances, due to China's weak position in cultural exchange as a developing country, Chinese scholars are anxiously concerned with the changing trends and struggle to respond to this changed and changing world, enduring huge pressures.

One important reason for their concern is that globalization is not only an economic phenomenon but also a cultural phenomenon. It is eliminating the cultural isolations and divisions, and thereafter, human history is flowing to merge into one single world history. Owing to the internal link of the one-world's economy and lifestyle, closer than ever before, the experience of daily life and aesthetic fashion, to a great degree, have been transformed into standardized models around the world. Some scholars emphasize that globalization should embody the diversity of aesthetic styles while others maintain that globalization tend to assimilate people's lifestyle and aesthetic tastes, which leads to the homogenization of the global culture. (1)

Globalization brings more international cultural communication and exchange, which arouses the public thirst for enjoying foreign cultural products, especially the ones which represent the mainstream western culture. An UNESCO survey showed that cultural communication and exchange has become interactive: China is becoming the third largest exporter of cultural goods, following the UK and US, and Asia's cultural product exports are growing to surpass North America(2). However there is no denying that due to western culture's dominant position, the process of globalization under the way can be considered to be the expansion of western knowledge, value system and artistic tastes to all over the world, spreading a series of western systematic universal value criteria. Therefore, globalization can be regarded as westernization and westernization is identified as universalization. By means of hybridization or assimilation, when they are introduced, the powerful foreign cultural products will easily squeeze out the weak local culture, resulting in the reduction of cultural diversity and the ruin of the existing local culture. Consequently, global culture is tending to be westernized. Another version of globalization is interpreted as Americanization because of its special prominent authorities in the western world.

All these drew a strong response from the Chinese academia. Some Chinese scholars struggle to fight against the penetration of globalization, and this gives rise to intense controversy on universalism or particularism in China. Consequently, ever since the 1990s, the struggle against essentialism, western cultural hegemony, and the awareness to stress on cultural heterogeneity of cultures and arts between east and west, have become a surging trend in China.

Another factor to stimulate such response comes from the shift of western paradigm, which has been widely spread in China and has made great impacts on Chinese scholars. The essential of the paradigm shift is from objectivity of knowledge to pursuing power of knowledge. Gramsci put forward a theory of “cultural hegemony”, to differentiate from traditional political hegemony. In his view, the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based on two equally important aspects: economic domination and intellectual and moral authority. While Michel Foucault declared that he only concentrates on the study of relationship between power and knowledge rather than the content of truth. For Foucault, power and its domination are his theoretical themes. Edward Said maintained that Orientalism is a sort of political discourse, one tactic for dominating, restructuring, and exercising authority over the Orient. There is no objective and fair knowledge system in terms of Orientalism done by the purposive western scholars.

These ideas have greatly influenced China’s academic circle after the 1990s to reflect on the Sino-Western cultural relationship, which has been defined as relationship of oppression and authority. The diffusion of Western culture in China is considered to be a process of cultural colonization. Correspondingly, Chinese scholars began to shift their research focus from searching for truth, a classical paradigm, to centering on political correctness and ideological struggle for power. And the conflict between Sino-western aesthetics is considered to be irreconcilably antagonistic.

For so long and so far, western aesthetics have always been in a guiding position. One famous Chinese scholar, Professor Ji Xianlin said that Chinese aestheticians have been the puppet of western aesthetics. Another scholar, Professor Cao Shunqing said modern Chinese aesthetics has lost its voice. They maintained that the only way to change the current status is to divert from western aesthetics, to clean up the deep-rooted occidental-centrism, and reconstruct a new Chinese aesthetic framework(3).

This tendency among many Chinese scholars in fact is a denial of modern Chinese aesthetics, and will mislead the future development of Chinese aesthetics. To be precise, they ignored the common grounds, the interlink between Chinese and western aesthetics. According to their viewpoints, the right way of modern Chinese aesthetics is dewesternization, that is, to reconstruct the local discourse based on China’s own tradition against western hegemony. In the chains of their logic, aesthetic theories stay isolated and unique in each country, and don’t share any common grounds therefore, cannot be inte-

grated. If so, Objectivity and universality of aesthetic knowledge are denied. Then, how should we understand the logical development of modern Chinese aesthetics and properly explain our aesthetic phenomena?

INTERPRETING CHINESE AESTHETICS WITH WESTERN THEORY: THE BASIC METHOD OF MODERN CHINESE AESTHETICS

Modern Chinese aesthetic theories are mainly based on western speculative aesthetics, typically, classical German aesthetics. The major research work is to explain Chinese aesthetic materials and art works in terms of western theories: interpreting Chinese aesthetics with western theories. This is a unique and original method adopted by Chinese scholars to deal with Sino-western comparative aesthetics, which is the foundation for us to establish modern Chinese aesthetic system. It can be regarded as Chinese scholars' contribution to the study of inter-cultural aesthetics.

From the very beginning, modern Chinese aesthetic history is a Sino-western comparative aesthetic history. Introducing western theories to explain Chinese aesthetic materials and art works becomes the basic method for aesthetic study, or we may say, the basic method of Sino-western comparative aesthetics. This was determined by the disciplinary characteristics even since aesthetics as an independent discipline was introduced and later transplanted into China. In this sense, modern Chinese aesthetics is and, I suppose, will be quite different from the aesthetic studies in each western country in the surroundings of homogeneous culture, in that it spans over the vast lands and involves a diversity of cultural connotations between Chinese and western countries, and goes in fierce conflict and mutual interactive blending. As a brand new domain in the Chinese history, Chinese aestheticians once stepped into this domain, it is possible for them to explore and further develop their own research method specific to their own national culture.

After World War, the third world countries rapidly stepped onto the international stage, and eastern countries had witnessed the gradual rising of their economic and political status. Under these circumstances, the studies of comparative aesthetics have been gradually developing. But traditional occidental-centrism still continues. In fact today it is still playing a central role in the global politics, economy and culture. However, the huge gap between Chinese and western cultural traditions and language symbols has made most western scholars to set back from going into the realities of eastern culture, so few of them are able to directly get involved in eastern academic research, especially Chinese culture. On the contrary, groups of Chinese scholars studied aesthetics in western countries, so they broadened their horizon and had vast international perspectives and accumulated rich experience in comparative inter-culture aesthetic research, and in this, came into being the unique feature of modern Chinese aesthetics, fundamentally, comparative aesthetics.

Therefore, there are several natural stages revealing the logical course of the development of modern Chinese aesthetic system. Firstly, Chinese scholars introduced western aesthetics and applied them to verify Chinese aesthetic materials and art works. This is the beginning of western aesthetics towards its sanitization and Chinese aesthetics to be westernized. Secondly, with more communications carried out, Chinese scholars tried to find out the common grounds between aesthetics, which is the interaction in more profound dimensions of the sanitization of western aesthetics and the westernization of Chinese aesthetics seeking to build up a common aesthetic theory across Sino-western aesthetics. In other words, we interpret Chinese aesthetic materials and art works on the basis of the concepts, the frameworks and expression mechanism of western aesthetics and finally establish modern Chinese aesthetics, blending the western theoretical aesthetic essence and the features specific to Chinese aesthetics. This is a process of searching universality between aesthetics in the course of interactive influence of both western aesthetics towards sanitization and Chinese aesthetics to be westernized. Today it is still our major workable method.

Can we say this method carves modern Chinese aesthetics into the puppet of western aesthetics? Essentially, Occidental-centrism is not identical with universalism. The former argues the superiority of western culture to other non-western ones, but the latter advocates the universal application of aesthetic knowledge and value system. The two can't be confused and taken to be the same one. Truth has nothing to do with hegemony that is related to Occidental-centrism. Although nowadays "cultural diversity" is often mentioned; some Chinese scholars maintain "to go back to ancient China" and "Chinese Characteristics". However, this reveals the long tradition of Sino-centrism and the particularism of unique Chinese culture regardless of the universal target and standard in theoretical researches as a discipline(4). As a matter of fact, the aesthetics, no matter Chinese or western or any other cultures, nationalities, each enjoys its particularities and shares universal common grounds, and may both encounter conflict and be integrated.

For the sake of establishing a discipline, we shouldn't over-emphasize the particularities of Chinese aesthetics regardless of the criteria of aesthetics and the universality in theories. And this is destined to be infeasible. In fact modern Chinese aesthetics, from the very beginning of its birth, was not a simple copy of western aesthetics. It had a strong sense of political utility: saving China from misery. The strong distinctive political utility is specific to China in modern Chinese aesthetics, and is different from classical western aesthetics. Bernard Bosanquet declared in the beginning of his book *A history of Aesthetic*, "Aesthetic theory is a branch of philosophy, and exists for the sake of knowledge and not as a guide to practice", "Art, we are told, is useless; in a kindred sense aesthetic may well submit to be useless also"(5). Professor Zhou Laixiang thinks that western speculative theories of aesthetics stress on the logic and integrity of the reason but do not take utility as its final goal. On the contrary, Chinese aesthetics cares more about its utilization instead of logic.(6)

Due to the pragmatic needs in Chinese context and the influence of traditional Chinese aesthetics, modern Chinese aesthetics apparently inherits the characteristics of ancient Chinese aesthetics which stresses the political utility; therefore it does not lose its own theoretical guide. Then, how should we think of the differences between China and western aesthetics? According to Bernard Bosanquet, ancient Chinese “aesthetic consciousness which had not, to my knowledge, reached the point of being clarified into speculative theory”(7), It means that the differences between aesthetics suggest that they are on different historical stages. When Chinese aesthetics developed into certain historical stage it inevitably would form its own speculative theory. The development of modern Chinese aesthetics proves that what Bernard Bosanquet stated is quite right. And this is the same in explaining the various differences between aesthetics. Professor Zhou Laixiang said, there exists a double reverse development trace between Chinese and western aesthetics. “While Chinese aesthetics goes from experience to theory and western aesthetics from theory to experience”(8). Therefore, he claimed, “The purpose of comparative aesthetics is to seek for the commons, immutabilities, and universalities among all kinds of countries.”(9)

This actually is the basic direction of modern Chinese aesthetics. Chinese scholars have created a method to explain China’s aesthetic phenomena with western theories while they successfully applied the methods similar to “influential study” and “parallel study” in international comparative literature research. The method set up a reliable bridge between aesthetics for their communications and connections, mutual flow and proof, and finally for the establishment of the general aesthetic theory surpassing the regional differences between eastern and western countries. It has brought with its own experience and tradition specific to Chinese aesthetic ideas to be merged into international aesthetic domain, to make international aesthetics step out of regional constraints of the homogeneous western culture and to a great extent break through the Occidental-centrism. This is the important contribution the Chinese aestheticians made to the international aesthetics in the research paradigm.

INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY: REDEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH METHOD OF CONTEMPORARY AESTHETICS

Aesthetics, as a discipline, came from the west. According to western academic tradition, aesthetics is a branch of philosophy, and philosophy is the confluence of different knowledge system and origin of various disciplines, and is characteristic of inter-discipline. As a branch of philosophy, aesthetics has the nature of inter-discipline. In history ever since the ancient Greece, the aestheticians are proficient in several branches of learning, especially in subjects between human sciences and natural sciences, which has become a tradition in western aesthetic studies. So nowadays in the global age, it’s urgent to apply an inter-disciplinary method in the aesthetic studies between aesthetic

speculation and mass media, and between the non-utility of aesthetic activities and the commercialization of literature and arts.

In the past, aesthetic theories were mainly based on literature-centrism, while nowadays one feature of the contemporary global culture is that the focus has turned into visual image in almost all the fields, such as culture, media and arts etc. Images have now permeated through our everyday life. In fact, in the past 50 years, there has been a gradual shift from the verbal and textual culture and arts towards visual culture and arts is now at a more and more fast speed, which has become a great challenge to traditional aesthetics studies. The visual turn took place mainly in two aspects: the shift in the whole social culture and arts and the shift in visual arts itself with movies and televisions at a leading position. All these changes resulted in a decanonization process in the field of present Chinese literature. Classical literary works are becoming farther away from the people, including the university students. Instead, American movies, MTV, Flash, cartoons etc. are becoming an indispensable part in most people's cultural life. TV, rather than books are their favorites.

Chinese movies relied mainly on storytelling, but now they pay more attention to action itself while plot, theme, and dialog, etc. are less valued. Hollywood movies dominate China's movie market; gangster films, western films, science fiction films, swordsmen film etc. are quite popular. Many blockbusters such as *Hero* and *House of Flying Daggers*, directed by China's internationally famed first-class director, Zhang Yimou, have also shown the fascination of Chinese Kongfu through delicately designed scenes, which have reaped millions of dollars, like Hollywood blockbusters.£"10£© Professor Zhou Xian thinks that movie is now undergoing a dramatic shift from narration to spectacle in the era of visual culture. Hollywood movies and Chinese directors of "the fifth generation" are evidences of this shift. The emergence of spectacle movies indicates changes from discourse to images, from time to space, and from reason to pleasure in the contemporary culture.£"11£©How to respond to the challenge of visual turn in the cross-interaction between the various disciplines and to breathe into traditional art philosophy fresh airs, we are still in want of deep and thorough reflection over aesthetic research.

Another impact of globalization on the interdisciplinary aesthetic research is the deterioration of global environment and the challenge of ecologism responding to the deterioration of the global environment. The environmental crisis in recent decades has pushed the science of ecology into the center of public attention and given rise to a new philosophical paradigm. Ecological thought has influenced almost every discipline including aesthetics. Thereafter, environmental aesthetics as a sub-field of philosophical aesthetics has got developed in the last thirty-five years. Professor Aronld Berleant wrote: "Recently years have seen the gradual unfolding of new field of study, environmental aesthetics, out of the convergence on a similar body of issues by scholars and researchers from different fields. This work appeared first at interdisciplinary conferences in aesthetics, environmental design, philosophy, and the human sciences. Soon, articles and books began to appear that

addressed similar questions from the standpoint of various disciplines—philosophy, cultural anthropology, architecture, planning, landscape architecture, cultural geography, environmental design, psychology. Artists, too, contributed to this trend, not only environmental artists but composers, playwrights, photographers, and film directors—practitioners who originated perceptual, experiences of environment that provoked new questions. This field of environment aesthetics, moreover, is international in scope, as people from different countries, traditions, and cultures discover in it a common interest.”¹²

The nature in traditional literature has greatly changed in aesthetic patterns. In the past, artists such as poets and painters often depicted the nature as the Land of Peace Blossoms away from the turmoil of the world like the Garden of Eden, a paradise where people live an idyllic life. But in the contemporary literary works, our natural environments have been described as an object with thousands of boils and hundreds of holes, which needs to be protected and saved urgently. *Walden; or, Life in the Woods* is a record of Henry David Thoreau’s two years’ experience of living at Walden Pond. The writer’s chief emphasis is to demonstrate that we human beings can absolutely live a more simplified and happier life. In her *Silent Spring*, Rachel Carson questioned the right of industrial factories to pollute without considering the harmful effects on the environment. Her work started the environmental protection movement in the United States. Global warming disaster movie “The Day after Tomorrow”, the American movie took a look at what the world would look like if the greenhouse effect and global warming continued at such levels, which would result in worldwide catastrophe and disasters, including a variety of hurricanes, tornadoes, tidal waves, floods and the beginning of the next Ice Age.

Such development of eco-literature gets well expressed in theories called eco-criticism. Eco-criticism has a clear distinction from other critical approaches. For example, literary theory, in general, examines the relations between writers, texts, and the world. In most literary theories, “the world” is a synonym of human society - the social sphere. But eco-criticism expands the notion of “the world” into the entire eco-sphere, which suggests reading literature from ecological perspective and concerning environmental crisis. Due to the serious environmental problems caused by the rapid industrialization and urbanization of contemporary China, this eco-criticism has great influence in China when it was introduced from the West. Since the mid 1990s, eco-criticism has become the focus in Chinese literary theory and criticism. Ecologism and environmental aesthetics began to exert great influences. The term “ecoaesthetics”, not generally used by western scholars, is mainly used by some Chinese scholars, concentrating on the study of the relationship between aesthetics and the physical environment, which has become a very important field in Chinese aesthetics at present.

Environmental aesthetics extends beyond the narrow confines of the traditional philosophy of art, opens to various areas and disciplines, from outer space to the museum, from architecture to landscape, from city to wilderness. This trend of contemporary aesthetics and its neighbor disciplines determine interdisciplinary methods, including the methods

of natural sciences and human sciences in aesthetics research. We often overstate differences between Chinese and western culture. In fact despite the differences of territory regions, cultures, religions, arts, common grounds, such as people's fundamental values, morals, lifestyles, aesthetic tastes do entail similarities. If in ancient time because of the isolation of geographic conditions and the limits of vehicles, the differences between Chinese and western culture are obvious, today in the integrative global age, with the development of vehicles and convenience of information exchange, interaction between Chinese and western culture has been obviously increasing fast, and the tendency to be similar has become one distinctive feature of this modern society. This inevitable tendency is underestimated when we are constructing contemporary Chinese aesthetics. What's more, the negative effects of narrow nationalism are also underestimated in the present Chinese aesthetics and art theories.

Conclusion

In this global age when confronted with western dominant aesthetic discourse, the most urgent task for us is not putting forward original Chinese theory to differentiate from the western theories, but to keep a foothold on China's local context, trying to comprehensively illustrate the common issues for aesthetic cultures of both China and other countries and to find the common laws across east-western aesthetics. How to reconstruct contemporary Chinese aesthetics system in the conflict between globalization and localization, in the challenge of visual turn all over the world and environmental aesthetics? Maybe we may avoid the imaginary trap of antagonistic Sino-western dualism this kind of rigid antagonism may just be a kind of imaginary existence, and work out a practical feasible general method including local context, contemporary horizon, common topic, Sino-western interaction, interdisciplinary integration, so as to make a comprehensive and consistent interpretation of Chinese and Western aesthetics. Based on this, Chinese aesthetics will flow into the current of international aesthetics, and finally construct some general theories transcending the limitations and narrows of nationalities and common aesthetic theory applicable to the whole world including western aesthetics. This is the irreversible trend for the development of Chinese aesthetics.

NOTES:

- (1) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization>
- (2) http://www.uis.unesco.org/template/pdf/cscl/IntlFlows_EN.pdf 2005 UNESCO report
- (3) Zhao Lianyuan, *The Study of Comparative Aesthetics*, Beijing: P.L.A. Press, 2003, pp. 26-27.
- (4) Zhao Dunhua, "A Defense of Universalism", *Academic Monthly*, May 2007.
- (5) (7) Bernard Bosanquet, *A History of Aesthetics*, (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. xi. xii

- (6) (8) (9) Zhou Laixiang, & Chen Yan, *The Outline between Sino-western Comparative Aesthetics*, (Hefei: Anhui Literature & Art Press), pp.15. 17-18. 9-10.
- (10) <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/film/151195.htm>
- (11) Zhou Xian, "Spectacle Movies and Visual Culture," *Literature & Art Studies*, 3 (2005).
- (12) Arnold Berleant, "Preface", in *The Aesthetics of Environment*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), p. xi.
- Dr. Dai Xun, professor Department of Chinese, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, P. R. China. President, Chongqing Association for Aesthetics. He is the author of *Translingual Travel: Discourse Practice of "Cultural Hegemony"*(2004), *On Transformations of Western Literary Theory into Chinese*(2005), *Ancient Chinese Literary Theory: Two Expressive Modes and Their Modern Fates* (2006), and *Repression and Resistance — Somaesthetics and Its Development* (2007).

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

ჩინური ესთეტიკის მეთოდები და უძღვებები გლობალურ მარქაში

კუნ დაი

*ჩინური ესთეტიკური ასოციაციის პრეზიდენტი.
სამხრეთ დასავლეთის უნივერსიტეტი, ჩინეთი.*

რეზიუმე

გასული საუკუნის 80-იან წლებამდე ჩინელ მეცნიერთა ესთეტიკური კონცეფციები მარქსიზმის იდეოლოგიური წნეხის ქვეშ იყო მოქცეული. ავტორი ფიქრობს, რომ ამჟამად მსგავსი, არასასურველი ზეგავლენის ახალი საშიშროება იშვა; გლობალიზაცია არ ნიშნავს მხოლოდ ეკონომიკურ ინტეგრაციას, გლობალიზაცია კულტურის სფეროებსაც შეეხება და ჩინეთში, ეს პროცესი დასავლური და ამერიკანისტული კულტურის ზემოქმედებით ხორციელდება.

ავტორი თვლის, რომ ევროპული ესენციალიზმი, რომელიც საბოლოო ჯამში არსისა და არსებობის დუალიზმამდე მიდის, ჩინურ ესთეტიკაში შეიძლება დავძლიოთ სამყაროს ერთიანობაში განჭვრეტის პოზიციიდან, რაც აღმოსავლური აზროვნების და კერძოდ ჩინური ფილოსოფიის უძველეს ტრადიციას შეადგენს.

PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE AND RELIGION



CULTURE – PHILOSOPHIES – PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

(PHILOSOPHY EMERGING FROM CULTURE: A VIETNAMESE PERSPECTIVE)

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Abstract

Culture is the source of fostering the systems of philosophy, the philosophical thoughts, and is the condition and material, the origin and condition for development of philosophy. A nation may have no own system of philosophy, but it cannot exist without its own culture. Culture is the necessary conditions, requisites for existence of each nation in both aspects of the material and spiritual life. According to that meaning, culture is also the requisites for the existence and development of the systems of philosophy.

Different from the systems of scholarly philosophy in which the thinkers, scientists completely define and create the philosophies, the universals are commonly nameless, appear and exist in the different forms such as: folk-verse, folk-speech, in the daily life, in architecture, etc... One cannot determine exactly the time of generating one certain universal, one specific philosophy. But one can determine the author and the moment of origin of one specific system of philosophy. Such philosophies, abundant and diverse universals have existed for a long time in the life of each national community, however they can exist only side by side, reflect the specific aspects, processes of the social life, but they cannot incorporate into a system of philosophy having an internal structure, a system of arguments. Their generalization level cannot be high and closely systematical like the systems of scholarly philosophy.

The life reality of the nations shows the national cultures cannot be short of philosophies, universals because they are the orientations for their activities, communication and communication. The more and more a culture develops, the bigger and bigger quantity and depth of philosophies get. The farther and farther go towards the modernity, the bigger and bigger quantity, depth and polyhedral diversity of the entire philosophies become. The more and more go backward to the ancient past, the smaller and smaller quantity, depth and polyhedral diversity of the entire philosophies become. The most important is that when the system of philosophies increases in both quantity and depth, the other factors in the national culture also develop in both width and depth according to the development orientation of

system of philosophies, since how far philosophies develop and expand, they will pave the way, create the direction, form the patterns for actions, communication and activities in order to create a new cultural value, a new cultural environment, new cultural products.

Another aspect in the relationship between culture and philosophy that relates to the philosophies in the national culture, is the role of the philosophies for the systems of scholarly philosophy. Only a few nations have the systems of scholarly philosophy. The systems of philosophy are normally at the high argumentative level in comparison with the philosophies in the national culture. The systems of philosophy are also important components of the national culture. The doctrine of the scholarly philosophy is the high-leveled crystallization at the high argumentative level presenting the world outlook and the outlook on life of the nation in that era which was refracted through the concrete philosophers' prism. The philosophies in the national culture are the direct materials for forming the structure for all factors of the systems of scholarly philosophy. Meanwhile, the philosophies can take part more or less by their contents of knowledge, way of thinking, and deduction... into the systems of philosophy in the form of archetype. On the other hand, many philosophies indirectly take part in the doctrines of the scholarly philosophy through influencing the philosopher's thought, consciousness during the study process, through the life experience, through adopting the experiences of other people, in order to take part into the system of the scholarly philosophy since such system appeared, formed, developed and was expressed to become the systematical argumentation.

The national culture is the living environment of the systems of scholarly philosophy, is the place supplying food, drinking water, oxygen and sunlight to those systems of scholarly philosophy. Like the fruit trees being planted in the national culture gardens, the fatter, the richer with appropriate temperature, humidity, light they are, the more they develop with the more fruit. The systems of scholarly philosophy are the products firstly of the national culture that were piled up, distilled and sublimed through talent of the awareness, meditation, skill and spirit combined with the other virtues of the philosophers who have created the systems of scholarly philosophy that were also sprouted, fostered in the national culture. There is no national culture that developed to a certain degree, which cannot have the systems of scholarly philosophy.

Culture is the spiritual foundation of the society, at the same time it is the spiritual foundation of philosophy. Culture in the broad sense of the word is the foundation of the existence of the humankind, at the same time is the decisive foundation for the birth, existence, development and perdition of the systems of philosophy. Culture despite the broad sense or the narrow meaning of the word is a regular motivating force of the social development in general in which there is the development of philosophy. A nation without a developed culture cannot have abundant, diverse philosophies; moreover, it cannot have any systems of philosophy. A nation may be enslaved for thousands years, but unless it has not lost, eliminated its own culture, it can exist as an independent nation. Nations can borrow

systems of philosophy, but cannot borrow the philosophies, moreover cannot borrow culture in general. That is the relative independence of philosophy with culture and the role of culture for philosophy.

According to the Latin origin, culture means cultivating, bringing up, educating, developing, respecting. At present, in Vietnam, in spite of the different nuances such original meanings are still present in a certain degree in the notion of culture in its broad sense of the word. Culture is a system of programs, modes of upper biological living activities of the human (including actions, activities and communication). That system has been formed and developed throughout the historical process and helps in maintaining and improving the social life in all its aspects. Such programs, modes of activities have been incorporated by knowledge, standards, habits, ideas, ways of action, thoughts, doctrines, trust, target, objectives, value orientations... Such things are diverse and abundant and have been accumulated for a long time, formed the social experiences – one incorporated factor of culture. Culture is the socially genetic thing from one generation to another.

In the historical process, the notion of culture also changes and develops. In the initial period, culture meant cultivating land, then it meant processes and results of invention and creation from the natural materials. In the following period, culture even implied the meaning of the human bringing up (tending) and educating process. The ancient Roman philosopher, Cicero was the first person to use such a new meaning of the culture notion. Since the later half of the 18th century, the notion of culture has been used broadly in philosophy and the other social studies. Culture is considered as the most important aspect of the social life, related closely to the modes of the human living activities, thanks to that can distinguish the animal being from the human life. Next, the branches of the different opinions on culture started to appear. Culture is considered as developing process of reasoning and the living ways having reason of the human, contrary to the wild and barbarous nature in the pre-historical period. Culture is the human spiritual life that is maintained and developed in the historical process, is the evolution of moral consciousness, ethics, religion, philosophy, law and political sense that impulses the progress of the humankind.

On the other hand, they also consider culture as particular features of a society. Culture is a system of values and ideas defining the mode of organizing society in the different historical periods. Such systems are different and relatively independent, which include the whole of the material cultural assets, the racial customs, the forms of language and the other symbol systems(1).

In history, initially one commonly identified culture with all the things would be created by the people. Then, they considered culture only the human activeness in action, activities and communication, with an aim of creating a new world – the artificial world different from the natural one. Culture is like the mode of performing and adjusting the human activities, is a special aspect of the social life. It has created and imparted from one generation to another the programs upper-biological in deed, activities and communication of the people.

Therefore, culture is not identified with the society, it is only a special aspect of the social life, presented in all different social states and there is no social phenomenon that is not affected and influenced by culture or does not bear the cultural imprint.

Culture is like an information code system, that encodes the human social experiences. Those experiences are in relation with the forms of actions, activities, communication, and therefore, with the whole social structure and state created by a human, they are presented like the upper-biological programs in regards to action, activity and communication. If in the biological systems, there are even the special information structures in order to manage and adjust such biological systems (ADN, ARN) called gene, then in the social systems such genetic code is culture. The forms of action, activity, communication are adjusted by "the cultural codes" with an aim of producing and developing factors, social sub-systems and their relations, typical for each specific mode of organizing society (that means featuring for the second natural world), communities and social institutions, personalities that are typical for such society. That is similar to the biological genetic codes conducting the metabolism in order to form the cells and organs of a biological body (2).

Regarding the human beings, beside the biological one, there is also another genetic code system. That is the social genetic code, having function of transmitting from one to another, from generation to generation the whole block of the social experiences. In order to be transmitted, preserved, such experience block must be present in the form of different signs such as: sound, script (writing system), language, voice, gestures, images... Such system of signs is very diverse, abundant so that it can record the block of the social experiences that are regularly renovated, modified, enriched and developed. Such system of signs is one of the incorporated factors of culture.

In the second natural world, the products created by the human are also the signs in the form of the different formulas and meanings. The material cultural objects play a dual role in the human life: on the one hand, they directly serve practical, specific objective and daily needs of the people such as: eating, dressing, accommodating, travelling... On the other hand, they are the means of preserving, transferring programs, meanings, contents, modes of adjusting activity, action, communication. Only in the second aspect, the second natural world bears the cultural meaning and content.

Development of culture creates meanings, contents, modes of adjusting activities of the people, creates new genetic code systems, in order to preserve and impart such meanings, contents and modes of adjusting. The society development connects closely with the formation of new modes of activity, therefore makes appear new programs, new modes along with new cultural genetic codes. In the development process, the disintegration, combination, exclusion, supplement among the new and old, modern and traditional systems, modes also take place.

Separating the fields of spiritual activities leads to generating new contents, meanings, modes of adjusting as the indirect and derivative structures in relation with the

concrete forms of the practice. According to the historical movement, the independent fields of the spiritual culture gradually appeared such as: religion, art, ethics, science, political sense and jurisdiction, They interact with each other and take part in adjusting activities, actions and communication in the daily human life.

In a certain development period of the society, the social genetic codes were formed, either directly or indirectly, adjusted the human activities, gradually created their orders, classes/ranks. They can be classified into 3 classes: 1- The past cultural remnants; 2- The contemporary culture (the programs, contents, modes of adjusting activities creating a defined form of the existing culture); 3 – The factors belonging to the future culture (the new moral disciplines, ideas, thoughts about the future society...). Three levels, classes, three those kinds of culture can be concretized, deformed and transformed in order to adjust actions, activities and communication of the people and can be unified to incorporate into a perfect whole system (3).

The cultural factors in the perfect whole system connote and connect closely with each other to create the universals, the philosophies bearing the nature of the world outlook, in which the social accumulated experiences are hoarded up. However, they are not the philosophical categories, but are the realistic reflections that are shown to become the cultural universals, the regulations, standards, philosophies. The universals bearing the world outlook nature and the philosophies can operate and develop even outside of the philosophical reflection. They were inherently available in the cultures where the forms of the philosophical knowledge haven't been developed.

The universals of culture can be divided into two big blocks having close interrelation. The first block acknowledges the most fundamental, common features of the objects, including the human activities. They are the basic structure of the human consciousness and bear the general nature: space, time, movement, relation, quality, cause and effect, ... The second block of the cultural universals is the special categories, defining people as the subjects of activity, communication, relation, such as people, society, consciousness, good and evil, faith, trust, hope.... The block of such universals acknowledges experiences, takes individuals into the social relations and communication. The universals of culture can be divided into two big blocks having close interrelation. The first block acknowledges the most fundamental, common features of the objects, including the human activities. They are the basic structure of the human consciousness and bear the general nature: space, time, movement, relation, quality, cause and effect, the second block of the cultural universals is the special categories, defining people as the subjects of activity, communication, relation, such as people, society, consciousness, good and evil, faith, trust, hope.... The block of such universals acknowledges experiences, takes individuals into the social relations and communication.

The cultural universals, the philosophies appear, develop and operate like a perfectly whole system, each factor interrelated and interacting either directly or indirectly. In the system of the cultural universals there have been expression of the most common conceptions in

regards to the basic factors and the aspects of the human living activities: human position, social relations, spiritual life and values of the human life. Those conceptions contain inside of the contents, programs, modes of general activities of the society and they are concretized by more concrete conceptions, typical for a form of defined social organization.

In the universals bearing the world outlook nature of culture may have the living alternatives and the private activities, which are typical for the different cultural styles and rooted in the human consciousness. At the same time, they are also closely related to the contents, modes, action programs of both the past and the future, presenting the features of the communication mode and human activities, of preserving, transmitting the social experiences and value standing. They bear the national and racial specific characteristics in each culture, and define the particular traits of the different cultures.

The universals of culture perform simultaneously at least three functions in the human activities: 1- Classifying and arranging the social experiences that have been being available in the way of “packing” notion in order to transmit to impart to different generations, individuals, eras; 2- The universals of culture is the basic structure of the human consciousness in a specific historical era. ; 3- The universals have interrelations to create an overall picture about the world, to form a thing called the world outlook of the era, which presents the general conception of the human and the world, and the value steps. Therefore, such picture will determine not only the human thinking but also the human emotion (4).

The meaning of the cultural universals will be perceived by individuals and they will determine the level of conception about the world, action and behaviour of the individuals. The meaning of the cultural universals is in the group level and the individuals will be adjusted appropriately with their specific circumstances.

Many philosophical doctrines in history have realized the fundamental position of the cultural universals existed in the era which generated those philosophical doctrines. The meaning of the cultural universals is located in all fields: in common language, in the phenomena of the moral sense, in philosophy, in religion, arts, technique, law, etc...

The society reformation always demands changing the values and the deep meaning of the life which are acknowledged in the universals of culture. The society transformation regularly goes closely with a revolution in the brain, with criticizing the orientations of the world view which are dominating that country and in that point of time, along with the proposal on new values. There will be no big change in the society if there is no change in culture. Being the subject of culture, but the human is always the creation of culture. It has personality thanks to adoption of the social experiences transmitted in culture through educating, fostering, socializing and “social genetics”

The activities of the biological program (eating, drinking, self-defence instincts, sexual desire, etc...) in the human have experienced in the socialization process, education, and performed in the form of the defined culture. There may be many manifestations of the biological programs which are forbidden because of culture. Culture “taboos” many

ambitions, wishes, desires presenting freedom of the animal instincts through educating, training the human since the childhood, culture also includes social – unconsciousness, which is transmitted among generations, among one another (5).

All changes in culture are due to the creative activeness of individual. The human is the creation of culture, but is the subject creating it. Although in the different cultures, abilities and conditions for creation are different. Obviously, creation in the traditional societies is inferior to the creation in the technological societies. If in the traditional society tradition is superior, in the creative technological society, renovation is superior. As well variability and genetics are all important for creature, tradition and creation are also equally important for society and culture. Culture not only creates, transforms the life, but also preserves the stable foundations of the social life.

In the traditional society, the cultures exchange relations with each other, borrow the fruits of each other, however they rarely touch their fundamental deep layer. In the technological society, the interaction among the cultures is stronger. The modernization processes connect closely with borrowing, adopting new technologies, science, education system that have changed the basic value of the traditional culture. At present, with the rapid development speed of technology, the cultural transformations are getting bigger and bigger, the position, role and interrelations between the scholarly culture and the mass culture also change strongly. Dialogue between the cultures is very important. The diversity and interaction among the cultures are the conditions for their development.

Nevertheless, though the impact of technology is so strong, each nation has its own culture. In the national culture there are the postulates, principles, behaviours which are expressed in its own way. Oriental, Vietnamese and European people all use a food tray when eating, however the food tray of the Oriental people is different from the one of Europeans': European people eat on individual ration, Oriental people together use a food tray and together enjoy dishes, Vietnamese people use chopsticks when eating, Europeans use spoons, forks, ...

Each nation has its own culture, but not that every nation has its own scholarly, academic philosophical system. Whatever nation has its own philosophical ideology and especially also has the system of the universals, the diverse and abundant philosophies. The systems of scholarly, academic philosophy have been summed up from the development of science, practice and social history, in other words, the development of the national culture, in which there are also the systems of the scholarly philosophy that were built previously.

Culture is the source of fostering the systems of philosophy, the philosophical thoughts, and is the condition and material, the origin and condition for development of philosophy. A nation may have no own system of philosophy, but it cannot exist without its own culture. Culture is the necessary conditions, requisites for existence of each nation in both aspects of the material and spiritual life. According to that meaning, culture is also the requisites for the existence and development of the systems of philosophy.

From reality of the development history of the nations in the world and in the South-East Asian Region, we can see in each national culture ever connotes the universals, the philosophies about the human, life, society and the world in general. However, that is not the system of philosophy. Such universals, philosophies can be disjointed, scattered, cannot be connected closely with each other, although those are the universals, the deep philosophies. They express meditation, summing up the human experiences, knowledge about the aspects, facts, single phenomena in the life. They can be expressed by folk verses, folk-speeches, literature, arts, architecture, and behavior in the life. For Vietnamese people :

“Oh gourd, love the pumpkin

Though of different species, you share the same trellis”

For a long time that folk-speech is the behavior in the relationship among people with people. However, that is not philosophy, also not the system of philosophy.

Different from the systems of scholarly philosophy in which the thinkers, scientists completely define and create the philosophies, the universals are commonly nameless, appear and exist in the different forms such as: folk-verse, folk-speech, in the daily life, in architecture, etc... One cannot determine exactly the time of generating one certain universal, one specific philosophy. But one can determine the author and the moment of origin of one specific system of philosophy. Such philosophies, abundant and diverse universals have existed for a long time in the life of each national community, however they can exist only side by side, reflect the specific aspects, processes of the social life, but they cannot incorporate into a system of philosophy having an internal structure, a system of reasons. Their generalization level cannot be high and closely systematical like the systems of scholarly philosophy.

Those philosophies, universals are located in the national culture, they do not separate, then closely connect with culture in both the broad sense of the word and the literal meaning, in both the material and spiritual culture. They mix into the national culture and they are tiny sand seeds in the sandbank of the national culture, is a basic incorporated factor having decisive meaning for the depth of the national culture. From a certain angle, can say, such philosophies, universals are the layer of compact, condensed sediment of the national culture. It is not the entire culture, but it is the core factor that creates quality of culture, makes culture more abundant and more profound. It is like meat seeds that are grinded smoothly in a soup pot or in a gruel pot we eat everyday.

On the other hand, the national culture is an endless source of milk fostering and developing philosophies and universals. The bigger and bigger size, intensity and working ability of a nation are and the more and more culture develops that make their philosophies, universals more and more abundant, profound, comprehensive and manifest the human life more fully. Development of the national culture supplies materials for the appearance, existence and development of the philosophies, universals. In the contrary direction, the philosophies, universals have effect of orienting and pushing up the human activities and communication, their actions according to the cultural, creative orientation for expanding and de-

veloping culture. The philosophies are models, orientations for the following development of culture. That means it is the direct base for the following development of culture.

Therefore, being an incorporated part of culture, but it is the core and important part. Moreover, the philosophies in each national culture are commonly familiar, directly related to the human daily life, they are transmitted through education of school, education of family, accumulation through experiences, learning from friends... The philosophies, universals are only at the experience level or experiences, but are not located at the argument level. Hence, they are easy to understand, to apply, appropriate to mind inner feeling, character, and personality of community, so they are easy to go deep into the human, easy to perceive and to orient the human activities, communication more lightly, gently than the argument philosophies in the systems of philosophy.

The everyday reality of the nations shows the national cultures cannot be short of philosophies, universals because they are orientations for their activities, communication and communication. The more a culture develops, the bigger the quantity and the depth of philosophies get. The farther and farther go towards the modernity, the bigger and bigger quantity, depth and polyhedral diversity of the entire philosophies become. The more and more go backward the ancient past, the smaller and smaller quantity, depth and polyhedral diversity of the entire philosophies become. The most important is that when the system of philosophies increases in both quantity and depth, the other factors in the national culture also develop in both width and depth according to the development orientation of system of philosophies, since how far philosophies develop and expand, they will pave the way, create the direction, form the patterns for actions, communication and activities in order to create new cultural value, new cultural environment, new cultural products.

Another aspect in the relationship between culture and philosophy that relates to the philosophies in the national culture, is the role of the philosophies for the systems of scholarly philosophy. Only a few nations have the systems of scholarly philosophy. The systems of philosophy are normally at the high argumentative level in comparison with the philosophies in the national culture. The systems of philosophy are also an important component of the national culture. The doctrine of the scholarly philosophy is the high-levelled crystallization at the high argumentative level presenting the world outlook and the outlook on life of the nation in that era which was refracted through the concrete philosophers' prism. The philosophies in the national culture are the direct materials for forming the structure for all factors of the systems of scholarly philosophy. Meanwhile, the philosophies can take part more or less by their contents of knowledge, way of thinking, and deduction... into the systems of philosophy in the form of archetype. On the other hand, many philosophies indirectly take part in the doctrines of the scholarly philosophy through influencing the philosopher's thought, consciousness during the study process, through the life experience, through adopting the experiences of the other people, in order to take part into the system of the scholarly philosophy since such a system appeared, formed, developed and was expressed to become the systematical argumentation.

The system of the scholarly philosophy by itself is a basic and important incorporated factor of the national culture, if that national culture has the systems of the scholarly philosophy. It is difficult to say that a high-developed culture can have the systems of the scholarly philosophy, but clearly that in the development history of the nations in the world, from the ancient age up to now, the systems of scholarly philosophy were born in the wide, deep, brilliant-developed cultures such as in: Greece, Ancient Rome, India, China, Germany, France, England, The national culture is the living environment of the systems of scholarly philosophy, is the place supplying food, drinking water, oxygen and sunlight to those systems of scholarly philosophy. Like the fruit trees being planted in the national culture gardens, the fatter, the richer with appropriate temperature, humidity, light they are, the more they develop with the more fruit. The systems of scholarly philosophy are the products firstly of the national culture that were piled up, distilled and sublimed through talent of the awareness, meditation, skill and spirit combined with the other virtues of the philosophers who have created the systems of scholarly philosophy that were also sprouted, fostered in the national culture. One can say there is no national culture that developed to a certain degree and cannot have the systems of scholarly philosophy.

In the national culture, the philosophies are the direct nutrition source of the systems of philosophy, since they were distilled, sorted out carefully, existed in the form of the general knowledge, the orientations for the human actions, activities and communication. A culture that has not developed to such degree of having the philosophies, cannot have the systems of scholarly philosophy. The other factors of the culture can either directly or indirectly affect the formation and development of philosophic thinking, of the formation, development history of philosophic thoughts, of the systems of scholarly philosophy. However, the impact through the philosophies is the most basic and important one. Similarly, the national culture is the source of maternal milk of the scholarly literary works, then the national culture is also the endless source of maternal milk fostering the philosophic argumentum, the systems of scholarly philosophy.

In reality, there is no separation between the national culture and the entire philosophies of nation existing in such culture. Similarly, the systems of scholarly philosophy are like that, but they are different from the systems of philosophies, the systems of scholarly philosophy belong to another layer; step in generalization degree and logical argument and systemization. The single philosophies are commonly not based on logical argument, their generalization degree is low therefore systemization is not as high as in the systems of scholarly philosophy. The systems of scholarly philosophy are the results of summing up, generalizing the development results of science, social life, historical experiences and individual experiences, i.e.: they are generalization, summarization of the development steps of culture; therefore, their generalization is higher than the philosophies and culture in general. The philosophies commonly reflect single scattered, incoherent experiences, facts, actions, not presenting the general laws or the deep essence of phenomenon, process. Therefore, they cannot bear the systemization, argumentum. But they are the important

materials for the systems of scholarly philosophy, and are the inevitable intermediary among the other factors, parts, layers, steps of culture with the systems of philosophy of that nation. Both special forms in the entire national culture inter-modify to form the general world outlook, outlook on life of that nation, they have effect to orient in general so that the human can act, communicate and operate in the daily life.

With the historical development of culture and national life in general, the philosophies as well as the philosophy have the ceaseless transformation. There are the philosophies that can lose effectiveness and fall into oblivion, there are new philosophies that arise, reflect new phenomena, things, process, as well there are the systems of philosophy that will gradually fall into oblivion. New systems of philosophy that can better meet the requirements of social life and individuals, will arise and develop. The men of the primitive age or of the slave age had the philosophies that for the time being the modern men do not have. On the contrary, the modern men have the philosophies that the ancient people could not have. Likely, the primitive men could not say "Precious like gold, the type of philosophy the modern men usually use. The similar situation is also available in the systems of scholarly philosophy. The new systems of philosophy of the following era that will ever inherit the philosophies, thoughts, arguments, achievements of the previous eras, arrange them so that they can be suitable for the new systems of philosophy, adopt new philosophies and the other new factors of the culture.

Philosophy occurs within the nation, pushes up the national culture to develop up to a new step, impulses the movement of the national culture, modifies, makes good the certain shortcomings of the national culture. Philosophy either presents the reflection of the national culture or is a basic side, a key area of the national culture. Philosophy is the national culture in the highest argument level, is the generalization of the cultural achievements in different fields from science to reality, from the knowledge to the living experiences, from the historical past to the present and future. Therefore, philosophy is affecting orientation of the world outlook for the following development of the national culture, to conduct actions, activities and communication of the human in creating new culture, in adopting and enjoying the cultural achievements in general.

If philosophy wants to be at the top of argument, it must sum up and generalize the development of all cultural fields. That requires the philosophies to have broad cultural views, broad and deep knowledge about the different fields of the national cultural life. The more philosophy stands at the top of argument, the more profound its size and degree of generalization, summarization become, the higher level it stand at in comparison with the philosophies and so, the more it has effect of orienting greatly for many different fields of culture. Such orienting effect can be through the direct way by adopting philosophical argument knowledge, possibly by the indirect way through adopting the philosophies that are located in the systems of philosophy themselves or were transformed, amended, made accurate in the process of appearance and existence. Each man who lives, operates and

communicates, is always conducted by some philosophical arguments and defined philosophies.

In the consciousness and life of each man, though being self-conscious or not self-conscious, they are always influenced by the philosophies and philosophy. The entire culture, but the core is that the philosophies and philosophy create paradigm, corridor, pipe of actions, activities and communication of the human. In relation with culture, all philosophies and philosophy creates a paradigm system, corridor, pipe for creating, adopting and enjoying the human culture. On the other hand, the cultural life in the development process also makes contribution in revealing the limitations, shortcomings, mistakes of the philosophies and the systems of philosophy, thenceforth, perfects, and amends or eliminates them out of the human sense and life.

Nevertheless, in the existence and development process of the philosophies and the systems of philosophy when forming paradigm, corridor, pipe for culture, they can bind, inhibit the cultural development, and especially inhibit thinking and ability of creating the human culture. The philosophies, systems of philosophy that are backward, obsolete or have mistakes, normally begin to have reverse effect by presenting their conflicts with the philosophies, systems of philosophy and culture in general, even among them with culture can begin a conflict period. In the conflict process, culture gradually presents demand on renovating, replacing the old philosophies and philosophy with the new philosophies and philosophy. At the same time, culture will gradually create, replenish and agglomerate materials for generating new philosophies or new systems of philosophy. The conflict between philosophy and culture will gradually create the cultural premises for resolving such conflicts and then the means that help resolve the conflicts. Culture will progress step by step, resolve gradually single, small problems coming toward resolving bigger problems, creating new cultural materials, meeting new requirement of the development, gradually modifying into the natural cultural treasure new knowledge, new philosophies, and new cultural values. On such agglomeration basis, culture will speed up philosophy to make new sudden breaches, create the systems of philosophy that are newer, more suitable for the development. Culture takes part in sorting out, screening, eliminating, preserving, bringing into play and imparting the values of old philosophy into new philosophy.

Culture is the spiritual foundation of the society, at the same time it is the spiritual foundation of philosophy. Culture in the broad sense of the word is the foundation of the existence of the humankind, at the same time is the decisive foundation for the birth, existence, development and perdition of the systems of philosophy. Culture despite the broad sense or the narrow meaning of the word is a regular motivating force of the social development in general in which there is the development of philosophy. A nation without a developed culture cannot have abundant, diverse philosophies; neither can it have any systems of philosophy. A nation may be enslaved for thousands years, but unless it has not lost, eliminated its own culture, it can exist as an independent nation. Nations can borrow sys-

tems of philosophy, but cannot borrow the philosophies, moreover cannot borrow culture in general. That is the relative independence of philosophy with culture and the role of culture for philosophy.

Not being completely identifiable however can imagine that philosophy is the brilliant halo of the cultural fire globe. The bigger and bigger, the more and more luminous such globe gets, the more and more brilliant, pervasive the halo becomes, the more beautiful its color becomes. Culture, philosophies and the systems of philosophy is three different layers, steps of culture itself in the broad sense of the word, but that is three in one – a culture in the broad meaning..

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

კულტურა და ფილოსოფია – ფილოსოფიური სისტემები

(კულტურიდან აღმოცენებული ფილოსოფია – ვიეტნამური პერსპექტივა)

ლუონგ ღინ ჰაი

პროფესორი, ვიეტნამის ფილოსოფიის ინსტიტუტის ვიცე-დირექტორი.

რეზიუმე

წარმოდგენილ ნაშრომში საკმაოდ ვრცლად არის გაშუქებული გენეტიკური მიმართება კულტურასა და ფილოსოფიას შორის, როგორც ზოგადი თვალსაზრისით, ასევე კერძოდ, ვიეტნამის სულიერ ტრადიციათა შენარჩუნებისა და განახლების პერსპექტივაში. ავტორი განსაკუთრებით ხაზს უსვამს განსხვავებას კულტურიდან აღმოცენებულ ფილოსოფიასა და სასწავლო-ფილოსოფიურ სისტემებს შორის. ფილოსოფია, როგორც კულტურის ფენომენი იკვებება ერის უძველესი, მითოსურ აზროვნებაში ფესვებამდგარი ტრადიციებით, რაც ადამიანთა ფსიქოემოციურ არქეტიპს შეადგენს. სასწავლო-ფილოსოფიური სისტემა კი შეიძლება ნასესხები იყოს ზოგადსაკაცობრიო კულტურის საგანძურადან, გლობალიზაციის ეპოქის მოთხოვნათა გათვალისწინებით. ავტორის აზრით, საჭიროა დამყარდეს ჰარმონია ფილოსოფიის ამ ორ სახეობათა შორის.

ავტორი გვისაბუთებს, რომ ერმა შეიძლება იარსებოს სასწავლო-ფილოსოფიურ სისტემათა გარეშეც, მაგრამ კულტურის არარსებობის შემთხვევაში, იგი შეწყვეტს არსებობას. ერი შეიძლება დამონებულ იქნას, მაგრამ საკუთარი კულტურის თვითმყოფადობა მას გადაარჩენს. ერი შეიძლება განთავისუფლდეს, მაგრამ თუკი ის მოკლებულია კულტურულ მემკვიდრეობას, დიდი ხნის სიცოცხლე არ უწერია მას.

აქედან გამომდინარე, ავტორი დაასკვნის, რომ კულტურას სასიცოცხლო მნიშვნელობა აქვს ადამიანთა ეროვნული ერთობისათვის. კულტურა არის ფილოსოფიის წყარო იმდენად, რამდენადაც თვით ფილოსოფიური აზროვნება, როგორც კულტურის ფენომენი, ერის თვითმყოფადობის, მისი ყოფნა-არყოფნის, მისი გადარჩენის აუცილებელ სულიერ ქმედებას შეადგენს.

THE CONCEPT OF SPIRITUAL COGNITION

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Yet ancient philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) and later Kant defined the certain hierarchy of human cognition and abilities. It can be expressed in the following way:

- *Sensory cognition* is the basic one, all our cognition begins with it. Aristotle in the beginning of his main masterpiece work "*Metaphysics*" wrote: "All the people by their nature tend to acquire knowledge. And its proof is perception impulse..." (980a);
- *Rational cognition* is functioning with the help of mind. It has ability to establish and disclose objective (cause-effect) relations between phenomena, laws of nature. Intellect is cognition through concepts and categories, it is not tentative but discursive;
- *Cognition based on the intellect ideas*. Intellect ideas serve for understanding while reason categories serve for assertion about perceptions. By an idea Kant means essential reason conception to which senses can't supply adequate subject. Cognition founded on intellect specifies world apprehension principles. In *Criticism pure mind* he notes that any our cognition is caused thanks to senses, then moves to reason and finishes into intellect as the highest cognition capacity;
- *Faith as "improvable knowledge"* directed to *cognition of incomprehensible and transcendental*.

Only the last two highest levels are considered as spiritual cognition.

Meanwhile we must make difference between faith and superstitions. Faith is based on speculative thought and doesn't contain naturalistic character while superstitions are specific "vain belief", faith in nonsense. Superstitions are always naturalistic; they give literal interpretation to all that is interpreted in spiritually-symbolic way by faith. Faith gives a scope to the human freedom and consolidates it but superstitions always mean complete human dependence on some forces or idols. The superstitions, same as mystics construct other worlds in the image and likeness of the sensual world; per se they just double and triple the present world. The faith says about other world as of a spiritual speculative world but not as of a world situated in some other space and time. The faith speaks about eternity. Hell and Paradise — are spiritual ideas so within these abstract concepts it is useless to look for wonderful gardens or for devils with pans. We can find these symbols in religious legends but they are not to be interpreted as naturalistic ones. There are always a lot of superstitions but there is only one faith though its interpretations can vary. The superstitions

are unscientific, but the faith is super-scientific, it includes science but is not limited by it. According to philosophy a human being can create his life on the basis of his sense and according to developed religion on the basis of faith in absolute virtue that is above and more powerful than stars or terrestrial augurs.

Let us correlate the discussed human cognitive abilities with the main kinds of human's intellectual development of the world:

| Cognition type | Cognition organ | Form of cognition | Cognition units | Purpose of cognition |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| Philosophy | mind (in theory) | reason | ideas | Speculative cognition essence of being |
| Religion | heart | faith | symbols | Divinizing and salvation |
| Science | intellect (in practice) | judgment, perception | conception, comprehension | Cognition of cause-sequence ties and laws |
| Mystics (super-stations) | Distorted mind, false perception | Imagination | Sensual hallucination or deluded mind | Illusion of joining to mysterious and powerful forces |

Then we can suggest another classification of the forms of cognition basing on kinds of spiritual human activity and restraining from hierarchical approach. In this connection it is possible to select some more forms of cognition: existential, moral and aesthetical.

We can also differentiate the following concepts:

- 1) *rational*, typical of science;
- 2) *extra rational out of rational*, typical of philosophy, religion, art and morals, that are not limited by the boundaries of rational cognition and get beyond it but do not deny the scientific knowledge within the science competence;
- 3) *Irrational*, typical of mystics, all kinds of superstitions pseudoscientific gnostics etc. Irrational is not compatible with rational and does not form a part of extra rational. It has ability to create all kinds of cross breed forms that may claim for spirituality (sects, extra-sensory and parapsychology magic and some modern «spiritual» trends and cure methods etc.), or claim for being scientific, though in fact remaining pseudoscientific, since are using incompatible methods (astrology and many others);
- 4) *Super-rational*, the cognition of which is ultimate goal of philosophy, religion and art the name of which is excessively used by irrational. Super-rational can be characterized as spiritual, for the latter relates to the first one. Mystics and superstitions are not super-rational but are just primitive “rational” and empirical. They claim for the status

of super national knowledge while remaining within the limits of rational and design structures of «other worlds», contradicting by that to empiricism and rationalism in the proper sense of the word. Without any authorization irrational is using both rational and super rational, being in fact pseudo rational and pseudo super rational.

Any true cognition regardless its form it has or the methods it use has a creative character. Creativity finds its reflection in cognition of unknown in the very movement of cognizing thought. The specific creative character is an inherent quality of intuition and of imagination. The development of creative imagination plays the role of a ram for break through the traditional theories and getting beyond their limits. The cognition creativity can exist in environment of freedom, objectivity and criticism.

Now it is much spoken about the lack of spirituality in a society and in a person, but what is the spiritual as it is? You may hear the most various answers to this question it: someone sees the spiritual only in sphere of religion or mysticism, someone associate it with the whole area of culture or identifies it as morals. Especially frequently nowadays the spiritual is connected to any mystical visions or ideas, extrasensory or Para psychological abilities. The ordinary consciousness maintains concept of spiritual in the individual interests. But what does its essence consists of?

First of all it is *self-cognition*. In the most intimate spiritual making where the person is extremely sincere to himself, he is capable to touch depths of his own life, to meet himself, sometimes for the first time is valid to find out and realize him. Thus the spiritual self-knowledge is carried out, for such self-recognition is simultaneously also spiritual transformation of the person. The spiritual knowledge begins there where a person in the unfathomed sincerity concerns depths of his own same as of general being.

Spiritual as a process represents itself in disclosing of essence of a person that is nothing else that the self-cognition. In the act of self-knowledge a person is given to itself, but in a paradoxical way, so, that he is a special essence that is in the dark concerning its own nature. Therefore the first precept appealed to a person from God, became a commandment “know thyself”. In a history it arises for the first time as an inscription on Apollonian temple in Delphi, then it is repeated by Tales, and it becomes meaning of the life for Socrates, getting in Plato’s theory about knowledge as reminiscence a complete kind. The same requirement is proclaimed in religion though in the form specific to it, it becomes also the basic theme of art, especially in Aeschylus’s tragedies in Ancient Greece, in Indian *Bhagavad-Gita* and even in *Epos about Gilgamesh* in ancient Mesopotamia.

The spiritual phenomenon realizes in a person, and this process can be named self-knowledge. Hegel characterized the given process in the following way: “Know *thyself*” — this absolute precept neither in itself, nor there where it was stated historically, has no value only *the self-cognition* directed to *certain* abilities, character, propensities and weakness of an individual, but value of knowledge of that originally in the person, originally in itself and for itself, knowledge of the *essence* as spirit. So in philosophy of spirit the so-called human-

knowledge is of small value, aspiring to investigate in other people their *features*, their passions and weakness — these as they are called, the bends of human heart - knowledge, on the one hand, having the sense in case it can appraise the knowledge of *general* - a person as such and by that the essence – spirit and on the other hand — engaged in casual, insignificant, *not original* kinds of existence of spiritual, but not penetrating up to *substantial* — up to the spirit itself”(1)

In true philosophy as spiritual making, within the framework of it and by it the self-knowledge was accomplished. Even the first naturalistic philosophers studied universe to learn themselves. Heraclites still earlier than Socrates, in fact, also was engaged only in self-knowledge, sitting on steps of a temple, playing dice with children and reflecting about eternity. He, “...as if having made something majestic and important, speaks: “I searched for myself” — and from Delphian sayings by the most divine considered “Know thyself”, - that, as Socrates has served as a starting point of rising of this question and his research...”. So wrote Plutarch about Heraclites (2).

Socrates passes to more direct self-knowledge, he is not interested any more in round-about ways to himself: “I have refused research of objective reality”, he spoke(3). Following Socrates it is possible to say that the spiritual knowledge is “art which helps us to care of ourselves”, i.e. it is directed not that belongs to us, but on improvement of ourselves (4). As per Socrates the spiritual knowledge is directed on search of essence of human ego that later Plato has defined as *idea, eidos* of a person (5). The identification of idea with the essence of spiritual has resulted then in its understanding as metaphysic-super sensual, to avoid it in the given work, the spiritual knowledge is defined as disclosing of essence of a person.

Deep conformity can be found in east philosophy. In Ancient Indian philosophy the spiritual purpose began to be determined by a concept *moksha*, i.e. “deliverance” in translation from a Sanskrit, and *Mokshadharma* - as a way, the law of delivering and one of Mahabharata’s books simultaneously. *Mokshadharma*, as well as Upanishads, comprises the basic conceptual system and principles, i.e. archetype of Ancient Indian Culture. In Indian philosophy the spiritual knowledge and essence of a person are defined through transcendental-immanent understanding of Brahman-Atman. Same is said, for example, in Taoist book “Guan In-Tzu “: “to search for wisdom outside of itself – the top of nonsense”, and the ancient Confucian philosopher Meng-tzu, said that “the doctrine has only one purpose – search for the lost human nature”(6).

The fundamental metaphysical categories of philosophy and basic religious symbols can be considered as conceptions of essence of a person. Then also the category of being is a symbol of essence of a person, because to it he is called to transcend from his existence, finding himself, thus, in *a gleam* of being (Heidegger). A person is an eternal way to himself, and for this purpose it is necessary for him to learn all universe as in breadth heavens, and in depth of his own psyche, the logos of which is infinite in its self-increasing (Heraclites). And for this purpose he needs transcendent and immanent, being and empiri-

cal world, and such concepts as *atom* (Democritus), *idea* (Plato), “the *unmoved-mover*” (Aristotle), the supreme *unity* (Neo-Platonist *The One*, Vedanta, VI. Solovyev) etc. They are, among other things, symbols of essence of the person, points of a foothold for thought and self-creation. In spiritual knowledge a person finds a way to his essence.

A person can be a slave not only of empirical circumstances, but also of ideas which are imposed on him by culture or ideology. Therefore research of forms of spiritual, results the analysis of the concept in clearing of consciousness from illusions. The philosophical analysis of spiritual is a way to freedom, process of self-purification and self-deliverance. In this sense philosophy, for example, is an esoteric science, accessible to everybody, but not by all is comprehended.

The experience of spiritual self-cognition that is creating essence of a person creates also a culture. It is the form-building core, we shall recollect confessions of St. Augustine, Rousseau and Lev Tolstoy they are not only the reflection of revolution in culture, but in many respects have served also as its catalyst. In a history of culture of mankind spiritual experience of knowledge is disclosing as Revelation, - a Tree with three branches: religion, philosophy and art. They are united right by the phenomenon of spiritual that, however, is materialized in these three spheres in specific way, basing on various intrinsic forces of the person, his abilities and potentialities.

Strictly speaking, the phenomenon of spiritual is not the property of culture in the sense that it is itself arises on the basis of spiritual acts. From nothingness strings of being are weaved, from spiritual is created cultural, its cloth is weaved. In culture the movement of spiritual is objectified. In spiritual creativity the person finds freedom and dignity. Spiritual acts derivate senses and real values, social and juridical rules, morals. The basic moral precepts have been born as revelation within the depth of self-cognition experience, regardless what basis it would be ground on. So, for example, a precept “Don’t kill!”, is already known for thousands years, but wars proceed on the Earth, and the state laws of many countries include a death sentence in its Codes.

The aforesaid understanding of spiritual does not coincide with anthropology of L. Feuerbach. The latter reduced all understanding of spiritual to love, and mostly sensual, than spiritual. In pathos of bringing down on the ground transcendental he has missed the essence of a person disclose itself through the process of transcend without which the birth of spiritual is impossible. The love as the strongest and the deepest experience, irrespective of object at which it is directed, already comprises in itself an element of transcendence, self-rebellion and spreading beyond its limits. For this reason Descartes said: “the concept of God is previous than me” (7). Through the given statement the philosopher, probably, wanted to tell, that a person is born spiritually from the supreme idea, original pattern, transcendence, instead of a monkey. “The pure concept, - explains Descartes in the other place, - there is a God “(8). Only basing on such utmost concepts, the person is capable to accomplish spiritual cognition, which creates his essence. By means of them a

person pulls himself by his hair out of an animal life, same as Munchausen – out of a bog. In this sense a person has his origin from God, or from human being, depending on what conceptual system we shall select. As to the traditional anthropology Heidegger marked, that it “is such interpretation of the person which basically already knows, what he is such and consequently it is never capable to be asked a question what creature he is”(9).

However, despite everything that has been told, the spiritual knowledge as constructing essence of a person, or developing it, it should be studied, under the name of the object, anthropology, i.e. by science about a person, in this case, if it is possible to express it as, - spiritual anthropology. The latter should not evaluate a person as something that is constant once and forever, and not as static concept. Even when a person thinks about himself and defines himself through a pronoun *I*, - *I* is no more than a symbol of infinite depth, and *I* is only its name. The essence of a person is not something static; the creative person each day is capable to recognize himself as something other. The essence of a person is developed during the spiritual self-cognition conducting a person in his infinite way to the Person, to perfection and to an ideal that is to open the spiritual archetype of humankind to the full volume. This process by itself is the supreme kind of spiritual creativity and creation where a person creates not something alien to itself, or something auxiliary for his existence, but his very essence.

The spiritual phenomenon can also be defined through concept of transformation. Spiritual is carried out then when a certain essence is transformed to the Person. Further this process can acquire its own symbolic and terms depending on what material it is accomplished: religious, philosophical or other creative materials. But in its essence the spiritual act is only spiritual, and then it is objected in certain areas and disciplines. When asking a question about spiritual, we inevitably find ourselves in the bosom of thousand-year cultural traditions. For spiritual knowledge a person requires some levers which would enable him to release him from himself. Here we with inevitability enter three mentioned spheres, each of them has the language in which and by means of which are gained the spiritual knowledge, results of which are fixed in the same language, on which it is carried out. There are developed certain methods of spiritual knowledge appropriate to specifics of spheres of its realization: philosophizing on the basis of thinking, religious belief on the basis of ability of the person to the supreme feelings. According to young K. Marks, “the originality of each intrinsic force”(10) of a person creates “the original way of its objectification”. The disclosing of united process of spiritual knowledge disintegrates and shows results in different areas, and through these channels allows a person to create himself. The phenomenon of spiritual cannot be torn off from its manifestations same as being from living, but it is also impossible to reduce it to them. Spiritual shows itself only in an image, only then it can be seen for a person, but any image disguise spiritual as such. “Jesus has told: Images are appeared to the person, and the light that in them, is latent. In an image of light of the father it (light) will open, and his image is shadowed due to the light”(11). Identifying images of spiritual with it as it is, the person limits and, thus, deforms his own essence, runs into

narrow dogmatism and fanaticism. However, living in the world of alienation, in the world of spiritual he also is compelled to move by way of trials and errors. Spiritual knowledge as revelation that splits into three basic spheres, nevertheless, makes a unity. The philosophy, religion and art as specific ways of display of spiritual not only enter in contradictions with each other, but also communicate, interact with each other in whole culture of mankind.

So, some intrinsic characteristics of the spiritual phenomenon are already determined, spheres of its actions and objectivities are allocated. At definition of the concept of spiritual it is impossible to stop at any of the pre-established points of view, for example, extremely religious or atheistic; it would deform the concept of spiritual as this would be only one sided consideration of it. In the modern world we notice every possible, sometimes opposite types of world-views. The task is, that their carriers could find common language, and, moreover, the general spiritual basis for dialogue.

Originally spiritual existed for a person as a mystery in such a manner that he was losing himself in it, ran into some kind of ecstasy, the changed condition of consciousness, nevertheless accomplishing thus some transcendence of his routine existence. But all this occurred mostly due to eliminating of conscious life, than due to increasing of sensibleness. However a person needed such way of transcendence, because even now, having come to a deadlock he can choose for remedy alcohol, drugs or various mystical illusions. Qualitatively new understanding of spiritual and a method of its achievement has appeared with occurrence of philosophy and monotheistic religions. The spiritual attitude to life began to appear where a person started to comprehend the life metaphysically from his position in the world. Basing on such judgment the representation of *idea* was born; idea about the ideal relation to life, i.e. spiritual appeared. The idea as spiritual vision is expressed most adequately, though not without some problems, in Plato's philosophy. In religion the metaphysical comprehension of life is fixed to its central symbol. Through such symbol or idea for human consciousness arises the possibility of an entry in spiritual, realization by a person of his spiritual life. Christ, Buddha, Plato have managed to penetrate into spiritual essence of position of a person in the world and to express it in symbols and concepts. Their positions contain speculative truth which is demonstrated on a material of various cultures and by various methods. And as the spiritual knowledge concerns not abilities of a person, not what he has, but what he is on essence, the spiritual truth is he himself on the highest level of sensibleness of his being when the essence of a person is completely developed, resulting in appearance the spiritual archetype of humankind. For this reason Christ spoke "I am an entrance", and al-Hallaj, - "I am the Truth".

Spiritual results from the position of a person in the world, which is characterized by such concepts as freedom, will, consciousness, speculation etc. For the analysis of a spiritual phenomenon research work of the mentioned philosophical categories is necessary. From realization of the spiritual cognition, its consideration comes out such concepts as existence and transcendence, that essentially characterize a phenomenon of spiritual and

which we shall discuss in more details further. As aforesaid and generally was clarified the concept of spiritual, its characteristics and area of realization then it is possible to get to more profound and versatile research of a problem of spiritual. As the summary of this item we shall generalize all told about a spiritual phenomenon.

Necessity of spiritual comes from position of a person in the world which is characterized by a duality and contradictions: *a human person by nature is a biological creature, and by essence - spiritual*, but a person is a unity and integrity of everything, what he has got. He enters sphere of spiritual or essentially human area when he starts posing existential questions asking about the significance of his own life. Spiritual is represented as truth of human life which is born from comprehension of the life itself. Spiritual is the supreme product of the life as it is which comes to the self-consciousness and conscious increase in the person. Searching for meaning of the life results in necessity of self-knowledge, essence of being. The spiritual cognition is vertical way whereas all other kinds of knowledge are distributed in a horizontal plane. This vertical, or the intrinsic cognition of meaning of the life is nothing else but self-cognition, as a result of which the essence of a person is developed and created, showing spiritual archetype of humankind.

The self-cognition as knowledge of the cognizing subject is speculation about his essence, as a result of which it comes to the increasing appearance that, in its turn, is characterized by humanizing of a person results to his humanization. Such knowledge is the supreme kind of creativity, - self-mastering. In an ideal achieved spiritual perfection it is possible to count in the one who has developed his essence, has humanized himself, and has opened in himself the spiritual archetype of humankind.

The process of spiritual creativity in a history of culture splits into three basic streams in which spiritual proves the most direct image: religion, philosophy and art. Spiritual as it is, is the unity in its concept, but during historical periods it is carried out by various ways. It is transformation of a person into a spiritual creature which is impossible without "points of a support", symbols of religion and metaphysical categories of philosophy, basing on which the consciousness is capable to purify itself. Spiritual penetrates all human live activity and without it in general there is no person, but in other spheres its activity is submitted only indirectly. However to its self-consciousness spiritual can come, if it is inquired not about something else, but about it itself, not about its spheres, even some direct objectified, but about spiritual as initial revelation, as contemplation in which all intrinsic forces of a person are resulted in the supreme harmony and perfection when his essence is completely realized in existence, history and culture.

Conclusion

In the present work has been carried out an attempt of definition of spiritual cognition and to lay out its naked essence through an analysis of its manifestations in mankind's culture. The very analysis of eastern and western culture and philosophy ancient and

temporary ones, resulted in substantial comprehension of uniformity of spiritual conceptions and its cognition that are inherent to a man and to the humankind in general. Concept of spiritual cognition is divided in several branches of its realization but nevertheless among such contradicting and multi-sphere aspects as philosophy, religion and culture, we tried to detect their inner unity that represent the spiritual as it is. Spiritual Cognition represents the highest form of manifestation of the reasonable life of a man, its essence.

The sense of spiritual phenomenon in simple and clear words is determined as relation of a man to his own life, to his I and to his own world in which he exists. Spiritual cognition is demonstrated in realization by a man of the purpose of his being, it express relation of a man towards each moment of his life from the point of view of Eternity. Though this relation is imported from outside but it is the essence of the life itself, immanent essence of which is disclosed through appeal to transcendental.

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See Foma's Gospe

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

სულიერი შექმნების კონცეფცია

სერგეი ნიჟნიკოვი

რუსეთის ხალხთა მეგობრობის უნივერსიტეტი

რეზიუმე

ნაშრომი ყურადღებას იქცევს სულიერი შექმნების დეფინიციის მცდელობით და მისი მანიფესტაციით ზოგადსაკაცობრიო კულტურაში. დასავლური და აღმოსავლური ფილოსოფიის, ანტიკური და თანამედროვე აზროვნების შედარებითი ანალიზის გზით დადგენილია სულიერი შექმნების თანდაყოლილი იდეა და არსი, ის, რაც მემკვიდრეობით მოსდგამს კერძოდ ადამიანს და კაცობრიობას ზოგადად.

ავტორი ერთმანეთისგან განასხვავებს რწმენას და ცრურწმენას. რწმენა ინტენ-ციაა მაღალ სფეროთა მიმართ, ცრურწმენა კი ნატურალიზმის ფარგლებში ტრიალებს.

ამ მხრივ ავტორი საინტერესო გრადაციას გვთავაზობს:

ფილოსოფია გონის საშუალებით, აზროვნების ფორმით და იდეათა გამოყენებით იძლევა ყოფიერების არსის სპეკულატიურ შექმნებას.

რელიგია გულის მეოხებით, რწმენის გზითა და სიმბოლოთა მოხმარებით მიიყვანს ადამიანს განწმენდამდე და გადარჩენამდე.

განიხილავს რა ადამიანური შექმნების მრავალფეროვნებას, ავტორი გამოყოფს აზროვნებისა და შემოქმედების სამ ძირითად შტოს:

ფილოსოფია, რელიგია და კულტურა.

როგორც ერთი ხის სამი განსხვავებული ნაყოფი, ისინი სწორედ სულიერებასთან ზიარების გზით ენათესავენ და ერწყმიან ერთმანეთს.

სულიერი შექმნება იწყება იქ, სადაც ადამიანი განიხილავს თავის თავს მარადისობასთან მიმართებაში. სწორედ ეს მიმართება ქმნის ჩვენი ცხოვრების აზრს და გვისახავს უსასრულო მიზანს წუთისოფლის წარმავლობაში.

VERBAL SIGNS AND CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS

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Abstract

The link between cross-cultural awareness and cognitive concept learning is based on the assumption that any verbal sign or word is a result of the analogical nature of human conceptualization. A cognitive concept designates a unified idea of dynamic educational process, concerning itself with both cognitive and affective realms (the intelligences and the emotions) of the human beings, pointing out that one does not exist without the other.

Actualizing multiple statements in one language unit and comprising diversified cultural tinges, this verbal sign becomes the conceptual symbol of the whole text. In addition it increases students' awareness of cross-cultural issue. Therefore culture specific meanings should be studied with an equally important emphasis on textual and cultural-historical detail. For this very reason pedagogy is featured as the conceptualization of a new culture when priority is given to the real global communication problems.

Key words: verbal signs, cross-cultural awareness, informative potential, word-concepts, conceptual translation, lingo-cultural memory.

1) COGNITIVE CONCEPTS AND GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE

Learning and teaching English introduces us into a world of cognitive ideas and exciting discoveries. Learning of foreign concepts makes relaxing atmosphere in class from global perspective because dominant paradigm in teaching and learning is based on cognitive intercultural awareness. So cognitive concepts expressed in verbal symbols feature a particular clear-cut universalistic propensity: deep, complex semantic relations between words involving not only the student but teacher as well in self-organizing and self-cognizing process that proves so challenging.

The link between cross-cultural awareness and cognitive concept learning is based on the assumption that any verbal sign or word is a result of the analogical nature of human conceptualization. Since our own conceptual system in terms of which we think and act

must be and is actually metaphorical, simple concepts or word-metaphors always reveal something fresh and esoteric simulating imagination and energy. A cognitive concept designates a unified idea of dynamic educational process, concerning itself with both cognitive and affective realms (the intelligences and the emotions) of the human beings, pointing out that one does not exist without the other. Concepts are born to provide any cognitive activity and are expressed by words, but they are never equal. The relations between the concept and word are therefore very complicated. Cognition of the world is performed in quantum computing and is expressed in different meanings simultaneously of one and the same word-concept.

The definition of concept that is found in a Concise Dictionary of Cognitive Terms [Kubriakova: 1996] is the following: it's the unit of mental and psychological resources of our consciousness and of that informative structure which reflects our knowledge and experience. Thus concept in Stepanov's definition is a kind of clot of culture in man's mode of thought; it is through this concept that culture enters into *lingua mentalist*. In other words through this concept any regular man who is not a "creator of cultural values", himself enters into this culture and in some cases even influences it [Stepanov: 1997]. So concept forming is regarded as a lively process for generating new ideas and thoughts in literary texts.

Admittedly, cognitive conceptual approach to language learning is the approach that basically gives the students responsibility to discover about themselves as well as the language and outer surroundings in order to co-operate not only with their peers but teachers too. Since the teacher is a guide for the students therefore he/she becomes a constant learner of what the learners need.

My viewpoint had grown out of an attempt to grasp needs analysis of the 21st century student who has an easy access to Internet website, where facts and figures are viable. But he/she is looking forward to getting more sophisticated emotional aesthetic information that the teacher is expected to share with. Alarming it has been noticed rapid boosting of information volume at the expense of emotional and spiritual development of an individual. Nowadays the problem of realignment of education system is virtually addressed to thorough reshaping the paradigm of cultural didactics; ultimately the major question at this point should be "how can we better prepare learners for the changing worlds of work and citizenship?" instead of "how do I improve my teaching?"

Not surprisingly we use communicative exercises while presenting sets of classroom activities arranged on a scale of increasing sophistication. The eclecticism and pot-pourri of teaching methods and styles is based on the conviction that repetition and practice of key words or concepts in the beginning stages of a language course should give way as soon as possible to a meaningful verbal interaction among the students.

Once learned, however, these concepts must be in natural situations in order to develop as high a degree as possible of communicative skills in the target language. My students are instructed to master effective teaching methods that provide the opportunity to

learn and fine-tune cognitive –concepts that are linked to key-words that are necessary in interpreting texts. The procedure of the seminal analysis of the text challenges students to pick out learning techniques that are best suited to learning language that is relative to their own cultural standpoint.

2) SEVERAL EXAMPLES

A good example for culture-specific differences can be traced in Georgian word “cross”, which has negative connotation for other cultures while in Georgian it is positive; compare in English such word-combinations as: double cross, on the cross, a cross to bear and to cross over to the other side, etc. they all express negative meanings, but in Georgian such word combinations as: *jvari gweria* (protected from evil eye), *jvriswera* (wedding in the church), *gparavdes lomisi jvari* (may the power of Lomisi cross save you), *Wamis win pirjvris gadasaxva* (crossing before meal-taking) they all express positive emotions.

Another example of comparative concept learning is illustrated in English word “derby” in American and English cultures. Two different pronunciations: English [da:bi] and US [de:bi] has several meanings: 1. Annual horse races run at Epsom, 2. Any of annual races, 3. Any important sporting contest: a local derby; 4. Derby Hat (US bowler). Shifting in meanings involves the whole history of two cultures. The original derby is an annual horse race at Epsom Downs, England and the Kentucky Derby (Churchill Downs in Louisville, Kentucky). However, it is nowhere near the town or country of Derby in north central England; it is a racetrack in Surrey, southwest of London.

The “derby” derived its name not from its location, but from the title of its founder Edward Stanly, the twelfth Earl of Derby, who established the race in 1780. Derby then became the term for a number of prominent horse races, usually restricted to three-year olds, and today it has come to mean any race or contest open to all comers or to a special category of contestants. In the US in 1880 the name “derby” was applied to a stiff felt hat with a dome-shaped crown and a narrow brim. This might be connected again with races when spectators from high and upper middle classes are expected to wear special hats. Many special occasions in England are still highlighted with the wearing of unique and trendy hats. Moreover, “Derby Parties” as in Kentucky became the gathering place for the rich and famous, especially those in well-placed positions in government to interact in an annual event.

Consequently, this cognitive concept is reflective of the age by showing an access to content, featuring culture-specific connotations. It is so-called cultural dialogue between different generations, different cultures and epochs.

Understanding the basic concepts of cultural comparison we have to develop appropriate learning materials for our multicultural audiences, which sometimes consist not only of Orthodox Christians or Catholics, but also of Muslims and Jews. Cross-cultural mean-

ings of words become a problem for translators, which is frequently solved in accordance with the order and demands made by the society's mindset or mode of thought, leading sometimes to unclear, culturally inappropriate or even absurd outcomes.

A good example of culturally alienated meaning is another English' word "gay", which has traditionally meant "happy" and "cheerful", but within the last twenty years or so "gay" in American English has come to designate homosexuals. Seemingly, it should have started with American writer Gertrude Stein, who first used this word in one of her short stories in this shifted meaning. She uses the word repeatedly in such a meaningful context over and over again, that finally the reader infers an alienated meaning of the concept and infers the implication of the meaning-shift in the concept of "gay-happiness" (which is a complete alienation in the application of the original concept).

The advantage of teaching culture-specific differences may be also illustrated with the following example from English and American cultures: if we take a phrase "homely girl" its usage in Standard English features several synonyms in the dictionary entry: "home loving", "cozy," "home-centered" but the same phrase in General American means: ugly, not popular, uninteresting. Thus the same wording in two cultures reveals different concepts: for British culture "homely" with things means: "simple', "plain", "not important" like in: "homely meal" as casual meal. While Americans perceive opposite meaning when used with people: "homely girl= unattractive, not very datable unmarried woman (when dating became very popular and gained acceptance, sitting home all the time meant a boring, uninteresting person). The language change came about to describe different concepts in the two cultures. The uninformed students' lack of understanding this difference is a perfect example of diversified cultural meaning i.e. a gap in their cognitive development. Hence this phrase is not the part of their experience. Actually proper understanding of any text is more likely to be a problem of cultural diversity than of linguistic differences. So what may be immoral in one culture might be moral in another or what is not permissive in one culture can be accepted freedom and rational action in the context of another culture. Interestingly, this difference even entered the new dictionaries with a stylistic marker: "inf. esp. USA". We offer an entry from English Language and Culture Dictionary: "*adj.* 1. *esp. BrE* simple; not trying to seem important or special; a homely meal of bread and cheese; 2. *AmE* (of people, faces, etc) not good-looking, unattractive, almost ugly" [Longman: 1992].

3) READING (INTERPRETING) EQUALS TO LINGUISTIC THINKING

The process of identifying the basic word-concepts in literary texts is a challenging task. It is to some extent a tension between anticipation and unexpected frustration. However this is an incessant seeking of random variants: nonstop comparison and analysis – dropping less probabilistic alternatives and then constant synthesis of the obtained results

until achieving the non-final decision to form a new cognitive concept – a new meaning. This assumption is significant for linguistics as well as for psychology in the study of the mind. This kind of approach to the study of stylistic effect produced by verbal sign is considered as the basic feature while molding word-concepts in modernistic literary texts.

Defining the term “concept” it should also be underlined how important it is to outline conceptual system of the whole novel in order to understand the purport of the author. In order to describe and illustrate the kinetics of springing up basic word-concepts connected with simultaneous realization of several meanings of a word, it is plausible to apply a method of technical systems and present this complex process as a hierarchical dynamic multi-level system.

Any concrete polysemic word renders its own model of the objective reality. Obviously the inseparability of objective content and observing subject as a price of all well-defined knowledge, must be definitely taken into account not only in linguistics. Moreover the position of the observer in relation to the language observed and described is far more significant. Nevertheless concepts render self-regulating and self-steering properties shifting the text into a conceptual system. The word being in itself a model of the real world becomes the center of the whole. Moreover every word-concept is the center and every center is unique and is related with the top level of the semantic pyramid. To what extent it is associated to that top point, defines its validity and accessibility in the literary text.

Literary texts tend to exploit the polysemic potential of language to create a unified whole in which ambiguity produces an enriching meaning to the text’s final comprehension. Most of the authors place such a word-concept in the titles, the constituents of which are spread all over the whole text as a system. The reader cognizes the adequate aesthetic information through storing up justified probabilities on different hierarchical strata. The procedure of selection or interaction of random meanings forms the basis for creating new information.

American symbolist poet Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Ushers” will serve as an illustration. The title indicates a concrete fact and it is so simple and logical that at first sight it doesn’t arouse any nebulous and vague associations; no brainstorming or great mental effort is needed to decipher it. Nevertheless when looking closer, considering Edgar Poe’s symbolic and tempestuous nature with all his ideals, we can come to the conclusion that this simple title is not so simple and ordinary, but many-fold and indefinite. Moreover this is a great simplicity that brings to light undecided associations. This simple word is charged with a meaning to the utmost degree.

For Edgar A. Poe any attainment of the exciting knowledge is destruction or in other words, the process of dying is revelation. Similarly throughout the story we see that the narrator, like the house, is *falling* and exists between the perception of *simple objects* and the neurotic perception of an aberrant world. Presumably the stylistically neutral and simple words “fall” and “house” in the title reflect semantic complicacy generating infinite potential information. Presumably indefiniteness means the power to transcend the concrete words. The author stretches the word to reveal its potential for ambiguity. Having availed with its true syn-

onyms from the language system in various repetitions in addition with context-dependant synonyms, the author offers simple word-concepts to generate quasi information about the described reality. The reality is the unfolding word itself. The content based information is developed in two directions; concrete and abstract: fall₁ –and fall₂, house₁ and house₂.

1. "FALL – drop, sink, rotting for years, 2. FALL – depression of soul, sin, coming to grief;

1. "HOUSE – mere house; 2. HOUSE – mansion of gloom, melancholy house".

The indefinite ambiguity of the simple word is generating and extending the potential information of these word-concepts, which is never-ending source for non-final associations. In this case we trace two types of predictability: linear and dimensional. The former takes place on syntagmatic level while the latter is the result of wider and super linear analysis embracing all the levels of text interpretation. This is doubly important for the beginning of predictability and adaptation. It should be pointed out that simultaneous perception of the word may be illustrated in multi-dimensional pyramid of meanings, based on sophisticated analysis of semantic and logical relations of immediate and remote constituents of the text elements in addition to componential analysis of the key words or word-concepts.

Here is an opening passage taken from the story that signals the starting point of cognitive predictability:

During the whole of a dull, dark, and soundless day in the autumn of the year, when the clouds hung oppressively low in the heavens, I had been passing alone, on horseback, through a singularly dreary tract of country, and at length found myself, as the shades of the evening drew on, within view of the melancholy House of Usher . . . – upon the bleak walls – upon the vacant eye-like windows – upon a few rank sedges – and upon a few white trunks of decayed trees – with an utter depression of soul which I can compare to no earthly sensation more properly than to the after-dream of the reveler upon opium – the bitter lapse into every-day life – the hideous dropping off of the veil. There was an iciness, a sinking, a sickening of the heart – an unredeemed dreariness of thought which no goading of the imagination could torture into aught of the sublime [Poe E.A.: 1983, 107].

The probabilistic information about destruction and death is inferred from the following word-combinations and phrases: 1. a dull, dark and soundless day; 2. clouds hung oppressively low in the heaven; 3. the natural images of the desolate and terrible; 4. a sense of insufferable gloom pervaded my spirit; 5. an utter depression of soul. The concept of death contrary to life is related with the house completely decayed, standing on the brink of the dark lake where its reduplication is seen in the still waters. The Ushers are visualized as victims of their environment. So the inverted world is probably opposed to rational. Incompatibility of contrasting concepts (life and death, rational and irrational, beauty and distortion) brings a new amalgamation of the simultaneous perception of new meanings: 1. the mirror of their minds and the material world; 2. white trunks of decayed trees and utter depression of soul, an iciness, a sinking; 3. unredeemed dreariness of thought - aught of the sublime;

The house with a zigzag fissure symbolizes Roderick Usher and his clan with all their sins and vices. This melancholy cracked up house is described as utterly dilapidated in every stone: *with the bleak walls, the vacant eye-like windows, trunks of decayed trees*, yet possessed of spacious totality. It is not a mere house, but both the family and family mansion, which metaphorically mean spiritual depression of the mankind. This feeling is incomparable with any earthy perceptions. It is enormous “mansion of gloom”, which has been “rotting for years”. The contrasts between something indefinitely big and enormous against something indefinitely small are amalgamated into one concept offering a concrete sense, which allows to cognize the unknown darkness physically. Thus the ambiguous and fuzzy feeling is rendered more precisely with ordinary words, which turn out cognitive concepts – expressing multiple statements.

The final confirmation of the poetic predictability and consequently the reader’s culture awareness to the text occurs in the closing paragraphs, when the indefinite semantic power of the key words in the title cuts the edge to show up the potential for ambiguity. This is the simultaneous perception of the death of the individual symbolizing collapse of the world. [L. Jokhadze: 2005]

For another illustration of the relations between the verbal sign and the cultural context we offer a snippet from Georgian hagiography about St Nino (who is responsible for introducing Georgians to Christianity in IV century)

ხოლო ნინო დარჩა განგებითა ღვთისაითა და წარმოემართა მთა(თა) კერძო ჩრდილოისათა და მოვიდა მდინარესა ზედა მტკუარსა და მოჰყვა ნაპირსა მდინარისასა და მოიწია მცხეთად, ქალაქსა დიდსა მეფეთა საჯდომელსა.

და იყო სამ წელ ეგრეთ, ილოცვიდა ფარულად ღმრთისა მიერ ადგილსა

მაყულითა შებურვილსა. და შექმნა ნასხლევვისა ჯუჯარი და აღმართა იგი მუნ და ილოცვიდა მის წინაშე.

და მეოთხესა წელსა იწყო ქადაგებაი და ხარებაი ქრისტეს ღმრთისა სჯულისაი და თქუა: “რამეთუ ვპოვე ცდომასა შინა ფრიადსა ჩრდილოისა ქუეყანაი.“ და მეექვსესა წელსა არწმუნა ნანა დედოფალსა, ცოლსა მეფისასა, სენსა შინა მისსა. და მეშუიდესა წელსა არწმუნა მირიან მეფეს სასწაულითა ქრისტესმიერთითა. და მსწრაფლ აღაშენა ეკლესია ქუემო სამოთხესა შინა, და სუეტი იგი იყო ძელისა პატიოსანი, რომელი თვით აღემართა. [კრებ. რედაქტორი ი. აბულაძე: 1964]

We present our translation of the same excerpt:

“Nino made for the North along the river Mtkvari and approached a big royal city (then capital) Mtsxeta. She stayed there for three years praying secretly on a place overgrown with blackberry bushes and made a cross-like symbol out of cuttings of grape vines while praying there outside of the city walls, which later became the place of worship. And during the fourth year she started preaching the precepts of Jesus Christ she said: “I found pagan people astray in the north of the country”. A year later she convinced and converted the wife of the king – Queen Nana (while she was ill at ease). The very seventh year she succeeded miraculously

in persuading King Mirian himself, who soon after built rapidly a church down below the palace, the column of which was of divine wood and it had risen by itself”.

When we look closer to the text, splitting it into smaller fragments and analyzing both immediate and distant co-occurrence or distribution of the word “jvari” (cross) we focus on this basic concept and to some extent on the total text. Allegorically, this combination of materials (unwanted clippings of grape vines binding with her own hair) symbolizes that the unwanted vines were likened to pagans - lifeless to Christendom. Noteworthy to say, that all the temples and churches of Georgian Orthodox are structurally built in cross-like shape. “Cross” is not a sign of death for Georgian culture (as we have already mentioned above) but it has been changed into a symbol of restoration, renewal, and born again soul. The concept of unwanted vine cuttings or waste came to be again useful and full of life. This life-giving concept of the vine is still sacramental for Georgian culture.

4) CONCEPTUAL TRANSLATION AS CROSS-CULTURAL PHENOMENON

From the perspective of cognitive concepts one can easily notice that verbal signs may possess various amount of informative potential which can be expanded pushing the edges of verbal sign rendering and generating fresh associations for the whole literary text.

Noteworthy to mention that polysemic word concepts present a lot of difficulties not only to readers but to translators, who are expected to know not only the source language but also to possess a thorough knowledge of all cross-cultural connotations with a historical-societal context. Thus capturing the major concepts of the literary text implies tracing all the semantic constituents of the word and their illustrations in the source text as well as in translation. Otherwise the word-concept loses its whole-ness and omnipotence of complicated text-building capacity. Consequently any translated text is evaluated according to what extent the word-concepts and their semantic constituents are interwoven in the text to make them like goads – firmly embedded nails – inspired by divine Spirit.

We assume that spotting the right word-concepts in a literary text equals to linguistic thinking which is striving to achieve the truth. This ability is innate nature of any language, it is rooted in the potential of the verbal sign from the beginning.

So professional translators, students of linguistics and scholars in philology face a problem of translating polysemic words from one language to another. It is a complicated job even for those who are expected to know not only the source language but also to possess a thorough knowledge of all cross-cultural connotations with a historical-societal context. Literary texts tend to exploit the polysemic potential of language to create a unified whole in which multiplicity, heterogeneity and simultaneous understanding of different meanings of concept-words is the source of new ideas enriching the final unity of both texts in either language.

The theory of concept formation as it has emerged in modern investigations has been sharply challenged in both theoretical and experimental work. Therefore a conceptual word is the significant part or “brand” for the whole which can best uncover and reveal the essence of the parts constituting the whole. The concept-word representing the whole is chosen on the ground of semantic, logical and cultural considerations.

Another example of cross-cultural connotations in the word-concepts is found in a age-old text, old Georgian manuscript dating to 979-983 A.D. , which was found on mountain Sinai, in 1902 and was reprinted by Georgian scholar [P.Ingorokva: 1954]

Some difficulties for professional translators are faced in such words which are perceived from the point of view of contemporary cultural memory. These words are “language” (ena) and “testimony” (sawameblad). They are misinterpreted by many translators with false concepts leading to absurdity. Georgian word “sawameblad” (testimony) is translated as “torture” and “ena” (language) instead of “culture” by many experienced translators which is to our mind due to the gap in cultural memory.

We present the opening sentence as the key concept of the whole manuscript in Georgian and our translation in English:

“დამარხულ არს ენაი ქართული დღემდე მეორედ მოსლვისა მისისა საწამებლად, რაითა ყოველსა ენასა ღმერთმან ამხილოს ამით ენითა.”

“Buried has been Georgian language (Kartuli) up to now and unto the Second Advent of the Messiah as a testimony that all should be judged through this language”.

Not considering cross-cultural awareness these word-concepts may be translated as “torture” instead of “testimony”, which leads to completely different information. We have to consider that social and cultural environment when the text was created and how it was then used by Georgian scholars. We have to enhance religious cultural context and investigate these words in X century culture. So that to refresh cultural memory.

We consider the key word concepts “buried mystery in the language”, which shed light to the interpretation of the whole historical text. The inverted order in English was used for the sake of emphasis, as the words “buried and mystery” generating linguistic prognosis offers a reader free choice of interpretation. The concluding sentence suggests again ineffable information pointing to the mysterious function of Georgian alphabet.

“Language” as it is used in the original manuscript should not be understood in its contemporary meaning. But we have to look at it from the viewpoint of totality of the text and infer its traditional meaning which the word had in those times. It meant not only speaking language but multitude of people living together, a tribe, a nation. We can confirm our point of view by a quotation from Old Testament, Isaiah 66. 18.

“. . . and I, because of their actions and their imaginations, am about to come and gather all **nations** and **tongues** and they will come and see my glory.”

We offer the same passage from Georgian Old Testament

“რადგან მე ვუწყი მათი საქმენი და ზრახვანი, მოდის უამი ყველა ხალხისა და ენათა შეკრებისა; მოვლენ და იხილავენ ჩემს დიდებას”.

Admittedly the author of the manuscript Ioane Zosime should use the word in its polysemic meaning of “tongue” (language), as “nation” and its “culture”, Georgian ethnicity and its historical mission as it was apprehended in the esoteric Christian circles of Georgia. This point of view and such interpretation may also be found in Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s book “Essays and Letters” [Gamsakhurdia, 1991].

The second word-concept which is also the key word-concept in the opening paragraph must be “testimony”. The latter presents a dubious case in Georgian. It is not the current meaning again from the contemporary Georgian language. Therefore by some translators it is misunderstood again. We have to appeal to the old meaning of the word, which is “testifying” and for confirmation we address for help to Holy Scripture “Gospel of John” (32). *“Then John gave this **testimony**: “I saw the Spirit come down from heaven as a dove and remain on him”*, which in Georgian translation sounds like this:

“და იმოწმა იოანემ და თქვა: და ვიხილე სული, მტრედივით გადმოშავალი ზეცით, და დავანებული მასზე”

In case we use “language” only in the present day meaning and “testify” in the meaning of “torture” we face another misunderstanding. In those days when Gospel came into being hagiographic and hymnographic texts were being created and interpreted according to the old use of these words. So we can conclude that Ioane Zosime could not use Georgian culture without Georgian language and his prophetic insight that this language and this nation should survive till the Second Coming. The encouraging prophecy of the author is a kind of strengthening and cheering statement for his people that Georgian nation will survive for the Second Advent of the Lord. The word “nation” is a later development in the language and hence its polysemy is clear at present. Nevertheless we need to look at hagiographic texts not from the angle of past but through the prism of present. This is our awareness to perceive past and present simultaneously and hence achieve the functionally adequate equivalents while interpreting and translating both in the source and recipient languages.

In the above presented analysis the meaning goes to the fixed stereotype of modern society disregarding the social-cultural borders of the mentioned word-concepts.

Additionally we offer samples of translated texts where a word-concept sometimes partially conveys the original concept not retaining the effect of the multiple meanings which is conceptual information that is ethic and historical reverberations in the original. To make this point clear we address to the best specimen in Georgian literature “The Man in Panther’s Skin” by Shota Rustaveli (XII c. Georgian writer), which is translated or interpreted by various translators in different ways. Naturally, our criticism should not be taken as ungrateful remarks to the translators. Marjory Wordrope’s translation is a virtually literal paraphrase, while that of Venera Urushadze’s is more poetic although not attuning to the author’s word-concept, especially the epigrammatic line that figuratively conveys the compact thematic information; moreover it shows the author’s concept his - viewpoint about general biblical

wisdom of didactic principles that make the essential pattern of man's upbringing and the purpose of his earthly existence. Unfortunately, part of the information is missing in both translations.

This is the original stanza in Georgian:

“რადგან თავია სიცრუე ყოვლისა უბედობისა,
 მე არ გავწირო მოყვარე, ძმა უმტკიცესი ძმობისა?!
 არა ვიქმ, ცოდნა რას მარგებს ფილოსოფოსთა ბრძნობისა!
 მით ვისწავლებით, მოგვეცეს შერთვა ზესთ მწყობრთა წყობისა.”
 [ავთანდილის ანდერძიდან, სტროფი 781]

Here is Marjory Wordrope's literal translation:

1. “Since lying is the source of all misfortunes, why should I abandon my friend, a brother by a stronger tie than born brotherhood? I will not do it! What avails me the knowledge of the philosophizing of philosophers! **Therefore are we taught that we may be united with the choir of the heavenly hosts**” [M. Wardrope: 2003].

An attempt of poetic version of the same stanza is performed by Venera Urushadze:

2. “Since the sin of deception is the source of our sorrows and troubles,
 What shall avail me the lessons instilled by the wise in all ages,
 Philosophy's **golden treasure, making us one with the angels,**
 If I abandon the friend who is dearer to me than a brother?”
 [The Testament of Avthandil, 771] [V. Urushadze: 2003]

We venture to offer our own rendering of the same stanza, which sounds like:

“Since lying and deception is the source of all our suffering
 Why should I throw up my friend dearer to me than a brother?
 I will not do it! What profit has a man from the knowledge of the sages in all ages?
We are only taught to be favored to join the supernal order of orders”.

Presumably more adequate equivalent of the epigrammatic concept has been traced: SerTva zesT mwyobrTa wyobisa - *join the supernal order of orders*. Moreover there is a simultaneous realization of the following meanings: 1. mystical joining the Lord posthumously (hierogamy), 2. the road to super cognition, 3. personification of super nature which prophesies man's Godly nature, 4. to share super principles, 5. to join in living liturgy partaking Jesus' Eucharist, 6. to join the cosmic order through organized behavior and righteous way of earthly life. What's more the latter becomes the core semantic element and moves to the top easily in our multi-dimensional cognitive pyramid. In this case all the meanings above enumerated are entangled in a node. Does this epigram in the final line have more than two or three of above-mentioned meanings? It does. It is so because of our knowledge of the world. Thus we experience likewise feelings and emotions with the author and plus our

creative aspirations in addition. So we are involved in communication with the author, dealing with co-creation, co-participation and co-perception. This is divine energy of the word-concept which strengthens the reader to the utmost and eliminates even the fear of death (another new connotative meaning). Thus the caring author implies a good reader and the latter is given a unique chance of comforting, through cognizing reality to monitor his behavior in this disordered earthly life.

The self-organizing power of cognitive concept is the essential principle in concept-learning process because every verbal sign is located horizontally on the syntagmatic axis and it is in constant relationship or cognation (analogy) with its corresponding highest point on the paradigmatic axis – vertically; hence this could be controlled on the pyramidal self-organized chart, the vertex of which designates the cognitive concepts. So, not only language characteristics but pragmatic and cultural factors are involved and closely interacted. Consequently, the principles of self-reflective concepts give rise to singularity and exclusivity, hence to freedom of an individual in cultural context.

Nevertheless it is extremely challenging to spot such a basic concept that may acquire the all-embracing energy in the translated text that may convey a hidden multiplicity. It should reveal compact information of Rustavelian thoughts in one unit, which combines and modulates the concept into poetry. It should be rhythmically precise in sound-symbolism, stylistically adequate (rhetoric devices of pun, alliteration, allusion etc.) and methodically appropriate, taking socio-semiotic and cross-cultural features into account. The exact equivalent is hard to seek even in the same language on the level of paraphrase as part of the information is definitely being lost. So a perfect translation relies on the goal, that expresses needs for what and to whom the translation is oriented.

5) CONCEPT-WORDS IN RELIGIOUS TEXTS (HYMNOGRAPHY)

From the standpoint of biblical usage and contemporary views of valid exegesis polysemic word-concept *repentance* became the basic concept for our translation of David the Builder's poetic testament "The Canon of Repentance". This word became the hallmark in the process of translating and it organized the English text of Georgian hymnography. The right spotting of the basic word-concept, which is the functional equivalent further provides the right rendering of meaningfully adequate compositional structure of the original. This should be a self-regulating system of co-perception, co-occurrence and co-creation, which will be proved hereby with depth analysis of the semantic structures of the core elements. [Jokhadze.L. : 2005]

Considering the fact that there is another version of the translation of the same original (published about at the same time simultaneously under the title of "Songs of Remorse" by Dodona Kiziria) we decided to specify the difference between the words *remorse* and *repentance* and prove our arguments for the preference of the latter.

No one can question language competence of the professional translator for whom English is almost second native tongue. But the confusion of words *remorse* and *repentance* should be caused due to alienation from the native culture which implies to stay too long away from the Georgian roots, when one feels so ungrounded and unstable because this also means lacking of the grace and of divine energy of the Georgian word.

Firstly digging into some contemporary reference books and theological data obtained by experts on the subject in question I found out that *repentance* has already a stylistic marker *Eccles* in dictionaries. We offer a dictionary entry:

repentance – (n) (Eccles) 1. being penitent. 2. repenting; feeling of sorrow, etc. for wrong doing, compunction, contrition, and penitence – with a willing to atone;

remorse – (n) deep regret for having done smt. wrong eg. He showed ~ for his crimes;

1. deep, torturing sense of guilt felt over a wrong that one has done, self – reproach;

2. pity, compassion: now only in *without remorse* – pitilessly repent.

Noteworthy that this difference is confirmed more convincingly by such a great American scholar as E. Nida, who is considered professional translator of the Scripture. Since these closely related words cause problems to translators we offer Nida's elaborate experiment performed on the basis of componential method of analysis.

| <i>repentance</i> | <i>remorse</i> | <i>conversion</i> |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| 1. bad behavior | 1. bad behavior | 1. bad behavior |
| 2. sorrow | 2. sorrow | 2. _____ |
| 3. change of behavior | 3. _____ | 3. change of behavior |

These three terms share the common components of psychological experience and behavioral event. They also include a number of supplementary components, which are important, but not contrastive. For example, *repentance* is often associated with penance in the thinking of many persons. It is also primarily "religious" in connotation. *Remorse* shares with *repentance* a component of sorrow for what one has done, but *repentance* indicates some change in the direction of proper behavior, while *remorse* has a dead end of sorrow, often of a highly egocentric morbid nature. But in the case of components of *repentance*, *remorse*, and *conversion*, there is a system of temporal priority, for as in *repentance*, there is first the bad behavior, then the sorrow for this, and finally the change of behavior. In other cases one encounters *to change in the heart*, which not only concentrates primary attention upon the change of behavior. Whatever expression is employed, it is essential that the principal component, *the change of behavior*, is not overlooked, for this not only occurs in the final position of temporal priority, but it certainly is the principal component for *repentance*. [Nida: 1982]

To evaluate the adequacy of the translation with the source text and the proper understanding of the author's purport we offer review-message on our translation first obtained from the outstanding translator of bible texts Eugene A. Nida: "I was pleased to

receive the excellent booklet of David the Builder of Georgia, “The Canon of Repentance”. The English translation is excellent. And I, definitely pleased to have this fine piece of liturgical material” [Jokhadze.L. : 2005]

Thus the functional adequacy of the word-concept is indubitable and the creation of the Georgian seminal work was virtually for this very reason (*change of behavior, mind, to turn from sin, to put on a new heart* emphasizing the psychological factors). We address to the context in the source language and analyze it both on the level of thematic organization as well as on the level of stylistic devices, which contribute greatly to the effectiveness of any communication, since figurative language here points out to the interaction of several meanings. The focus should be firstly on the smallest division – the word, then the troparion and to some extent on the entire text. Consequently any troparion should be translated with careful consideration of the whole structure.

The Canon of Repentance belongs to the genre of philosophical lyrical poetry and reflects contemporary view on man and universe, sin, eschatology, repentance and other constituents of Christian Weltanschauung. Every phrase is virtually connected with the Old and New Testament, and with this or that theological or philosophical issues. Traditionally this genre of hagiographic texts is based on the biblical knowledge and is meant for reviving immortal values to replenish the sinful nature of man. It can not say anything new to a reader well-informed in theology. Significantly, it is verbal sign and its metaphoricity that carries a latent figurative shift and organizes a new stylistic system to generate aesthetic-cognitive information for the creative reader. I tend to think that such words are *canon* and *repentance* that occur in the title to organize the text and help render the author’s message.

Presumably, a node of multiple meanings is deep-rooted in these polysemic words and their constituents are spread all over the whole text. Firstly, the compositional structure coincides with the Matin Prayers or morning Canon, which usually consists of 9 songs (prayers), but the second canon is missing to be read only in fasting times, especially during Lent (L.J.). The same order is observed in the *Canon of Repentance*. So it proves to be more of a canon than a mere song. Hereinafter only the first and the ninth parts of the Canon of Repentance are represented for consideration with proper titles to every canon like *Praise be to the Lord Most High* and so on. Presumably, it relies on Byzantine model of structuring hymnography, where every canon is thematically defined.

უგალობდითსა

1. რომლისაცა წინაშე
ქედ-დადრეკილ არს ყოველი
მუხლი ყოველი მოდრეკების და ენაი
ყოველი
შენსა ხმობს აღსარებასა,
მეცა, სიტყუაო,
აღმსარებელსა მომხედენ!

Praise be to the Lord Most High

Thou before whom every neck is bowed
and bent is every knee
and every tongue confesses

Thou, O, word
hearken to me, a penitent

The lexical variants and semantic components of *repentance* are spread all over the whole text expressing its different figurative tinges. In the first Prayer of the Canon the following words *penitent-repent* are used that belong to the same semantic domain. In Prayer III-iniquity of dwellers: *Cain's murderous mind, perverseness of Seth's sons, the transgression of giants, Egyptians' inhumanity, ill-habits of Canaanites*, in Prayer IV-V-VI – redemption of sins and atoning for them; in Prayer VII – new rebirth of the word, in Prayer VIII—asking for mercy and conversion of the penitents, in Prayer IX – restoration through repentance. So words within the same semantic domain are simply piled up one on the other. These nouns do not refer to different potentialities or degrees of evil. They simply emphasize the enormous wrong doing of the sinner. Furthermore the first Prayer is associated with the last Prayer of the canon and describes the earnest address to the Almighty, the Holy Trinity and the Mother of God. This is a stylistic frame to the poem, stressing the unity of the whole. It expresses the fundamental melody of *repentance* with its recurrent semantic elements ensuring the thematic information of the text as a united whole.

From this point of view the stylistic (pragmatic) quality seems to be the most determining factor in the acceptability of religious texts in translation, it is essential to pay due attention to those features which carry so much informative potential. The major stylistic device is parallel constructions that activates multiple latent statements prolonging the process of cognition a great deal, e.g. the binary opposition of *my crown and kingship* and *a slave to his conqueror* carries the latent message which is revealed in the final troparion: *Therefore came the Virgin*. Noteworthy how the metaphoric icon is preserved in the translation of the phrase: *like an up-flowing torrent of evil*, describing God's omnipotent power to make a river go upward. It implies a person off the track, not observing God's precepts. Moreover the question is how to translate the ambiguous, metaphoric feelings of the poet into a precise and many-sided concept. Again it is the blessed word that comes to aid with its fossilized, age-old internal meanings, responsible for the gamut of different functions and associations. Likewise I attempted to preserve the original spirit and translated another metaphorical word-combination in the same way,: *invest the word with flesh in a tabernacle material* (ganazrqe xorciTa da karviTa miwisaiTa). The polysemic word *tabernacle* renders several meanings simultaneously and carries the major informative power in this case: 1. a temporary shelter as a tent; 2. dwelling place; 3. the human body considered as the dwelling place of the soul; 4. the portable sanctuary carried by the Jews in their wandering from Egypt to Palestine, later the Jewish Temple; 5. shrine, niche, etc. with a canopy; 6. a place of worship esp. with a large seating capacity; 7. (Eccles) a cabinet like enclosure for consecrated Hosts, usually in the center of the altar at the back.

Presumably they are all to be taken into account in this case. The first, the third and the seventh prayers are stylistically relevant for the troparion. The rightly selected meanings reveal the essence of the whole Prayer. It should be again underlined that all the nine Prayers of the Canon are entitled separately, which is entirely neglected in all other translations. This seems rather arguable, as it is known that all the canons are based on the Byzantine model of

composing. Any deviation from the fixed order would mean blasphemy, as the Christian symbols in literary texts are conventionally based on scholarly consensus never to be altered.

The Canon attains its ultimate point of completion in the final part. In the troparion of the first Prayer, dedicated to the Virgin Mother, the repentant strives for removing the heavy-laden burden of despair that he offers in atonement for his sins. The Holy Mother - defender of sinners - is the pledge for it. This troparion together with the final one in Prayer IX (when the Virgin gives birth to the new unity - the divine flesh, through her intercession the Logos, Christ as the verbal sign - invisible God became visible) achieve the super stylistic effect.

ადიდებდითსა

4. მარტო, სრულო, სამ-მზეო,
ერთ-ცისკროვნებაო,
განმინათლე მხედველობითი სულისაი,
რაითა
გიხილო ნათელი
ნათლითა უფლისაითა,
სულითა ღმრთისაითა ძე
გამოგვიბრწყინვო მაშინ
დაუსრულებელთა საუკუნეთა!

Glory to Him

O Thou Simple and Perfect,
Three in one undivided,
in three suns united,
clear the sight of my spirit
that I might see light
in the light of the Lord
and then the Son of endless ages
shall shine forth ever and ever!

This is the emotional information inferred through the aesthetic-cognitive function of the word that renders order in the whole text in both languages, where every verbal sign or word combination is in close connection with the Old and New Testaments.

We offer the review message of D. Gilbert, an American theologian, which is added to our translation published in separate addition: "It was with great pleasure and interest that I read Lali Jokhadze's translation of "The Canon of Repentance" by King David the Builder. Without being able to comment from the original, I felt that she had captured not only a poetic style, but the heart of a man in search of peace with God. The king's sorrow is clearly born out of a conscience stricken by the revealed truth of God's holiness, sovereignty, mercy, and righteous judgment. In this beautiful verse, one feels to the depths of the king's soul as he confesses his guilt before the God who sees all. His comfort comes to him through drawing near to Mary, the Mother of God, because it was her Son who took away the sin of the World and who invites us today, "Come unto Me, all who are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest". Were Mrs. Jokhadze's translation of this beautiful example of Georgian literature to be published, I believe that many of the English-speaking words would appreciate the opportunity to get acquainted with an important part of Georgian history and faith." (Rev. David Gilbert, BEE International Biblical Theology Faculty).

On the whole the informative potential of the cognitive word "repentance" features the universal text-building efficacy, which creates the linguistic basis to perceive the whole text as one integral verbal sign. It generates a new conceptual system where different meanings of the same word co-exist (speak) and cooperate in the conceptual space to get the

author's message across. The functional adequacy of the translated word-concepts opens up the compatible access for the translator to choose thematically ample lexical variants. So a new conceptual self-regulating system is being generated from the very beginning. Having perceived the magic power of the multiple IP of the divine word the translator easily spots the dynamic equivalents in the recipient language. The creative indefinite potential of the Georgian word apparently should be sought in the bosom of Christendom, since the divine word itself is the common holder of cosmic love and energy.

Sometimes it is difficult to determine which communicative function is predominant but when it is seen that this is the wisdom that comes from the religious language of the Scripture or hagiographic texts it becomes clear that the informative-instructive function is prevailing. In this case a word-concept definitely acquires exclusive informative power, since the author is preoccupied to feature not his own talent and virtues but to convey God's word. This is the case where the individual manner of writing is concealed and the age-old figure of speech is highlighted in the source text. Then the informative potential of the word-concept generates universal self-regulating principle that forms basis to render order and decipher religious texts not only in the original but also in translation. Such word-concepts have exclusive energy to make order out of chaos.

Stemming from this we make an attempt to cognize what kind of constituent is the literary text of the world's conceptual system and what word-concept describes most efficiently the cognitive distribution of the real life. In this respect figurative language is the most prolific area to investigate. So polysemic words, cognitive metaphors or other word-concepts are considered to be fundamental means for generating information and systematizing any literary text. Due to this we are able to cognize the unknown abstract world through the known and concrete. Cognitive concepts (cognitive metaphors) assist us to cognize the world both visible and invisible, organizing the surrounding chaos into the order of orders. As we are continuously involved in making probabilistic choices a certain impact born from a goal-oriented selection of meanings, creates a multi-fold system in which polyphonic perception of the real world is realized. The process of realization of several meanings creates emotive information when none of the meanings are lost. On the contrary, each of them has its equal right, its value and its unique feature to exist. This dynamic co-existence of mutually excluding meanings is sometimes so intrinsically interwoven, that it makes an ambiguous infinitude being more appealing and challenging.

Undoubtedly, such transparent words and their informative potential depend on the context and situation, which is presented as a lingo-cultural entity associated with the laws of general linguistics. We have analyzed various examples from literary texts when word-concepts convey polyphonic effect pushing edges of the semantic field when used as metaphors, allusions, similes etc. then they acquires various communicative functions at the level of text interpretation. We distinguish integral influence of emotive-expressive, didactic-informative, aesthetic-cognitive or concept-forming or concept-defining functions. The multiple statements as such are not a statistic sum of dictionary meanings but a synchronous act of instant realization of several contextual meanings, developing its semantic net. In addition we have to stress

that the effect of the multiple meanings, caused by a stochastic choice creates a multi-dimensional system of associations and connotations, the interaction of which identifies some universal values of this linguistic phenomenon: predictability and adaptation. Although these universal properties are not revealed at once and the reader cannot prima facie perceive them so easily, yet they play a significant role in getting the author's message across i.e. identifying the informative potential of the word-concept in the text.

Summarizing, cognitive concept learning we assume that it is best described as an access to global knowledge and to cultural awareness, which in turn meets the double challenge of change in behavior head on. Students find themselves compelled to go through a stricter and more enticing course of training in self-cognition and self-realization to infer appropriate message and to live up to the standard of intellectual worth. So teaching culture-specific differences introduces learners to the new way of cognizing reality, pushing forward a new culture.

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

ვერბალური ნიშნები და კროს-კულტურული ცნობიერება

ლალი ჯონაძე

ილია ჭავჭავაძის სახელობის თბილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი, უცხო ენების ფაკულტეტი, საქართველო

რ ე ზ ი უ მ ე

ძირითადი სიტყვა-კონცეპტები: ვერბალური ნიშანი, კროს-კულტურული ცოდნა, კოგნიტიური კონცეპტი, კონცეპტუალური თარგმანი, ლინგვო-კულტურული მექანიზმები (აზროვნება).

კონცეპტუალური სწავლებისას კროს-კულტურული (ინტერკულტურული) ცოდნა ემყარება ვერბალური ნიშნის ფუნქციონირებას, ანუ ენობრივი ერთეულის სამეტყველო რეალიზაციას მხატვრულ ტექსტში. ენათმეცნიერება, რომელიც შეისწავლის ენის ერთეულების ფორმათა ფუნქციონირებას, წინა პლანზე წარმოაჩენს ამ ერთეულთა ინტერდისციპლინარული მეთოდებით კვლევას სხვადასხვა კულტურათა შეპირისპირების ფონზე.

კოგნიტიური სიტყვა-კონცეპტი ნაშრომში განიხილება, როგორც სწავლების დინამიკურ-შემეცნებითი პროცესი, რომელიც მოიცავს ადამიანის მოღვაწეობის ორივე მხარეს, როგორც ინტელექტუალურს, ისე ემოციურს. ასეთი კონცეპტი, რომელიც მიაჩნია სხვადასხვა მნიშვნელობათა ერთდროულ, ბუნდოვან რეალიზაციაზე, ტექსტში შეიცავს მრავალ კულტურულ შრეებს. (სტილისტიკაში იგი ამფიბოლის ხერხითაა ცნობილი). ამ დროს ვერბალური ნიშანი მთელი ტექსტისთვის კონცეპტუალური სიმბოლო ხდება და ერთდროულად ამდიდრებს სტრუქტურის კროს-კულტურულ ცნობიერებასაც. ამრიგად, სიტყვა-კონცეპტი ინტერკულტურული განათლების განუყოფელი ნაწილს შეადგენს. ბუნებრივია, კულტურათა შეპირისპირებით მიღებული განსაკუთრებული და გამორჩეული მნიშვნელობები უნდა განვიხილოთ დიდი გულისხმიერებით, როგორც ტექსტის დონეზე, ასევე ისტორიულ-კულტურული დეტალების შემეცნების თვალსაზრისით; წარსულის მეგვიდრეობისა და თანამედროვე კულტურის თანადროული აღქმა სხვადასხვა კულტურებთან (ეპოქებთან) ერთად ერთ, მთლიან წყობას წარმოქმნის.

ქართული კულტურის კონტექსტში ყურადღებას იპყრობს სიტყვა “ჯვარი”, რომელსაც, განსხვავებით დასავლური თუ სხვა კულტურებისაგან, დადებითი კონოტაციები გააჩნია. ქართული ჯვარი განახლების, გადარჩენის, გამარჯვების, გარდაქმნის, ღმერთთან მიახლოების, ახალი, მარადიული ცხოვრების სიმბოლოა. ნაწყვეტი ქართული აგიოგრაფიიდან, რომელიც წმინდა ნინოს საქართველოში შემოსვლას ეხება, სემანტიკურ-სტილისტური ანალიზის საშუალებას გვთავაზობს:

“ხოლო ნინო დაშთა და წარმოემართა მთათა კერძო ჩრდილოისათა და მოვიდა მდინარესა მტკუარსა, მოჰყვა და მოვიდა მცხეთად ქალაქსა დიდსა მეფეთა საჯდომელსა. და იყო სამ წელ ეგრეთ, ილოცვიდა ფარულად ადგილსა ერთსა შებურვილსა ბრძამლითა მაყულისაითა და შექმნა სახეი ჯუარისაი, ნასხლევისაი, და მუნ დაადგრა და ილოცვიდა. და ადგილი იგი იყო ზღუდესა გარსგან. ხოლო მათ მაყუალთა ადგილი არს ზემოისა ეკლესიის საკურთხევლისა ადგილი”.

აქ შინაარსობრივ სიტყვა-კონცეპტად გვევლინება “ჯვარი”, რომელიც მოთავსებულია მოცემული ტექსტის შუა ნაწილში, საიდანაც ნაწილდება შემეცნებითი ინფორმაცია როგორც რეტროსპექციაში, ასევე პროსპექციაში. აღნიშნული სიტყვის ინფორმაციული პოტენციალი კონკრეტდება მისი უახლოესი მსაზღვრელით - “სახეი ჯუარისაი ნასხლევისაი”. ირკვევა, რომ ლექსიკონები, როგორც ქართული ისე ინგლისური, ასე განმარტავენ სიტყვა ნასხლევს:

1. გამოუსადეგარი ვაზის ყლორტი, 2. გადასაგდები, ანუ 3. ბალასტი. აღნიშნული მნიშვნელობა კიდევ უფრო მტკიცდება მომდევნო პარაგრაფით:

“ვპოვე ცთომასა შინა ფრიადსა ჩრდილოისა ქუეყანაი”. იქმნება მეტაფორულ-კოგნიტიური ინფორმაცია: უღვთო, ცთომილი, წარწყმედილი ხალხისა, რომელიც წმინდა ნინომ კვლავ მოიზიდა სიცოცხლისაკენ და მოაქცია ისინი სწორი გზისაკენ “სასწაულითა ქრისტესმიერთა” და “აღაშენა ეკლესია ქუემო სამოთხესა შინა”.

სიტყვის უსაზღვრობის სემანტიკური ფენომენი ავტორის მიერ ინტერკულტურული სპეციფიკის დადგენის ეფექტურ საშუალებად განიხილება, ვინაიდან სიტყვის ესთეტიურ-შემეცნებითი ფუნქცია ინფორმაციულობასთან ერთად იქცევა თარგმნილი ტექსტის აზრობრივ-კომპოზიციური სტრუქტურის ძირითად მათემატიკურ პრინციპად.

ნაშრომში აგრეთვე წარმოდგენილია დავით აღმაშენებლის “გალობანი სინანულისანი”-ს ავტორისეული თარგმანი ინგლისურ ენაზე. როგორც კი სიტყვის უსასრულობის პოტენციას შევიგრძნობთ, მაშინვე უფრო მასშტაბური ხდება აზროვნება და იხსნება არა მარტო ენის უნარ-ჩვევების, არამედ სხვადასხვა კულტურათა დროისა და სივრცის ბარიერიც. მაშასადამე, მით უფრო იზრდება ადამიანის ინტერკულტურული ცოდნა-შემეცნება. ამით მკვლევარი ერთგვარად ამაღლებს განიცდის დრო-ჟამის მიმართ და ჭეშმარიტად ეზიარება უყამობის შეგრძნებებს.

დავით აღმაშენებლის “გალობანი სინანულისანი”-ს თარგმნისას მარტივი სიტყვა წარმოგვიდგება მხატვრული ტექსტის ვერბალურად რეალიზებული მნიშვნელობების მთელ კომპლექსად, რომელიც მოიცავს ინფორმაციის გადამუშავების კოგნიტიურ პროცედურას. ეს კი თავის მხრივ, წარმოქმნის მთელი ტექსტის კონცეპტუალურ-სტილისტურ სისტემას. მაგალითად, სიტყვა „მონანიება“ (repentance)) ტექსტში გვეცხადება სიტყვა-კონცეპტად, სხვადასხვა აზრთა ინტერპრეტაციისათვის, რომელიც აზუსტებს და თანდათანობით აყალიბებს მთლიანი ტექსტის საზრისს. აღნიშნული კონცეპტი “repentance” გვეკლინება ფუნქციურად ადეკვატურ სიტყვად ორივე ენისთვის, რათა სრულყოფილ იქმნას როგორც თარგმანი, ასევე ინტერპრეტაცია. ამ სიტყვის შეცვლა მისივე, არცთუ ისე კონტრასტული, მაგრამ ახლო სინონიმით “remorse”, მიუთითებს არა ინგლისური ენის არცოდნაზე, რაც შეიძლება დავაბრალოთ მთარგმნელს, არამედ წარმოაჩენს გაუცხოებულ ფესვებს ორიგინალის კულტურაში. აქ იგულისხმება კროსკულტურული მეხსიერება ანუ ლინგვისტური აზროვნება.

ორივე სიტყვისთვის საერთო კომპონენტია სინანული ცოდვის ჩადენისათვის, თუმცა სიტყვას “repentance” რელიგიური კონოტაცია გააჩნია და მიანიშნებს ეპიტემიაზე, ანუ ცოდვის გამოსყიდვის შესაძლებლობაზე მონანიების გზით. “remorse”-ის კომპონენტიც სინანულია, მაგრამ “repentance” გულისხმობს საქციელის გამოსწორებას და აზროვნების შეცვლას მონანიების საშუალებით. პირველ შემთხვევაში გულისყური გადატანილია სინანულზე და ქცევის დაგმობა უყურადღებოდაა დატოვებული, ხოლო სიტყვაში “repentance”, ეს კომპონენტი მთავარ პრინციპულ თემად გვესახება.*

* იხ. ამერიკელი ენათმეცნიერის და ბიბლიის უბადლო მთარგმნელის ი. ნაიდას შეფასება, ჩვენს მიერ შესრულებულ “გალობანის” თარგმანზე: “ნასიამოვნები ვარ თქვენი წერილით, დათარიღებული 1999 წლის 23 მაისით და შესანიშნავი პატარა წიგნით საქართველოს მეფის დავით აღმაშენებლის შესახებ. ინგლისური თარგმანი საუცხოოა, ალტაცებული ვარ ასეთი მშვენიერი ლიტერატურული მასალით. ი. ნაიდა”.

GEORGIAN CULTURE AND TYPES OF CULTURE

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None of the main typological conceptions of culture mentions Georgian culture among the types of culture. What is the reason for this? First, it may be that Georgian culture is not an independent type of culture characterized by some specific content and originality. Second, if it is so and Georgian culture belongs to a particular type of culture, we still have to clarify its typological characteristics in order to show the type of culture it is most closely related to. Third, it may be that Georgian culture is a marginal phenomenon, in other words, it is an eclectic mixture of different cultures, an untenable culture, and therefore it has remained out of the sphere of interest of researchers. Fourth, perhaps it is the 'smallness' of Georgian culture and its minimal influence on other cultures, or just a scarcity of information on it, that restrains researchers from including it in their areas of research?

If we disregard some fragmentary discussions of Georgian culture, a systematic-holistic analysis of it has not been undertaken at any of the leading scientific centres abroad. Georgian academic institutions have for the most part limited their interest to historical research on Georgian culture. Neither has a cultural-philosophical analysis of Georgian culture been carried out in our country. In this paper we consider the history of Georgian culture as a whole. We limit ourselves to identifying its essential tendencies and to making some conjectures. A thorough study of Georgian culture is a task for future research.

We shall take as a working thesis the real fact that Georgian culture as such actually does exist and has a centuries-old history. It is not a marginal culture and, although like other cultures it has been subject to many external cultural influences, it has nevertheless managed to 'Georgianize' these. Georgian culture is manifestly a national culture; the linchpin of this culture is the national language. To make this point clear we note that language is not a unique centre of some oriental cultures. An example is Azerbaijani culture, where the language is Turkic and not characteristic of this people alone and, although it is an axis of their culture as a language, it is not a centre of this culture alone. This culture is therefore not national, but is, so to say, general-Turkic. If we consider this argument valid and admit the fact of the existence of Georgian culture as a national culture, then we can study its character, demonstrate its peculiarity, determine whether it is a type of culture absolutely independent of other cultures or whether we can ascribe it to one of the general types of culture.

The national character of Georgian culture which we have identified above does not specify it in particular, as the majority of cultures are characterized by this feature. Unique forms

of culture are formed on the basis of an original world outlook. The earliest forms of world outlook which determined the specific features of one culture or another are myth and religion. For example, the character of Chinese culture is essentially determined by Confucianism, that of Indian culture by a Buddhist world outlook, and so on. As we know, Georgian culture has no such basis in its 'own' world outlook, although original myths can be traced in it. However, these myths are not of a systematic character and therefore cannot be considered as an overall world outlook. We can also point to Zoroastrianism, which is believed to have spread to the whole Caucasian region and perhaps to Georgia as well, but which did not become a national religion defining the character of Georgian culture. Thus Georgian culture was not formed as an independent type of culture. This argumentation leads us to the conclusions that, firstly, the existence of Georgian culture is a fact and ignoring it in scientific studies may be explained by a lack of information and, secondly, Georgian culture is not characterized by a strongly-marked specificity, that is to say, it is not an independent type of culture. In this case the following problem needs to be addressed: What is the type of culture to which Georgian culture displays some resemblance, and which group can it be ascribed to? In order to determine this let us resort to a widespread version of the typology of cultures that identifies the following principal types: Near Eastern, Chinese, Indian and European. The choice of this typology is of instrumental importance only. Any other typology of cultures might be selected such as, for example, that used by UNESCO. Our choice is determined by procedural considerations, as our aim is to elucidate the problem of the typological affiliation of Georgian culture, and some cultures listed in the chosen typology were historically in more or less 'close' relation to Georgian culture. This analysis of the problem also includes a consideration of other typological conceptions.

To begin with, we can reject any typological resemblance of Georgian culture to Chinese and Indian cultures. In the first place, these cultures are territorially so far removed from Georgia that it seems impossible that any of them could have significantly influenced Georgian culture or vice versa. Although the existence of the Silk Road proves that there were some contacts between these regions and Georgia, such relations were of an economic and commercial character only. Besides this – and of crucial importance as spatially separated cultures can be typologically similar – Chinese and Indian cultures are based on the world outlook of Confucianism and Buddhism, respectively, and neither is in any way characteristic of Georgian.

The issue of the relation between Georgian culture and the culture of the Near East (that is, to Arabian-Muslim culture) and European culture requires a special analysis.

§ 2. GEORGIAN CULTURE AND CULTURE OF THE NEAR EAST

What becomes immediately evident while comparing these cultures is their intensive interrelations over long periods of history. Historically, they were destined to be neighbours in the same geographical area and it is not at all surprising that, besides the conflicts, there has

always been a dialogue between these cultures. Before Islam became dominant in Iran (according to A. Toynbee it was Islam that hindered the development of Persian culture and he therefore considers it a relict culture), Georgian culture had intensive contacts with it and these contacts continued into the later period. The influence and impact of certain elements of Persian culture on Georgian culture are evident. But a difference in the religious foundations of these cultures is equally clear. Georgian culture is a Christian culture, while Arabian, Persian and (in the later period) Turkish cultures are Muslim cultures. Certainly, religious differences marked their modes of life, value orientations, and so on, although one particular factor must be taken into account: both Christianity and Islam are Biblical religions and this means that certain – if not identical, at least similar – elements can be found in them. Let us note one type of culture in the typology given by Spengler that is at first sight rather strange: the Byzantine-Arabic culture. According to Spengler, Byzantine-Christian and Arabic-Muslim cultures have a common basis – a magic spirit which is characterized by a total rejection of everything corporeal. It follows from this that religious differences as well as resemblances, at least within this theory, do not mean differences of cultures. By the way, it is possible to discover certain essential resemblances between the medieval Christian and Muslim cultures. For example, both cultures are characterized by a rejection of corporeality and the primacy of spirituality, theo-centrism and collectivity versus anthropocentrism and individualism, intuitivism and inertness while rationality and dynamism are eliminated, and more. It may be said that there is an essential resemblance between Georgian and Muslim cultures in the common cultural features at this stage of the history of culture. Such a resemblance does not result exclusively from the nature of Georgian culture, but is characteristic of the Middle Ages as a whole. Georgian culture became fundamentally permeated with the rationalistic spirit of ancient Greek culture. King David Aghmashenebeli of Georgia (1089–1125) considered Gelati (a cathedral in west Georgia where an academy of sciences was established) as the Second Athens and the New Jerusalem. A new stage of European culture originated in the merging of Christian and classical values and entailed a range of changes in many spheres of man's life. We cannot detect a similar process in Muslim cultures.

To sum up we can say that, while being a Christian culture, Georgian culture also revealed a typological resemblance to Muslim culture in the Middle Ages, as did any other Christian cultures of this period. In spite of this, Georgian culture distanced itself from Near East culture during the subsequent period and accepted a European direction of development. What were the characteristic features of this direction and did Georgian culture pursue it to the end?

§3. GEORGIAN CULTURE AND EUROPEAN CULTURES

The fact that both Georgian and European cultures are, in general, Christian cultures does not imply that they are typologically identical. Ethiopians belong to a Christian culture (this

African nation is one of the most ancient Christian nations), but no one has ever thought of ascribing it to European culture in spite of their shared religious faith. Similarly, *orthodox Slav culture – which in the latest conceptions of culture is considered as an independent type of culture – belongs to the Christian culture*. Georgian Christianity is also orthodox although, in spite of this confessional resemblance to Slav orthodoxy, there is no typological resemblance between them. In support of this statement we may say that Russian culture is characterized by collectivity, Georgian culture by individualism; Russian culture as an immediate successor to Byzantine culture is strictly religious and a love of life and mundane pleasures are considered blasphemy, while Georgian culture is marked by a love of life, joy and – let us say – a certain aesthetical nonchalance. Georgian culture is a joyful culture.

In comparing Georgian and European cultures we have to consider the stages of development that European culture passed through. Such a comparison will highlight their resemblance as well as the differences between them. As we know, the first stage of European culture is that of the Middle Ages, which is characterized by the replacement of pagan values by Christian ones. Christianity and its 'spirit' penetrate every layer of culture. In this respect Georgian culture underwent the same processes, only more so: Christianity was accepted in Georgia much earlier than in many European countries. Thus Georgian and European cultures of the Middle Ages typologically resemble each other. In the next stage of history a certain synthesis of Christian and classical values began in European culture and marked the start of the Renaissance. The same processes developed in Georgian culture, but the Renaissance and its particular results are not as clearly discernable in Georgian as in Italian culture. By the way, some consider the Renaissance in the strictest sense of the term as a purely Italian phenomenon, but this is not of importance for us in this case as our aim is to demonstrate that the main tendencies that characterized the Renaissance are not foreign to Georgian culture. The essential characteristic feature of the Renaissance – a merging of rationality and religion – also occurred in Georgian culture. Georgians had close contacts with Greek culture as early as classical times. There even existed Greek city states on the territory of Georgia (Phasis academy was an important centre of Greek culture in Georgia). Such relations would undoubtedly leave certain traces in the historical memory of the Georgians. In short, classical culture was not a foreign phenomenon for Georgian culture even before the Renaissance. We mention this to show that neither Greek philosophy nor the rational aspect of classical culture were unknown in Georgian culture in the Middle Ages. The ideas of Neo-Platonism and the Areopagitic doctrine in particular were widespread in Georgia. By the way, according to one scientific hypothesis Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, whose doctrine is acknowledged as a theoretical basis of the Renaissance, was a Georgian scholar, Peter the Iberian. During this period Greek philosophy was translated and intensely studied at Iqalto and Gelati academies. Such Georgian philosophers as Eprem Mtsire, Ioane Petritsi, Arsen Iqaltoeli and others worked in this period. The merging of Greek rationality with the principles of Christianity brought

about, in the main, the same results in Georgia as in Europe. Mundane everyday life became of importance in Georgian culture. The evidence of this fact is the development of a secular literature. Relation to the Universe extends beyond purely religious borders – a love of life, joy, and a joyful aesthetical attitude to life formed during this period characterize Georgian culture up to the present day. The source of Georgian individualism is to be sought in this period. Let us recall the abolition of the death penalty by Queen Tamar. Is this not evidence of recognition of and respect for man? Of course, we are not asserting that the Renaissance stage of European culture was fully realized in Georgian culture. As we have already said, it is a special feature of Italian culture proper, and from this viewpoint other European cultures share the same position as Georgian culture, although it must be said that the main aspects that characterize the Renaissance can be traced in Georgian culture as well.

The distancing of Georgian culture from that of Europe becomes evident in the modern period of the history of culture. In modern times a new scientific paradigm is established, the universe is studied from a scientific viewpoint, the foundation of which is the activity of the subject. This brought about socio-political and mental changes. In fact, present-day European values were formed in this period. Traditional states were transformed into modern societies. Collectivistic societies were replaced by individualistic societies. Traditional forms of government changed according to democratic principles. Individualization and urbanization accelerated, fields of science and technology were established, and so on. Georgian culture fell behind in these processes, although later (but neither willingly nor through its own efforts) certain aspects of modern European culture still managed to penetrate it. The ideas of the Enlightenment were imported via Russia by the 'Tergdaleulebi' (nineteenth-century Georgians who had received an education in Russia). Certain branches of science developed, the first Georgian university was founded (in 1918), industrialization and urbanization took place in the twentieth century, and much more. However, right down to the present, Georgian culture has failed to adopt and assimilate European liberal-democratic values.

To summarize, we may state that Georgian culture displays a certain typological resemblance to European culture although differing from it in many ways. We suggest that Georgian culture belongs to a sub-type of European culture, specifically, to the Mediterranean culture.

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

ქართული კულტურა და კულტურის ტიპები

აკაკი ყულიჯანიშვილი

თბილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი, საქართველო

რეზიუმე

ქართული კულტურის სისტემურ-ჰოლისტური ანალიზი არც უცხოურ და არც ქართულ სამეცნიერო წრეებში არ განხორციელებულა. ამ ფაქტს რამოდენიმე სერიოზული ახსნა შეიძლება მოეძებნოს, მათ შორის, ერთ-ერთ მთავარ ფაქტორად გვესახება ის გარემოება, რომ ისტორიულად საქართველოს პოლიტიკური თავისუფლების დაკარგვა საოცარი სიზუსტით ემთხვევა კულტურის ინტენსიური მეცნიერული კვლევების დაწყებას ევროპულ სააზროვნო სივრცეში. ამიტომ, ქართული კულტურა ევროპული მეცნიერებისათვის უცნობ ფენომენად რჩებოდა; რაც შეეხება საკუთრივ ქართულ სამეცნიერო წრეებს, აქ, ძირითადად, ქართული კულტურის ისტორიის საკითხებით დაინტერესება სჭარბობდა და არ ხორციელდებოდა მისი კულტუროლოგიური ანალიზი.

ქართული კულტურის კომპარატივისტული ანალიზი ევროპულ კულტურასთან მიმართებაში, გვაძლევს იმის თქმის საშუალებას, რომ ქართული კულტურა ტიპოლოგიურ მსგავსებას ამჟღავნებს ევროპული კულტურის მიმართ: ისიც ბერძნულ-იუდაურ კულტურათა ერთ-ერთი წარმომადგენელია და რენესანსის ეპოქის ჩათვლით, ევროპული კულტურის ყველა არსებით მახასიათებელს შეიცავს. თუმცა, ისიც უნდა ითქვას, რომ საზოგადოების მოდერნიზაცია ევროპაში უფრო ადრე განხორციელდა. ქართული კულტურა ამ პროცესში მოგვიანებით ჩაერთო და თანაც, ჩაერთო არა პირდაპირ, არამედ დაპყრობილი ქვეყნის გაშუალებული გზით. მიუხედავად ამისა, ქართული კულტურა კულტურის ტიპებს შორის ყველაზე მეტ სიახლოვეს ევროპულ კულტურასთან ამჟღავნებს, იგი ევროპული სივრცის ხმელთაშუა აუზის კულტურათა ერთ-ერთი წარმომადგენელია.

OTAR JIOEV – RESEARCHER OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF CULTURE

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Research into problems associated with values became a priority at the Institute of Philosophy from the 1970s and was actively conducted alongside the study of traditional classical philosophical problems. The foundations for this research into values were laid by Angia Bochorishvili, Niko Chavchavadze, Zurab Kakabadze, Otar Bakuradze, Otar Jioev, Tamaz Buachidze and, in the later period, by Merab Mamardashvili. It was logical that the study of the philosophical problems of culture was put on the agenda as culture is a system of realized values, a process of implementation of spiritual values and, therefore, the internal links between these sets of problems are evident. In this respect a symposium on the problems of value which was held in Tbilisi in 1965 was of special importance. Jioev actively participated in this together with Russian and Georgian philosophers.

It is precisely the fundamental analysis of the concept of value and a deep insight into its essence that enables us to apply successfully this concept to the philosophical problems of ethics, aesthetics, philosophical anthropology and culture.

Certainly, it took some time to establish the tradition and to reach the scientific level of research that exists at the Institute of Philosophy. The ideological atmosphere and the 'pressure' under which philosophers of the older generation – our teachers – and even our generation had to work are well known.

In conditions where the assertion that being determined consciousness and social being determined social consciousness was dominant, the direction in which research into the philosophical problems of culture was to be carried out was determined and clear from the very outset. Many scientists handled with caution and even fear the implication that there is a certain immanent regularity in the development of superstructure phenomena, among them culture, and that these are relatively independent of the level of economic development. In particular, the evaluation of greatness of the classical (Greek) culture by Marx and his appeal to Shakespeare in this respect are well known, as is Engels's admission of the unprecedented development of literature in Norway and Russia in the nineteenth century. This means that the level of development of culture quite often does not closely correspond to the economic level of society and its development is characterized by specific immanent regularities.

In spite of all this, problems of culture were analyzed on the basis of the formula that material culture determines the development of spiritual culture.

Such was the context when in 1963 a small work by academician Angia Bochorishvili entitled *What is Culture?* was published. This work is very important as, in contrast to all other works published in Georgia, culture is interpreted here as a value phenomenon which is an arena for revealing man's essential powers and reflects not only the degree of man's domination over nature but also (and this is essential) the degree of transformation of man himself who at the same time is both the subject creating culture and its object. The author demonstrated the difference between civilization and culture, interpreting the latter as a process of realization of values, as a phenomenon expressing the process of man's becoming, his 'humanization'. Bochorishvili established this tradition in the study of the problem and was the first to interpret and characterize culture as a unity of positive values. This prepared the foundations for further research.

The difference between civilization and culture is determined by and based on the fact that man is a child (or citizen) of two worlds, nature and society, therefore of freedom and necessity. Recalling Kant's words, there are two things that never cease to fill the soul with surprise and awe no matter how often we reason on them, namely the starry sky above us and the moral law within us. We may say that the starry sky and nature in general are governed by the laws of nature which are necessary and universal, while the character of moral law is different: it is the ought. In the sphere of the moral it is possible to speak of purposiveness, regulative character, and so on, but not about necessity and universality. This means that the laws functioning in nature and society are different. The laws functioning in society, in historical necessity, are characterized by an important feature that implies that man's free, purposeful creative activity participates in the historical process and the realization of historical necessity. Stressing this aspect in contrast to the materialistic and naturalistic interpretations of history means that the specificity of historical necessity is conditioned by the existence of value determinism in history. In other words, man's creative free, purposive participation in the process of history, in the realization of historical necessity, is based on a value attitude to reality, and such activity of man cannot be reduced to natural physical determination. Such was the interpretation of the specificity of the historical process by Jioev in his work *The Nature of Historical Necessity* published in 1967 in Russia (and which was later defended as a doctoral thesis). I stress the fact that the work was published in Russia as it was immediately followed by criticism from Moscow where many negative reviews were published (although a few attempts were made to defend it as well). The fact was that no one could forbid Kant to discuss the problems of freedom, but when the head of the Department of Historical Materialism at the Institute of Philosophy puts forward the problem of man's free participation in history and argues that people with their ideals, aims and value orientations participate in the process of realization of historical necessity, and that in contrast to spontaneous regularities functioning in nature, this is a specific feature of historical necessity, it could not be left without severe criticism on the part of reactionary forces. Jioev's attitude was viewed as teleologism, subjectivism, a revision of Marxism and the inevitable criticism followed without delay, but this

is a matter for separate discussion. I stress this fact only because a study of the nature of historical necessity and the specificity of man's free purposive activity in history led the author to research the philosophical problems of culture.

The first thing that a researcher into the philosophical problems of culture has to do is to determine the concept of culture. Perhaps there is no other concept (term) that has so many definitions as culture (there are almost three hundred definitions of this concept which at first sight appears so familiar and clear). Each of the definitions puts forward one aspect or another of culture and attempts to use this as a basis to elucidate the essence and nature of culture.

According to the most widespread and less controversial definition, culture is creation. But creation itself is an extremely specific and complex phenomenon. Equally (if not more) complex and specific is freedom, which is one of the principal and most important conditions of creation. Jioev in his works attempted to elucidate specific features of culture as creation, and concluded that the necessary conditions of creation as the formation of new values (that is, of culture) are: purposiveness, existence of the subject of activity, freedom, and the realization of values. Of course, these conditions imply each other: a real subject can be given if there is freedom, realization of aims and values, and so on. In order to discover how these conditions of creation are realized in the sphere of culture, it is first of all necessary to elucidate the relation of creation to man and his essence. This is just the way to determine that freedom and purposive action are possible if man's activity is not reduced to natural, physical determination (and it is not). Thus, creation as an essential aspect of building culture – and, therefore, of man's active, purposive transforming activity – conditions and expresses man's specific character.

Considering creation as man's essence and his specific feature means that only man can transform the universe and reality, and only he does not subject himself to the outside world but imposes his will on it. As Jioev emphasizes, this of course does not imply that nature is changed only due to man's creative activity, as the same result can be achieved as a result of the activities of animals. In the case of man we speak about transforming reality according to certain aims. Creation is essential for man because it is a necessary aspect of man's active transforming activity and this aspect determines his human specificity.

It must be said that creation as an aspect of man's transforming activity is essential for man not merely because it is a distinguishing feature of man but because it has an explanatory force as a necessary condition of man's transforming activity: when we say that man in the process of transforming reality transforms himself as well we imply the importance of creativity.

Discussing the above issues Jioev draws attention to the fact that the realization of values is a necessary condition of creation and that creation itself is a value. Of course, creation is a value though its value depends on what is created. Creation cannot be a final criterion of value. But neither can man be such a criterion, as it is important to find out what

can be a criterion of value for man (objectivity of value is necessarily specific: it must be of universal character while at the same time it can have meaning only in relation to man).

In so far as value has some meaning in relation to man the character the phenomenon has to which man is to strive to and which still retains a certain objectivity must be shown. Jioev's answer to this problem is the following: nothing can have any value for man but that which corresponds to his nature, to his essence, to his self. He demonstrates that it is impossible to understand value as a condition and criterion of creation unless we take into account the importance of the social nature of man and interrelations between individuals, between 'I' and 'you'. This means that the problem of the criterion of creation naturally and logically leads us to the problem of the criteria of culture and value. These problems require special research and Jioev also analyzed them carefully. We can state that creation necessarily means the realization of values, and speaking of creation in any sphere of culture implies (and really is) a realization of values. Without a realization of values we would be dealing with a game and not with the creation of culture.

Discussing problems related to interrelation of science (cognition in general) and of creation and morals and creation Jioev rightly concludes that creativity is characteristic not only of the creation of culture but also of the process of adoption of the values of culture.

Jioev paid special attention to the analysis of the dialogical nature of culture. Culture as a process of the realization of values is a dialogue – it is a dialogue with the past, with other epochs, other cultures and people. Due to its dialogical nature and by means of this, people of different epochs can understand each other. Culture as a dialogue, as a condition of man's socialization, forms a person, makes him a tolerant being who can direct his own activity according to values common to the whole of humanity.

There is one more important issue which it is necessary to consider in order to characterize culture and elucidate its essence. This issue received close attention and has been thoroughly analyzed in Jioev's works. It is a problem of the structure of spiritual culture. The structure of culture is determined by the relation of man to the reality, by the interrelation of the forms of spiritual mastering of the world. According to the level of development of a society these forms are different in different epochs, although there are identical elements which enable us to characterize the structure of spiritual culture. These elements are mythology, religion, ethics, art, science, philosophy, legal norms, and so forth. The main elements of spiritual culture fulfilled different functions in different epochs, and relying on this fact it is possible to speak about the specificity of value orientation of any given society: if a belief in supra-natural powers is a starting point for mythological-religious consciousness, then classical philosophy – which is oriented toward the world and man – accepts reason and logic as criteria of the truth. The Middle Ages were oriented toward faith and God, and therefore the Bible is the only criterion of the truth. During the Renaissance artistic creativity, the arts, the reflection and expression of man's bodily and spiritual harmony interpreted as the unveiling of the beautiful, were considered to be the main objectives. In modern times

the unprecedented development of science brought to the fore the importance of knowledge and therefore of science. This tendency is also the most important for the contemporary European (Euro-American) civilization at present. Exaggerating of the importance of science and technology is characteristic of Western civilization (Oriental Indian-Chinese civilization is of a different type). Well known debates between the extreme scientific and anti-scientific positions are not at all as harmless and purely theoretical as they might appear. The core problem of these debates is the following: is the harmonious interrelation of elements of culture more fruitful for the development of culture and for social progress, or is exaggeration and absolutization of the role and importance of some of these elements at the expense of others more desirable? If at any stage in the development of society science and technology are considered of crucial importance, and if in such a society they are considered the most important elements of culture while the importance of other elements (morals, art) is ignored, we can state that in this society consuming tendencies prevail, moral consciousness lags behind the speed of technical progress and culture is in crisis in such a society where the technical mode of thinking is absolutized. Any society that is oriented on possession and not on being (to use Fromm's terms) develops one-sidedly. According to Aristotle, a society which develops science and technology and progresses in this direction but is retarded with respect to morals is moving not forward but backwards. This problem is connected with an important problem of culturology. It is a problem of types of cultures and, accordingly, of civilizations.

A civilization or a culture which is oriented in the main on domination over nature and on procuring material comfort (well-being) is of different type to that which is in the main oriented toward spirituality and the perfection of man's inner world. Western civilization (which is called 'enchanted by things') belongs to the first type, while Oriental civilization (and culture) is of the latter type. If the first type of culture is oriented toward ensuring material comfort (well-being), the second is oriented toward man's spiritual perfection. These civilizations and cultures contain different understandings of man's life, of the essence of his being and the importance of metaphysics for man. It has its own world outlook and metaphysical foundations. All these problems were thoroughly analyzed by Jioev.

Jioev analyzed different aspects of understanding the concept of culture, the problem of culture as a value phenomenon, problems of the interrelation of culture and creation, of culture and civilization, of culture and freedom, the problem of the dialogical character of culture, problems of developmental regularities of culture and the criteria of this development. He put forward many interesting and well-reasoned ideas which should be taken into consideration by those scientists who study the same problems.

Thus Jioev made a very significant contribution to and impact on research into the philosophical problems of culture, and he established the tradition of corresponding research at the Institute of Philosophy (and in Georgia). His works determined to great degree the standard of research into the philosophical problems of culture.

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

ოთარ ჯიოევი – კულტურის ფილოსოფიური პრობლემების მკვლევარი

ირაკლი კალანდია

სავლე წერეთლის ფილოსოფიის ინსტიტუტის დირექტორი, საქართველო

რეზიუმე

სტატია ეძღვნება ოთარ ჯიოევის დამსახურების წარმოჩენას, საქართველოში კულტურის ფილოსოფიური პრობლემების კვლევის არსებული ტრადიციის მიმართ. კერძოდ, ნაჩვენებია, რომ მან ღირებულების ცნების საფუძვლიანი დამუშავების შედეგად, თანამედროვე აზროვნების სტანდარტების დონეზე გამოიკვლია კულტურის, როგორც ღირებულებითი ფენომენის, კულტურის როგორც სულიერი სტრუქტურის, კულტურისა და შემოქმედების ურთიერთობის, კულტურის დიალოგიური ბუნების და კულტურის განვითარების კრიტერიუმების აქტუალური პრობლემები; აღნიშნული საკითხების მაღალმეცნიერული ანალიზით ოთარ ჯიოევმა მნიშვნელოვანი წვლილი შეიტანა ქართული კულტუროლოგიის განვითარებაში.

INTERPRETATION OF PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE IN PROFESSOR TAMAZ BUACHIDZE'S WORKS

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Culture is the place where the essential powers of man are revealed. It is a phenomenon demonstrating the level of formation of a person. The purpose of culture cannot be identified either as a mere enlarging of the area of man's mental vision or as the education of man, but its aim first and foremost is the perfection of man's spiritual world and the sophistication of his soul, in other words, the development of the ability of overall sensitivity and perceptiveness in man's spiritual organization. This is the reason for Otto Spengler's statement that spirit dominates in culture and intellect in civilization.

Culture does not only express the level of man's domination over nature. The process of creating culture reflects how man – a subject who creates culture – is changed and transformed. People transforming the outside world (and their own selves as well) in contrast to other beings create a new reality, a world of culture. Man's life is a life realized in culture. These are the issues discussed by Tamaz Buachidze when, in analyzing the Hegelian understanding of the essence of history, he reflects upon the interrelation of man and history that is the meaning of philosophy and writes: 'Man is a dialectical unity of different essential forces. History is not a realization of the absolute might of reason: it is a process of realization of essential powers of different range given in man, and this process corresponds to that of forming different spheres of culture. The level achieved by culture forms new possibilities and originates new interests that determine the transformation of culture. Culture changes and so correspondingly does man also. [Ref. 1, pp.244-5]

Buachidze considers as valid the idea that the only subject, the only moving force of history, is man, and it is therefore unnecessary to seek some transcendental factors in relation to man and human society when talking of the meaning of history. The problem of the meaning of history must be founded on an analysis of human nature: 'One of the essential and most evident features distinguishing man from the animals can be characterized only in the following manner: the environment suitable for animals to live in is nature, the environment suitable for man is culture. Animals live and act in those settings that are formed in the process of the development of nature and do not form any new world. The human world is not solely a result of the development of nature, but is also a result of human activity. Man transforms nature and creates a new reality, culture.' [Ref. 2, p.33]

Such a situation is not accidental for man as animals are better adapted to nature than is man. While the means necessary for living are 'ready-made' for the animals, man cannot live if he does not struggle to overcome his somatic unfitness to live in nature, and he does this by creating a new reality. This means that man, unlike the animals, cannot be only a consumer. He must of necessity produce in order to consume later.

Therefore, man in order to exist has to cognize the natural regularities and 'transform and subdue' nature. He can do this only if he creates such a phenomenon that will be different from nature and will help him reach his goal. Culture is just such a phenomenon.

However, the destination of culture is not limited by the fact that originally it was a means of satisfying man's vital needs. The content of this demand has changed over time: In ancient Rome, the plebs demanded not only bread (food in general) but also entertainment. Since creating culture became a profession it has ceased to be simply a means necessary for preserving man's life and it has established itself as an arena for revealing man's essence and his essential powers. Not only did Greek art or culture serve the slave-owning state, but the Greek slave-owning state was a means of – and an arena for – the development of classical culture. In other words, culture responds to such essential demands of man as creation and active and free action and activity. As Thomas Mann said, culture is precisely what differentiates man from the animals. Culture is synonymous to humanity: it is the eternal striving of man towards ideals. It is a tendency to reach perfection and an eternal striving toward it that is originally 'nestled' in man. The transformation of nature and changing the environment according to values is the basis of man's activity directed toward the formation of culture (both material and spiritual). In this sense, as Buachidze has shown, 'man's history is nothing but a process of the realization of essential powers of different range given in man's potentialities that corresponds to the process of forming different spheres of culture. The phenomena of culture are the bearers of values, they are things of value... That is why we can say that history as a process of the realization of essential powers. It is a process of creating culture and at the same time is a process of creating phenomena of value.' [Ref. 2, pp.35-6]

Buachidze emphasizes the fact that every new level of culture forms new possibilities and new interests for man and those different spheres of culture correspond to different essential powers of man: 'Each essential power "attempts" to "reify" and realize itself. But the difficulty of history is precisely that realization of one essential power becomes a reason for hindering other essential powers: it opposes the process of the realization of other essential powers. An essential power realized in one sphere of culture either hinders some other essential powers given in man's potentialities or opposes the essential power realized in any other sphere of culture.' [Ref. 1, p.245]

On the basis of an analysis of the Hegelian understanding of the essence of history Buachidze rightly concludes that the struggle to overcome opposition between realized and potentially given essential powers has accompanied history from its beginning (and will continue to do so in the future). He writes: 'It is a movement towards man, towards a free

realization of every essential power of man, and this is revealed in removing the opposition between realized and potentially given essential powers of man at every new stage of the development of humanity, or between essential powers realized in different spheres of culture. This is precisely the meaning of history and its main content.' [Ref. 1, p.246]

The above is echoed in an analysis by Buachidze of one of the main statements of Nietzsche's doctrine, the reappraisal of values. He showed that, according to Nietzsche, tendencies of nihilism are potentially and implicitly given in the traditional world outlook where the values of the mundane world are generated on the basis of the transcendental ideal world. Thus, according to Nietzsche, the traditional world outlook contains in itself conditions of its own destruction and, therefore, in the process of its historical development, it moves towards a depreciation of the values established by it. He writes: 'The possibilities of nihilism are already given in that principal act which, according to Nietzsche, determined the subsequent history of European culture. This is the act of dividing the world into the real and the seeming worlds.' [Ref. 3, pp.481-2].

The death of God and the domination of nihilism that is the process of the depreciation of traditional values is inherently connected with scepticism, hopelessness and passivity. But 'passive nihilism', according to Nietzsche, is pernicious to humanity: it is limited to destruction only. It would therefore be fatal for history to stop at this stage. Nihilism must put an end to the old, but nihilism must become a foundation for building the new. Nihilism is to be not an end but a transitional phase. A new perspective is pointed out and new possibilities are opened up in nihilism understood as a process of the depreciation of false values. The process, which is directed at destroying old-fashioned values, is to be brought to an end.' [Ref. 3, p.482].

Nietzsche demonstrates a deep understanding of man, his soul and his internal world in his extremely interesting analysis of the origin of the Greek tragedy. In this work, *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, the problem of the origin of Greek tragedy is interpreted philosophically. The author presents art as a specific revelation of two forces that form the foundation of the world, as two sources of the world: the Dionysian and the Apollonian.

According to Nietzsche, it is from such an understanding of the metaphysical sources of the world that it is possible to conclude that art, man and culture can be perfect only if both sources of the world are organically united in them. Tragedy is a model of such perfection, but this art too had its end. Nietzsche considered that at a definite stage in historical development a new world outlook formed in the classical world. This world outlook was marked by a scientific spirit and did not take into account the Dionysian. Tragedy and the tragic experience of the world were killed by reasoning, logical, scientific man. Boisterous Dionysus was replaced by 'theorizing' Socrates and myth by science. A period of decline in the history of European culture began and a new culture arose, the Alexandrian, based on a scientific outlook.' [Ref. 3, pp.501-2]

Nietzsche considered contemporary man lived in a culture that was devoid of the Dionysian and therefore one-sided. This explains the extremely negative attitude of the

author of *The Birth of Tragedy* to his contemporary culture and to his epoch in general.' [Ref. 3, p.502].

It is therefore not accidental that Nietzsche – who was worried over the fate of man and was searching for ways out of this situation – attempted 'to unmask his contemporary metaphysics, religion, art, morals and law. He attempted to prove that, beyond the elevated phrases of different branches of culture, trivial, "mundane", "rather human" strivings were hidden. According to Nietzsche, the culture of his epoch was an arena of illusions and falsehood. That is why at this period Nietzsche's ideal is "free spirit" which, in contrast to "bound spirit", opposes the traditional culture and is free from its illusions.' [Ref. 3, p.503]

Analyzing Wilhelm Dilthey's views on the importance of an objective spirit and his idea that relying on the works of men of genius it is possible to study the 'energetic action' of certain forms of spiritual activity as results of general spirit found in language, myth and religious customs, traditions, law, and so on, Buachidze rightly points out that Dilthey's considerations on objective spirit are certainly of great importance in cultural studies. He writes: 'And really, what is culture if not objective spirit! Every culture... is reified, objectified spirit. The phenomena of culture reveal the soul of their creators, their world outlooks, aims, ideas and values. If you want to grasp this soul and its activity, it would be most fruitful to grasp those sensual phenomena of this soul in which it is "placed"... The soul of the Georgian nation – its world outlook – is originally embodied in every phenomenon of objective spirit or culture: in Georgian ornaments and frescos, songs and shairi (a form of folk musical-poetic art), religious rituals and dance... Georgian mythology, fairy tales, proverbs, habits and customs, literary art, law, philosophy... in a word, everything that is not psychic but exists in a form of objective spirit, that is, is more than psychic, is a starting point and the firmest foundation for those who intend to investigate the "Georgian" phenomenon.' [Ref. 4, p.28].

This same idea is developed when Buachidze asserts that, in general, history is a process of creating value phenomena (as mentioned above). The same is true of the history of every nation. The creation of value phenomena is the creation of culture. Culture as the second nature, a new reality, is created by man who, in contrast to all other beings, is endowed by a spirit whose main characteristic is freedom. As a result of a thorough analysis of Max Scheler's theory, Buachidze puts forward the idea that man endowed by spirit is able to 'look from the outside' at himself, his instincts and natural yearnings, and liberate himself from their domination. In this sense, spirit as an ability for self-knowledge is, on the one hand, a negative freedom: it means freedom from something. But spirit is not only negative freedom, it is also positive freedom. Spirit can be free not only *from* something but it can be free *for* something, it can be a creator. Man as a spiritual being is a creator of culture and, in fact, of everything marked by spirit. Culture exists as a variety of national cultures. Culture in general is a unity of German, French, Russian, Georgian and other cultures. Each nation singles out and transforms those aspects and phenomena that are meaningful and carry certain values for it.

Buachidze holds the view that each national culture reveals the image of one nation or another, its needs and demands, nature, and characteristic features. He stresses that, according to the famous modern philosopher Erich Rothacker, the ancient Greeks are the authors of philosophy and art, in which their spirit was reified. The ancient Jews did not know philosophy although they were (religious) genius in religion. As for the Romans, they did not have their own (original) philosophy or philosophical conceptions, and their interest was directed towards domination, legal norms and issues of state government. Buachidze shares Rothacker's opinion that the demands, needs, interests and world outlooks of every nation are reflected in language as well as in culture. For example, while such words as 'logos', 'cosmos' and the like were very often used in statements made by the ancient Greeks, the Romans preferred such terms as 'civic', 'imperium', 'nomos' and so on.

Buachidze paid special attention to an analysis of the views of Otto Spengler, the well-known thinker and outstanding researcher on the problems of culture and civilization. The limitations of this paper rule out a full discussion of Buachidze's views on these problems, and so we must confine ourselves to a few remarks.

According to Spengler, historical reality is a unity of different cultures. A superficial external observer can discern only the chronological order of different cultures in this historical process, but a deeper insight into history reveals that cultures are not only different, but there is also a certain resemblance between them. As Buachidze asserts, Spengler – like Goethe, who attempted to solve problems of the morphology of living organisms in order to explain how nature in general came alive – attempts to discover the 'initial phenomenon' of history. The morphology of world history must study individual and unique ways of the realization of spirit (which results in culture) in different cultures (Chinese, Babylonian, Egyptian, and others). 'At the same time it must compare the phases of different cultures and detect resemblances between them. In order to achieve this aim, the morphology of world culture, according to Spengler, uses a specific tool, analogy... Only analogy reveals the real essence of cultures: the fact that each culture is an organism.' [Ref. 4, pp. 85-6].

Since culture is an organism, it must be characterized by the same features as a living organism: it is born, grows, becomes old and dies. According to Spengler, the spirit of each culture strives to fully realize its possibilities and to establish itself in material substance. 'Young' culture is creative and full of energy; it is in the process of becoming. But culture as an organism passing through different stages gets older and its creative forces are exhausted. The process of becoming is replaced by creation, live by lifeless, and movement by stagnation. Spengler calls this last stage of the development civilization.

Buachidze rightly notes that Spengler is an uncompromising opponent of mechanicism, that the morphology of world culture is incompatible with a mechanicistic interpretation of the history of culture, as cultures are living organisms and reducing them to mechanical regularities will not justify the essence of culture. However, Spengler runs to another extreme: his theory is biological. Buachidze writes: 'It is indubitable that culture is

alive and not dead. But it is a spiritual life. Man endows it with life and not nature, and this is of decisive importance... The decision is up to man "himself": it is up to the spirit of man which is directed not only towards nature but also towards "higher values". Man is not determined by nature. On the basis of free spiritual acts he creates culture which is ontologically quite different from the existence of nature. The "ether" of natural existence is necessity, that of cultural existence is freedom.' [Ref. 4, p.97].

Taking all this into consideration, Buachidze is absolutely right when he states that, as culture is not (and cannot be) a biological phenomenon, it is impossible to extrapolate the laws that characterize the biological. He writes: 'It is impossible to say that the life of culture passes through the same phases as that of animal or plant life. In the sphere of culture it is not at all impossible for an old culture to find a new impetus of life and start full-blooded life.' [Ref. 4, p.98] This requires certain impetuses, and such impetuses are not unknown in history. They somehow correct Spengler's idea that 'every culture is enclosed in itself'. 'Encounters' with different cultures and the assimilation and creative acceptance of their achievements are instances of such impetuses.

In spite of various shortcomings in Spengler's doctrine 'one thing has undoubtedly been treated with a very deep insight: every phenomenon of culture – even the least important – is an expression of spirit, is a result of the activities of this spirit and therefore forms a wholeness, a unity... Each culture has one creator, and this creator is its spiritual soul or spirit. The soul, in a narrow, psychic sense, cannot create culture: it is man's individual state, it is part of man's internal life and remains such to the end. Spirit can be 'reified': it can turn into a word, a poem, an ornament, a sculpture, a painting ... The life of the spirit is creation.' [Ref. 4, pp.99-100].

Buachidze specifies the notion of creation and states that creation is a synthetic process, the origination of a new living organism (here, living does not mean biological life, but the life of the spirit or spiritual creation). Creation is the introduction of life into material. It is the animation of sensual substance, its spiritualization. He writes: 'It is a free act as a result of which a unique, original and different living thing is born. Such a living thing may be a poem, or a musical composition or a work of architecture... The result of the creative activity of the national spirit is a spiritual phenomenon, a spiritual culture which can be interpreted and understood.' [Ref. 4, p.101].

Creation is a form of activity, a process of forming something new. It is man's specific ability that distinguishes man in the world. Creation can exist only in conditions of freedom.

Discussing the interrelation of the most important concepts of culturology – freedom and culture – Buachidze concludes that 'man as a spiritual, cultural being observes everything through the prism of his contemporary culture. Man's freedom is not absolute (it cannot be such): it is confined by a system of values or culture, the second nature. In spite of such "confinement" man is a creative free being. This freedom is based on spirit as the ability of man to remain human.' [Ref. 5, p.110]

Thus, although Tamaz Buachidze has left no work devoted specifically to the philosophical problems of culture, his writing on the analysis of the doctrines of some representatives of the philosophy of life and his research into actual problems of philosophical anthropology are quite illuminating as far as some of the principal problems of the philosophy of culture are concerned. This owes to the profound insight and substantiality characteristic of Buachidze's thought.

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

კულტურის ფილოსოფიური საკითხების კვლევა პროფესორ თამაზ ბუაჩიძის შრომებში

ირაკლი კალანდია

სავლე წერეთლის ფილოსოფიის ინსტიტუტის დირექტორი, საქართველო

რეზიუმე

თამაზ ბუაჩიძეს კულტურის პრობლემებისთვის სპეციალური გამოკვლევა არ მიუძღვნია, მაგრამ სტატიის ავტორი ფიქრობს, რომ მიუხედავად ამისა, მის შრომებში, ჩაქსოვილია კულტურის ბუნების, არსის, ადამიანისა და კულტურის ურთიერთობის, ისტორიის, როგორც ღირებულ ფენომენთა შექმნის, ანუ კულტურის შემოქმედების პროცესის საკითხების ღრმა ანალიზი, გამოთქმულია არაერთი საგულისხმო მოსაზრება და ჩამოყალიბებულია დებულებები, რომელთა გათვალისწინება მეტად მნიშვნელოვანია კულტურის ფილოსოფიური პრობლემების მკვლევარებისთვის.

SYMBOLS OF CULTURE AND DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

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The character and structural peculiarities of the system of social life and being in general are determined by an essential element of this system, known as *eidos* in the ancient Greek tradition and called *idea* by Plato and *form* by Aristotle. The nature of idea-form is such that it never undergoes any changes nor is it ever transformed into any other form. In this sense it is eternal and unchangeable and functions constantly, at least until it is replaced (forced out) by another form. At the same time, such replacement is not immediately connected to either the course of objective physical time or to the quantitative change or qualitative development of things and events. These idea-forms are such ontological foundations of the whole universe understood as the *cosmos* (in the ancient Greek sense of this word), the mode of existence of which cannot be explained comprehensively from a philosophical perspective by pointing to the fact of human or divine creation. This aspect is clearly revealed as early as in Aristotle's philosophy where form taken in its extreme state presents itself as a pure form, God.

It is important to take onto consideration the fact that the philosophical thinking of Socrates-Plato-Aristotle moves in the space of such language dispositions in which the word God (*Theos*) – as noted by many researchers on ancient Greek philosophy and language – was used preferably in a predicative rather than a substantial sense. Therefore, in contrast to the Christian, for whom 'God is love' and who proceeds from an admiration of God's existence and only later enumerates its predicates, for the ancient Hellene 'love is *Theos*, that is, God'. [Ref. 1, p.28]

An almost similar situation occurs in the Bible. In the sacred history of creation such words as 'created' and 'made' are used (the Hebrew word 'bara' means created from nothing, while 'assa' means to make or to model from some given material). These indicate that man of that period was much closer to the mysteries of being than are our contemporaries whose consciousness is burdened by the scientific spirit of our time and by the rigid, lifeless and rationalistic constrictions of theoretical thinking. This closeness is also revealed in his less referentive (when language is perceived only as a system of certain signs) perception of language: the words expressing the deepest foundations of being were used as metaphors and symbols. In using metaphors and symbols man more actively co-participated in the process of creating his being or, to use philosophical terminology, he spiritually communicated with the

metaphysical foundations of the universe. These acts of co-participation were much less determined (in comparison with the contemporary) by the rational aspect of his consciousness which, none the less, gradually strived to subject the whole of reality to the rigid and lifeless constructions built by it.

The main means and 'tools' of this striving, if we consider it in its extreme state, are such contents of consciousness received via abstraction from the variety of reality (for example, concepts and objective laws). It extremely impoverished the whole of reality as well as human beings, since such an attitude eliminates eternal impulses and vital forces and, in the end, even those mysteries that are given in the foundations of being. There is only way to understand and grasp these mysteries, namely by using symbols in order to penetrate and stay in them.

The internal kernel of this mystery is that there is always an element in our historical life and culture, in our being in general, that resists analysis and cannot be fully cognized. This element is simply 'the unknown which we do not know, and do not know it in its essence.' [Ref. 2, p.198] Our consciousness is able to 'obtain' this 'unknown' and grasp and understand it to a certain degree, not with the assistance of concepts and laws as these contain no mysteries at all (although we do not reject their important role in the process of cognition of reality), but via symbols which, as the main 'tools' used by man to penetrate into these mysteries, turn man into a co-participant and (in extreme cases) into a co-creator of the system of being. We think it is possible to consider Plato's idea and Aristotle's form as such symbols. The fact that these philosophers did not realize this aspect (although it is true that certain conclusions drawn by Plato in his dialogue *Parmenides* as well as the character of conceptualization of 'pure form' by Aristotle make this assertion less categorical) can be explained if we remember that in a space that was not yet burdened by the system of philosophical concepts of the ancient Greek language there was no possibility of such conceptualization, even on an intuitive level.

Word-symbol in contrast to word-sign has an additional meaning as it points to something that is cognized only by abstract thinking and it participates in 'the force and meaning of this something'. [Ref. 3, p.275] Symbol is the main 'tool' which man uses to gather and organize events and phenomena into a united system that, if taken by themselves without this organizing principle, are dissociated and scattered in space and time and are thus characterized by different levels of being (past, present, future). These events and phenomena are very often so distanced from each other that there is reason to speak of their objective (free from the participation of man's will and consciousness) unity and association: neither nature by itself, nor the natural present in man has such a mechanism that would ensure the natural reproduction of those moral actions of people that are sometimes too distanced from each other in time.

The abilities to reproduce such unnatural and, in this sense, supernatural events and phenomena are purely spiritual abilities. They originate, are born or are produced in man only in the space of his interrelation with culture and in its spiritual assimilation.

Culture fulfils this function in man's life due to its symbolical character. In contrast to concept, symbol is, as mentioned above, something that enables man to exceed the limits of empirical reality and communicate with the mystical depths of being. As a result, symbols turn into conscious constituents of reality that cannot be reduced to its passive reflection and they imply a creative attitude to it.

In a general philosophical context the result of this attitude is a system of being – the unity of 'I' and 'non-I' – that is situated between man and external reality and is clearly expressed in any natural language. It is, in other words, as Wilhelm von Humboldt writes, 'a world lying between the world of external events and the internal world of man'. [Ref. 4, p.304]

The creative participation of man in the process of forming this linguistic world which exists between man and external reality is expressed in the fact that each natural language contains word-symbols that point to something which has its own individual appearance and, due only to these symbols, is involved in the system of being.

Symbols enable man to grasp those forces and principles functioning in the system of being in general and in man himself in particular which, as basic principles of the constitutive order of being and the universe in general, determine its existence in the form of the cosmos. In the philosophical context Plato's idea and Aristotle's form are just such symbols. The analogical symbol is God (Theos) in the ancient Greek world vision and therefore it had rather predicative force and pointed to something that 'exceeds man, is not subject to death, is eternal'. [Ref. 1, p.29]

We suppose that it is in such a context that we have to seek an explanation of the fact that Aristotle identified form taken in its extreme state (pure form) with God.

Idea, form, God... these are just a few of the endless variety of symbols of culture (philosophical, artistic, religious, and so on). Their importance and strength in man's life is clearly seen in the fact that they somehow mysteriously manage to penetrate and resound in the inner world of man and originate corresponding forms in him.

These symbol-forms originating in man fulfil a decisive ontological function in his life primarily as they purposefully transform and individualize in an organized unity those diverse forces, vital energy and natural elements existing in man himself which, in these forms and on their basis, reveal themselves in man's life as the spiritual energy that creates culture and man's being in general. They are precisely those forms that determine and define everything that is human, everything we do and create in our lives. If we consider metaphorically this life as a 'text', we may say that if not this 'text' as a whole, then at least its human aspect is 'written' by these forms themselves. This happens to the degree and extent that these forms are in us and that we, in our turn, are in them.

It is therefore possible to say that our 'I' and our being as a whole, are the same as those forms in which we realize ourselves and such as our Gods are. These forms, driven to their extremes, exist in us in their pure state and then our 'I' (and our being as a whole) is

completely embraced by these forms (in other words, we completely exist in them). If we resort to the images of the ancient Greeks we can say that we become like that endless sphere, the centre of which is everywhere although its periphery is nowhere, and in which there are no 'privileged points'.

It is just in such a 'spiritual state of our being', based on a perfect religious feeling or on a philosophical world vision that a common cultural field is found for the most fruitful intercultural dialogue and for a truly spiritual unifying of humanity (something that is so important for the peaceful development of the globalization process). The fact that the 'spherical state of being' includes not only the personified 'I' of the spirit of one or another culture, but also the whole volume of the 'non-I' – everything that really exists or is possible in the future of culture – provides a firm foundation for this perspective.

In all other cases a culture is under threat of being forced out of the 'brackets'. In such cases, due to the absence of a common spiritual super-temporal space, any encounter with a different culture takes place in real space and time and is therefore determined by different, often spiritless and thus mutually exclusive interests. There is a risk that it will result not in the positive cultural outcome of a fruitful dialogue, but in a real war. Events occurring in the world nowadays provide good evidence of this, and point to an acute lack of an overarching world outlook (philosophical in the main) and also to the imperfection and extreme scantiness of the religious feeling of present-day man.

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

კულტურის სიმბოლოები და კულტურათა დიალოგი

თეიმურაზ მთიბელაშვილი

საქართველოს საგლე წერეთლის ფილოსოფიის ინსტიტუტი

რეზიუმე

ადამიანის ცხოვრებაში და მთლიანად ყოფიერების სისტემაში ყოველთვის მონაწილეობს რაღაც ისეთი ელემენტი, რაც ბოლომდე არასოდეს არ ექვემდებარება რაციონალურ ანალიზს. ამიტომ, მისი ამომწურავი თეორიული შემეცნებაც პრინციპულად შეუძლებელია. ეს ის ელემენტია, რასაც პლატონმა და არისტოტელემ, შესაბამისად, იდეა და ფორმა უწოდეს და რაც არსებითად წარმოადგენს უზოგადესი ფილოსოფიური ცნების რანგში “ამაღლებულ” კულტურულ სიმბოლოს. ეს სრულიად კანონზომიერიცაა, რადგანაც აღნიშნული ელემენტის, ასე თუ ისე, მოხელთებას და ცნობიერების ველში შემოყვანას ადამიანი, უპირველესად, სწორედ კულტურის სიმბოლოებითა და მათი სულიერი ათვისების პროცესში თვით მასშივე განვითარებული სპეციფიკურ-ადამიანური (და ამ აზრით ზე-ბუნებრივი) უნარებით ანხორციელებს: კულტურის სულიერი ათვისებისას, მისი სიმბოლოები და, შესაბამისად, მისი ძირითადი ფორმებიც, რაღაც იდეალური გზებით აღწევენ ადამიანის იმანენტურ სამყაროში და წარმოშობენ (ბადებენ) მასში შესაბამის ფორმებს, რომლებიც შემდგომ გადამწყვეტ როლს თამაშობენ ყოფიერების მთელი სისტემის ფორმირებასა და ადამიანის ცხოვრების წესის განსაზღვრის პროცესში.

აღნიშნული ფორმების ზღვრული სისრულე რეალურად მიიღწევა ადამიანის სრულყოფილ რელიგიურ გრძნობაში, ან კიდევ, უმაღლესი დონის ფილოსოფიურ გამოცდილებაში. ამათგან პირველი ისეთი შამთხვევაა, როდესაც ადამიანის რწმენის “ობიექტი”, ანუ მისი ზღვრული ინტერესის “საგანი”, თავისი ბუნებით, ნამდვილად ზღვრულია (მონოცენტრისტული რელიგიების ღმერთი), ხოლო მეორე კი ისეთი, როდესაც ადამიანი, კოგნიტურ სიტუაციაში მიღწეულ ეგზისტენციალურ პოზიციაში უშუალოდ ჭვრეტს სამყაროული წესრიგის სუბსტანციურ საფუძვლებს.

აბსოლუტურ ზღვრულობამდე მისულ ამ ორივე შემთხვევაში მიიღწევა ჩვენი ზნეობრივი და თეორიული ცნობიერების (ნებისა და ცოდნის, გულისა და გონების), უფრო ზოგად კონტექსტში კი ჩვენზე ყოფიერების ისეთი სრულყოფილება, რომელშიც ჩვენი “მე”, ძველი ბერძნების ცნობილი მეტაფორა რომ გავიხსენოთ, ემსგავსება იმ “უსასრულო სფეროს”, რომელშიც ცენტრი

ყველგანაა, – პერიფერია კი არსად და სადაც არ არსებობს არავითარი “პრივილეგირებული წერტილი” (ან სხვაგვარად, სადაც ყველა “წერტილი” თანაბრად პრივილეგირებულია).

სწორედ ყოფიერების ასეთი სისრულე უნდა მივიჩნიოთ ნებისმიერი ადამიანისა და მისი კულტურის განვითარების უმაღლეს საფეხურად, იმ იდეალურ მიზნად, რომლისკენ სწრაფვამაც შესაძლებელი უნდა გახადოს მთელი კაცობრიობის სულიერი გაერთიანება და ჭეშმარიტად პროდუქტული დიალოგის საფუძველზე ამ კულტურების ისეთი ერთიანობის უზრუნველყოფა, სადაც, იმავდროულად, შენარჩუნებული იქნება თითოეული მათგანის თავისთავადობა და ინდივიდუალური სახე.

GLOBALIZATION AND ORIGINALITY OF CULTURES

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It is universally acknowledged nowadays that the globalization processes under way in the contemporary world entail not only positive but also negative aspects and that concentration on these negative tendencies and attempts to avoid their possible outcomes are amongst the most pressing issues of the day. One such negative tendency of globalization is the danger of dismantling interstate borders, which can result in the disappearance of national states and the death of nations. This tendency is thought to bring about a levelling of national cultures and thus is of extreme danger, especially to the cultures of small nations. A loss of cultural originality is tantamount to the physical disappearance of these nations. The preservation of cultural originality and cultural identity means finding a way to save one's own culture and originality. But what can small nations – and Georgia in particular – do to avert this danger? Where can they find a firm basis that can be used as a guarantee of salvation and future existence and development?

Georgians have more than once faced the danger of linguistic and cultural assimilation. During the past two or three centuries the source of this danger was mainly Russia. The forcible incorporation of Georgia, first into the Russian Empire and later, following the intervention of Bolshevik Russia and the occupation of Georgia, into the Soviet Union, made the problem of defending and preserving national culture and national originality extremely acute. The formula given by Ilia Chavchavadze 'language, homeland, religion' embraces all aspects of this problem and points out the direction of the necessary steps to be taken for the self-protection and preservation of our nation.

In order to illustrate the constant anxiety of Georgian thinkers over the defence and preservation of national Georgian culture, we have chosen Kikodze whose journalistic and literary activities were directed towards popularizing Georgian culture and emphasizing its importance.

Kikodze, who studied at various universities in Germany, wrote in his memoirs *From Dawn till Midnight*: 'In vain I tried to find in European science answers to the questions that tortured me. It was impossible to fill the spiritual emptiness with Flaubert's novels and Chopin's preludes. I was not then well-acquainted with the history of Georgian culture, although my intuition was right: that only in the cultural past of my homeland was it possible to find a candle that would light the dark paths in the labyrinth of scepticism'.¹

His interest in issues of the national spirit and of the national energy embodied in Georgian culture and in the Georgian language formed the mainstream of Kikodze's work. He constantly resorted to these issues when problems of Georgian culture and art were discussed, and these issues are raised in letters addressed to representatives of different cultures and art.

Kikodze's philosophical, aesthetic and culturological views have several theoretical sources. The most prominent are romantic philosophy (that of Hegel in particular) and Wilhelm Wundt's psychology. According to Kikodze, a positive result of the views formulated and developed in these schools was the establishment of the idea that a person is to be understood, not as an absolutely free and independent individuality, but as a subject who has complex and multifaceted interrelations with a social object. Kikodze shares this position when he discusses the national problem or when he, in his own words, attempts to find out whether – independent of man and above him – there exists some social entity, specifically a nation, as a creative psychic spirit and ethical value, or else both these must be attributed solely and completely to the person. According to Kikodze, a reasoning person considers himself, not as an isolated island in the boundless sea of life, but as a living part of a social entity (of a nation) whose growth, development and regeneration are as useful for him as its degradation, retardation and distortion are harmful and dangerous. Man realizes that there is something next to him and above him that creates things greater and more beautiful than an individual can. This active creative force is a reality of a higher degree and value than an individual spirit, and it is itself immortal and makes a person immortal in so far as that person enhances its progression.

Kikodze considered the nation a spirit, a psychic entity. He resorts to Wundt's psychology in order to demonstrate and prove this idea. In his view, the reality of social psychics is given in the interrelations of phenomena that, in their essence, are the products of spiritual creativity, although they stand above individual possibilities. These socio-psychic phenomena are language, arts, religion, mythology, world outlook, habits and traditions, and they demonstrate the reality of the national spirit just as the presence of intellectual and emotional elements witness to the reality of an individual spirit. The essence of both individual and national spirit consists in activity, creativity and motion.

According to Kikodze, a proper esteem and respect for the original and the unique that form a person and a nation are of the utmost importance. It is in this context that he discusses the interrelation of the national and the universal, and shows that such an attitude made it possible to discard the colourless ideal of world citizenship. In his view, we must consider important and progressive just those phenomena created by individuals and nations that are new, anomalous in the most noble sense of the word, and brilliant in their unpredictability and that, when involved in free competition with others, make humanity's life more colourful and interesting². It must be stressed that Georgian culture has never been characterized by particularism and isolationism. Whether due to its geographic location or to its historical fate,

Georgian culture has experienced foreign cultural influences, although it always managed to neutralize such influences and transform alien elements into organic parts of Georgian national culture. Kikodze emphasizes that Georgia united three cultures, the Byzantine, Oriental and Hellenistic-Classical. But it united them in such a manner that 'a completely new national image emerged that differed markedly from the cultures of Byzantium and Persia, as well as from that of Asia Minor³. Kikodze notes that the ancient Georgians were an energetic nation, and this is expressed not only in the building of monuments of material culture, but also in language and literature. This can be illustrated best of all by the fact that Georgians introduced strong national elements into foreign literature: 'Persian poems and novels were more Georgianized than translated.'⁴ Kikodze shows that ignoring the importance of international relations in literature and the arts is chauvinistic narrow-mindedness. He stresses that the interchange of ideas and viewpoints is characteristic of cultural humanity. Progressive humanity posed deep problems, and paid serious attention to man and the problem of his destination. According to Kikodze, only those nations that can properly take these problems into account and give original answers to them can be considered mentally mature. He concludes that no nation can follow an accelerated pace of culture if it is isolated spiritually, relying only on its own capacities⁵. Such an understanding of the interrelation of the national, individual and universal is typical of Georgian thought and spirit. Consider Vazha Pshavela, a great Georgian poet, who in an article entitled *Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism* states that every real patriot is a cosmopolitan and, similarly, every reasonable cosmopolitan is a patriot⁶. Kikodze in his turn shows that every aesthetic culture is national, and any culture that has not originated from a national spirit cannot be a genuine aesthetic culture⁷. Kikodze demonstrates that the specific features and individuality of a nation and, specifically, national phenomena are to be sought in the sphere of spiritual culture, as it is precisely here that national uniqueness and self-sufficiency stand out most distinctly. He felt that the national spirit can be seen most vividly and substantially in language and in those spheres of spiritual creativity that use language as their medium. These are customs and traditions, aesthetic and ethical culture, social and philosophical outlooks, and mythology and religion.

Kikodze formed his understanding of the essence and importance of language and of national languages in particular on the basis of Humboldt's conception of language. He studied Humboldt's views through Wundt's interpretation. Humboldt's conception, as a Georgian linguist, Professor Guram Ramishvili points out, is not easy to understand. Some of his statements need interpretation and others resemble stimuli for further research more than a set of explanatory statements. Although it is certain that Humboldt considers national languages as a vital force and not as a lifeless product codified by a set of grammatical rules, language is *energy* and not *ergon*⁸. There is an internal unity between a nation and its language. It is impossible to detect precisely the moment when a national language originated, therefore the origin of a nation is simply a transition from one stage of a given stable range to another. It is thus impossible to identify the exact moment when a nation and

its national language originated. According to Humboldt, different languages are not different signs of the same thing, but are different visions of the same thing⁹. Ramishvili shows that getting away from an understanding of language as a 'mirror of culture' and changing to an understanding of language as energy offers us a key to the proper realization of the interrelation of language and culture, as language appears on the stage not at the end of cultural creation, but is a given from the very beginning.

These are the aspects of Humboldt's conception that are important for Kikodze who, to his credit, demonstrates that language is not a means formed once and forever, but is itself a spiritual action that incessantly creates it. Language, as Kikodze showed, is an 'expressive movement'; it is an expression of a nation's spiritual world. Language is a force of culture and is a means of storing and keeping social experience. Kikodze notes that language is a social knot that unites a society far more closely and safely than political or religious organizations.

Kikodze emphasized the special place of one's mother tongue. A mother tongue is organically intertwined with thinking. Language difference is a result of difference in thinking. A sameness of language means a sameness of will and, therefore, a sameness of creative spirit and talent. Kikodze justly remarks that it is precisely language that shows the richness and strength as well as the poverty and weakness of a national spirit. The maturity of thinking of a nation, the variety of feelings and the vitality of a national character are revealed in language. Language facilitates concentration of national energy as it unites not only living generations, but draws together the past, present and future and, as a word is passed on through the channel of thought, posterity inherits traditional ideas alongside with that word¹⁰. We can agree with the idea that language is a constituting factor of a nation and, therefore, it is a means of forming nation as a cultural organism¹¹.

As we have demonstrated above, Kikodze preferred those phenomena in the sphere of culture that use language, first and foremost, fiction. In his numerous articles and essays on the heritage of Georgian writers, Kikodze strives to show the glimpses of the national energy accumulated and revealed through language. The main ethos of these works is directed towards the protection of the national language and national spiritual culture.

Taking all of the above into consideration, it seems natural that Kikodze is confident of the decisive importance of the national element for aesthetic creative activity and for literature in particular. Literature expresses the national creative might and variety. It facilitates the revival of national energy, aesthetic education and moral perfection. As words are more closely associated with national psyches than the languages of architecture, painting or music, the task of literature is to express national reality, its past and its present, and the feelings and ideals of the nation. Although in the main art and literature are much more than contemplative expression of life, they are also mighty forces of national revival. That is why, thanks to art and literature it is possible to educate a nation aesthetically, to regenerate it in

a multicoloured aesthetic culture, and to enhance its rebirth. Kikodze had a strong faith in the great national mission of art.

Although Kikodze in his analysis of national culture mostly emphasized literature, it does not follow that he considered other spheres of culture less important in expressing and strengthening national energy and spirit.

Kikodze's articles and essays (this paper deals with those published at the beginning of the twentieth century) are filled with optimism and an unshaken faith in the revival of the Georgian nation. After almost a century Georgia and Georgians face the same or even more serious and severe problems in retaining national originality, strengthening the national spirit, and reviving and developing the national culture, but one thing remains certain: Kikodze showed a real way of national survival – respect for national culture, strong ties with one's own historical roots, and, first and foremost, care for and the development of one's own mother tongue.

NOTES:

¹ Kikodze G., *Letters, Essays, Sketches*. Tbilisi, 1985, p. 568 (in Georgian).

² Nation, language and aesthetic culture / *ibid*, p. 18.

³ Meskheti/ *ibid*, p. 196.

⁴ Nation and national energy / *ibid*, p. 158.

⁵ Methods of modern critic / *ibid*, p. 150.

⁶ Vazha Pshavela, *Works*, Tbilisi, 1990, p. 397 (in Georgian)

⁷ Nation, language and aesthetic culture/ *ibid*, p. 18.

⁸ Ramishvili G. *A Theory of Mother Tongue*, Tbilisi, 2000, p. (in Georgian).

⁹ Ramishvili G. From comparative anthropology to comparative linguistics/ Humboldt von w. Character of a language and character of a nation/ Humboldt von w. *Language and philosophy of culture*, Moscow, 1985, p. 312 (in Russian)

¹⁰ G. Kikodze, Language and national energy/ *Letters, Essays, Sketches*, p. 156-7.

¹¹ N. Chavchavadze, On the value aspect of the concept of nation/ *Philosophical problems of culture*, Tbilisi, 1980, p. 102 (in Russian).

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

გლობალიზაცია და კულტურათა თვითმყოფადობა

მარინე ამბოკაძე

საქართველოს სავლე წერეთლის ფილოსოფიის ინსტიტუტი

რეზიუმე

სტატიაში ნაჩვენებია, რომ გლობალიზაციის პროცესს თან ახლავს არაერთი საფრთხე, მათ შორის სახელმწიფოთა საზღვრების გაუქმების საშიშროებაც, ეროვნულ სახელმწიფოთა გაქრობისა და ეროვნულ კულტურათა გადაგვარების საბედისწერო შედეგით. ეს საშიშროება განსაკუთრებით დიდია მცირე ერებისათვის და სახელდობრ, ქართველი ერისათვის. სტატიაში განხილულია გერონტი ქიქოძის შეხედულებები ქართული კულტურის არსის და თავისებურების შესახებ. ნაჩვენებია, რომ გერონტი ქიქოძე ეროვნული თვითმყოფადობის, ეროვნული კულტურის შენარჩუნებისა და გადარჩენის მთავარ გზად, ერის ისტორიულ-კულტურული მემკვიდრეობის დაფასებას და ქართული ენის, როგორც ეროვნული ენერჯის მქონე, ცოცხალი შემოქმედებითი ძალის განვითარებას მიიჩნევს.

MYTHIC MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE AND RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

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Science has for a very long time asserted that the earth is spherical. Today, even a third-grade pupil knows this, but it would be better if we considered more carefully one of the oldest mythic truths according to which the earth is flat. In ancient times, people had no doubt as to the truth of this statement. There was a time when such a notion was the only model of cosmic and human existence, and it was the truth for millions of people. There were famous scholars, thinkers, military and political figures among these and, what is more, the spiritual fathers of mankind, great religious authorities and clergymen shared the same idea. Hence, we would be quite right in raising the question as to whether this assertion of our ancestors contains some valuable information by today's criteria, or whether everything is the result of the weakness and stupidity of the human mind, something that evokes nothing more than a smile nowadays. But the latter is less acceptable. We can acknowledge that our ancestors were not so unintelligent and backward as not to know that the earth was not flat, but round! They deliberately masked this, attaching sacral and esoteric meaning to it, and covered the real essence of matter with poetic and mythic images. However, for its part, the later kept information of great sacral importance (Let us recall what type of sacral and esoteric meaning was attached to numbers by Pythagoreans and with what respect they kept numerous secrets connected to them. We know from the history of philosophy that one of the Pythagoreans killed himself because he had given away the secret of the number *N*.) Our ancestors would have known that, besides this world, there is another universe in another dimension or without any dimension at all – in the form of a super dimension ('the kingdom of heaven', 'paradise'). The earth is flat! It stands on three whales, and these whales themselves stand on a turtle.

Such is a very short statement of mythic cosmology, which is a poetic mythic-archetypal expression of the real essence of matter. The whale is a water animal, and so is the turtle. In both cases we are dealing with water, something that cannot be accidental. The fact that the origin of life is connected with water is scientifically acknowledged. It is not accidental that the first philosopher, Tales of Miletus, acknowledged the water element as the source – 'arche' – of the universe. One of the seven Christian sacraments, baptism, which is the beginning of Christian life, is also connected with water. According to the above

archetypal model of the universe, it stands on water or its origin is connected with water. The Bible also confirms this. The prophet David says that God established the world on the water. '[He] stretched out the earth above the waters.' (Psalm 136.6). The same idea appears in Genesis, according to which 'Darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.' (Genesis 1.2). John of Damascus explains that 'the deep is nothing more than a large amount of water', 'God created the universe to separate the upper universe water from the lower universe water', as he 'established himself in the middle of the water deep' (God placed the water above the universe in order that it would not be burnt in the intense heat of the sun and the heavenly bodies.). The closeness and connection of the archetypal model of the universe to the Bible is evident from the above. It is clear that myth secretly tells us the Biblical truth, which raises the possibility of asserting that the basis of the archetypal model of cosmic and human existence is the Bible, Holy Scriptures.

Mythic and religious notions of the structure and regularity of the universe were not yet complete at the stage of culture and civilization in question. It is true that religious notions dominate, but mythic ones are not yet rejected. Moreover, there is no conflict between these notions: quite the contrary, myth serves religion. It is in the service of religious faith because it is a purely specific human phenomenon. A geocentric system proved religious anthropocentrism, to which the notion of the earth's flatness corresponded. It is true that in Ptolemy's time the spherical configuration of the earth did not give rise to any doubts, but these ideas came from mythic consciousness and did not oppose religious doctrine.

If we want to comprehend the essence of the phenomenon, we should not only be scientists and scholars, but poets as well. Poetry is very close to both philosophy and religion (the poetic images of the Psalms are not accidental).

When someone says 'I am standing on something' the speaker's own belief and faith is always underlined, and it is just this idea that is meant in saying that the earth stands on three whales or on an elephant (as in the Hindu myth). The whale and the elephant are the largest animals in the universe. Greatness is underlined by them: something huge, global and universal is implied (the universe, the cosmos). Their number is three, a symbol of the old triad of love, kindness and beauty, or a symbol of God, the creator of the universe. The turtle, which figures here, is certainly a symbol of time, which flows slowly like a turtle (a turtle is nearly always a symbol of slow movement). Let us recall the paradox of Zeno of Elea, *Achilles and the Turtle*. This paradox, besides its metaphysical and logic-philosophical content, also has poetic, mythic and religious aspects, namely, a man, even the swift-footed Achilles, could never outrun turtle-time!

According to mythic notions, the earth is at the centre of the universe (geocentrism). This is one more archetypal scheme. Information and knowledge given here must not be considered on a physical plane, but looked at 'with understanding', obtained 'with understanding' on a hermeneutic plane (Wilhelm Dilthey). We can then discover that our

planet, the earth, is not in the spatial centre relative to the universe, but is in the centre of attention of a supernatural, super cosmic being: God. That is why anthropocentrism is a necessary feature of religious and mythic thinking. That the earth is flat and stands in the centre of the universe and is supported by three whales standing on a turtle (water) means that the three-dimensional universe (earthly civilization) is at the centre of attention and protection of a superior supernatural being, God, and the extraordinary long path to him can be traversed with love, kindness and beauty (love-faith, kindness-moral, philosophy and aesthetics-beauty). The fascination and beauty of old myths are exactly in this. So our ancestors did not have a false and scientifically unjustified model of cosmic and human existence after all.

Ancient (eastern, if you wish) scientific or philosophic thinking is nourished by mythic archetypal images of the universe. For its part, Biblical thinking is a nourishment of myth. Mythic images are closely interwoven with scientific opinions. Where 'ratio' does not feel itself confident it always resorts to the help of myth, as a result of which the revelation of mythic images and symbols becomes necessary. Even the genius Plato addressed myth in his very critical moments, when pure reason (mind) was not capable of progressing because of a lack of power and skills. That is why man's mind devours myths like spring water, this likeness of the truth, and there is nothing extraordinary in this. It can be said that it is a necessary feature of ours (human beings), as human beings are the creators of myth and symbols (Ernst Cassirer). Symbols and myths themselves are regulators of our experience and explanation-understanding and are thus worthy of attention. It could be added that myth interpreted in this way is in unison with religion, namely, with Judaeo-Christian doctrine as given in the Holy Scriptures.

Unfortunately the 'living perception of myth' is lost. It is out of reach and, in some cases, is even unacceptable to modern, totally estranged persons. However, myth does not require our faith, but our understanding. That is why it is time for us to treat it 'with understanding'. Myth hides the truth in itself. This can be said especially of religious truth, which has an objective, ontological meaning and is of heavenly origin. Esoterically given truth connects it with religion, namely, Christianity – Orthodox Christianity – which hides heavenly truth in itself.

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

უნივერსუმის მითოსური მოდელი და რელიგიური ცნობიერება

კახა ქეცბაია

საქართველოს სავლეთ-აღმოსავლეთის ფილოსოფიის ინსტიტუტი

რეზიუმე

სტატიაში გამოთქმულია მოსაზრება, რომ სამყაროს შესახებ არსებული მითოსური (იგულისხმება კოსმოგონიური ხასიათის მითები) მოდელი, ხშირ შემთხვევაში საღი აზრის პოზიციებიდან დაუჯერებელიც კი, სრულ უნისონში შეიძლება აღმოჩნდეს რელიგიურ ცნობიერებასთან. განსხვავება მხოლოდ ისაა, რომ მითი ბიბლიურ კოსმოგონიას პოეტურ-ფილოსოფიურ ფორმაში გადმოსცემს. ამ შემთხვევაში მითოსი უნივერსუმის ყოფიერების იდუმალი ენის როლს ასრულებს. ძველი მითები თავისებური ფილოსოფემებია, რომლებიც დაფიქრებას საჭიროებს. ამ ფილოსოფემებსა და მითოლოგემებშია დავანებული ძველი მითების ხიბლი და მშვენიერება, რომლის მიზანია ადამიანის ზიარება უზენაეს სიყვარულთან, სიკეთესთან და მშვენიერებასთან.

ანტიკური მეცნიერული აზროვნება მითოსითაა ნასაზრდოები. მითოსური სახეები მკვეთრად იჭრებიან მეცნიერულ მსჯელობებში. იქ, სადაც “რაციო“ მყარად ვერ გრძნობს თავს, გონება ყოველთვის მითოსს მოიშველიებს. ამიტომაც აუცილებელია მითოსური სახეებისა და სიმბოლოების ფილოსოფიური ინტერპრეტაცია. გენიალური პლატონიც კი, კრიტიკულ მომენტებში, როცა წმინდა გონებას აღარ შესწევს სამყაროს წვდომა, მითოსს მიმართავს. ჩვენი გონება, მოწყურებული შთაგონებას, ეწაფება მითოსს – ჭეშმარიტების ამ პოეტურ განსახიერებას და ასე ცდილობს მოაწესრიგოს საკუთარი ყოფიერება.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE MAKING OF PLANETARY ETHICS

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The question arises as to whether we can, today, in an epoch of extending globalization, discuss and philosophize in a purely academic manner, delving deeply into theoretical discourse, while leaving behind our attention to a world storming with passion and unsolved problems. Pain and anguish, in the words of modern philosophers, are contained in the essence of conceptual thinking. A thought must be sensitive to the sufferings of billions. And the twenty-first century has already brought horrible ecological and social cataclysms. Entering the new millennium, we bear in mind Karl Jaspers' words: 'The twenty-first century will be a century of the humanitarian sciences or it will never be at all.' And what is happening? The tension and stress of human existence are increasing every day.

Two directions are usually identified, two areas of increasing contradictions: man's attitude towards nature and the ecological crisis, and the attitude of people to each other and social conflicts. My first thesis concludes by bringing these two contexts together, as everything that happens between people has an effect on the universe. The idea of the integrity of human culture and the world of nature is well-founded in the conception of Teilhard de Chardin. He proved that evolution is, first of all, a psychic transformation as consciousness is 'the substance and blood of growing life'. Geogenesis and biogenesis are *per se* psychogenesis. A particular stage of development, the era of **noogenesis** is beginning: a new cover or **noosphere** is being formed around the earth. The thinking layer is opening beyond the biosphere and above it. That is why man is not just a link in the chain of evolution. This is a fundamental event in the life of the whole Earth: it, in de Chardin's words, 'is changing its skin', is finding its soul. [1]

The scientific argument for this revolutionary thesis was given in Vladimir Vernadski's conception of the noosphere enveloping the Earth as a 'thinking' or ideal membrane. Man is not just 'present', 'mastering' the surrounding world; his thought and his activity have a cosmic sense. Man and Earth are indivisible, representing a particular structural element of space.

Relying on these ideas, the thesis of the close inter-influence of social conflicts and ecological cataclysms might be well founded. Speaking of the first aspect, it is, above all, the increasing clash between Christian (Western) and Islamic (Eastern) civilizations. It is

already quite usual to mention the 'clash of civilizations' and the numerous refutations of this view. Leaving the debates to one side, real tension is indeed growing. And the most usable term to characterize this situation is 'terrorism'.

But should not the politics of a superpower towards weak countries be described in terms of terrorism? Is not confirmation of the rights and freedoms of man and of democracy with the help of military power a manifestation of terrorism? How can the extermination, humiliation and plunder of the cradle of eastern culture, the blessed, luxurious and diverse Baghdad, the city of the *Thousand and One Nights* be called anything else?

Terrorism is anywhere and everywhere: it does not have a frontline, it brings danger and threat to each and every one, right here and now. That is the nature of the fourth world war that is already being fought.

There is no place for terrorism in Islam. By their spiritual and moral potential Christianity and Islam are kindred religions, confirming the universal values of mercy, love and compassion. There is not a single mention in the Koran that violence and murder open a way to Paradise. The history of Islam acknowledges the humanistic orientation and astonishing tolerance of this doctrine, always finding possibilities for acceptance of and dialogue with other religions and with Christianity in the first place. The problem of the modern world is the establishment of a spiritual equilibrium between these two world religions which have common historical roots and identical spiritual and moral aims and orientations. It should not be permitted for traditionally tolerant religious doctrines to collide, engendering a 'clash of civilizations'. A spirit of tolerance and mutual confidence must be the highest priority.

When we speak of global or planetary ethics of solidarity and co-operation we primarily mean the transformation of the consciousness and psychology of all mankind, their incentives to peacefully resolve problems and conflicts, and to co-operate and work in partnership without heinous acts of violence and terror.

The globalizing world must have global principles. Global egoism will lead to the collapse of humanity on Earth. Consequently, global egoism must be opposed by humanity's spirituality, that is, by planetary ethics. 'Planetary ethics' means those moral aims and actions that are typical of the very essence of man, his spiritual and moral basis. In other words, planetary ethics is the simple human norms of morality that must be necessarily distributed everywhere in today's world.

The philosophical substantiation of such planetary ethics is to be found in Immanuel Kant's famous treatise *Perpetual Peace*. The philosopher did not, of course, know the term 'terrorism' and its associated horror but, from a position of intellect he expressed the idea of the possibility of stopping warfare among peoples then and forever. Under natural condition, Kant says, it is difficult to imagine the extinction of man's aggressiveness. The condition for perpetual peace must be established according the principles of morality and international law.

Kant's idea of perpetual peace is becoming more relevant under modern conditions of globalization. Even in the middle of the last century, as Karl Jaspers shows, the prerequisites of a common world history and a real unanimity of peoples on Earth were created. Our planet has become 'smaller' than the Rome Empire in its day. No important event – and even insignificant ones – can be localized or kept in the spatial gap. But, as Jaspers says, the spiritual situation of the epoch is very paradoxical. With the help of science and technology the new world is approaching unity, but losing sense.

Humanity, having achieved scientific and technological successes that astound our imagination, discovers 'a catastrophic impoverishment in the sphere of spiritual life, humanness, love and creative energy'. The unity of the world's history has been reached beyond the contexts of sense. Globalization unites and binds together the powers of evil as well. Terrorism becomes international, making use of information technology and the Internet for its destructive goals. Kant's idea of life without wars and violence and based on the intellect and moral principles becomes vitally urgent.

In the twentieth century numerous thinkers and public figures raised their voices to advocate perpetual peace: Mahatma Gandhi with his active ethics of non-violence, Mother Theresa with her inexhaustible attempts to help all the needy, Albert Schweitzer with his conception of reverence for life, and many others. Thanks to such individuals the idea of planetary ethics can become a reality today, as those who have laid the foundation of its conceptual basis have shown how to accomplish the idea in practice.

As alarm bells sounded throughout the world, Albert Schweitzer decided to take a brave step: to reveal the sources of the modern tragedy of humanity. He supplemented Kant's idea of perpetual peace with a moral postulate of reverence for life, not only that of man, but life in itself. 'Ethics is the boundless responsibility for everything living.'^[2] This principle includes not only a social, but also an ecological dimension: life in itself is sacred, be it man's or that of an animal or a plant. 'When in the spring last year's grass gives way to fresh greenery, this happens because the plant's roots sprout billions of new shoots. In the renewal of ideas, too, so essential to our time, this is the only way: all people have to renovate their views and ideas, concluding from them a sense of life and peace.'^[3]

This means that terrorism directed against humanity and nature must be opposed by non-military power, but such a method cannot defeat terrorism. There is a need of another invincible power: good will, human morality and spiritualness. The sages insisted that 'hatred cannot be stopped with hatred, but with love'. Power must indeed be opposed with power, but with the power of the national spirit. On this occasion we will not be acting defensively, rather terrorism will be put on the defensive; it will hide and escape, losing its militancy and offensiveness by the hour and by the day. And these are not just good intentions in the manner of Manilov. Morality and spiritualness have real possibilities to stand against universal evil. First of all, it should be in the sphere of education that new intellects are formed, with their value purposes and preferences. We need a radical transformation of the educational

process in both East and West. Young people must be brought up in a spirit of tolerance and mutual respect, developing the abilities of dialogue and common understanding.

Today, more than anything else, philosophy as a human doctrine and as a spiritual universal is responsible for saving peace and for a planetary perception. Its power often underestimated, and it is appropriate to mention that it is precisely as an idea that philosophy is the start of a real, often even revolutionary, change of situation. Indeed, philosophy is able to do many things: to astonish, to agitate, to plunge into doubt, to absorb with its profoundness of thought, to prompt self-education, and to reveal the essence of the universe and human history. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes, humanity today as never before needs philosophy, the designation of which is the salvation of the world. 'The discourse is about to remind people of their association to the universal being, which they should not forget.' [4] The world is wrapped in the web of the Internet. There are many mediators between man and reality: words, signs and terms that distance the vivid flesh of life. Philosophy, which always counted general thinking as a point of pride, from now on is called to do another task: to teach man to see the world anew in all its vividness and unique fascination. And then he will join the mystery of Universe, will acquire integral thinking, planetary thought. [5]

Shifting of accents to the conception of the 'planetary ethics' of William Blackstone and his associates (Blackstone was professor of philosophy in the state of Georgia in the early 1870s) took place in the modern ecological problems. The process of a new ecoculture is now forming, and also a new ecological ideology, the basis of which is Blackstone's planetary ethics and the 'sense of globality' of A. Pecheyi. I mean the well-known position of Blackstone's American associates that has become orthodox in the West and which may be expressed rather succinctly as: 'We should accept not only non-anthropological values and the right of other species in the realm of animals, we should agree that it is normal to think about inanimate substances, that they have moral rights. Trees, rivers, mountains and oceans, having moral rights, must have legal rights.'

Thus planetary ethics is a whole complex of interrelated principles, aims and ideas, a whole and dynamic complex to be put into a working system. All these ideals and principles derive from human moral values, residing in the best philosophical works of various countries and peoples, and in religious doctrines with their legacy of love, mercy, moral purity, the aspiration to live in harmony with nature and with each other. The traditional values of the Turkic world call for it. To the specific principles of planetary ethics we should attribute:

- Tolerance;
- Peaceful and constructive dialogue between cultures, civilizations and confessions;
- Education for all that prioritizes upbringing over imparting this or that kind of knowledge or professional skills;
- Ecological imperatives of human culture.

The principles of integral ethics should be perceived by each and every one: heads of states, heads of international organizations and civil structures, and individuals. This is Kant's categorical imperative, knowing no concessions or reservations. From the point of view of such an approach it is necessary to accomplish an inversion of the thesis that is now popular: thinking locally, acting globally. In its new form it sounds differently: thinking globally, acting locally. It means that relying on integral thinking, it is important to take into consideration the particularities of situation, region and national traditions.

Speaking of international organizations, the first to command our attention is the United Nations, which has done much for the cause of peace in the world. But today, the conceptual positions of the UN obviously does not meet the spirit of our time. We need a new UN philosophy, a new value strategy, oriented to the expressed positions of integral ethics, and an accompanying institutional and structural transformation of the organization's activity. The issue is also about other international organizations. Their conceptual strategies and the nature of their activities should be reformed in accordance with the key task of the current situation: the shift from terrorism to a planetary ethics of consent and tolerance. The moral principles of such an ethics should be realized with the help of well-developed and reliable legal mechanisms. (In this connection let us recall Immanuel Kant's writings.)

Today, informal, popular humanistic movements form part of the globalization processes, attaching to them a humanistic character. For example, after the death and destruction of the 2004 tsunami in South Asia / Pacific, millions of people made voluntary donations to provide humanitarian aid to the victims. In general, the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is growing. Planetary ethics cannot be realized from 'above' alone, nor solely by politicians, all the more so as they often pursue narrowly practical interests, either private or state. By the way, the events in South Asia / Pacific after the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami showed that it is impossible to survive by oneself. The consequences of large natural disasters can be coped with only on a global scale.

The principles of planetary ethics should also become supreme on state level. We may note that the President of Kazakhstan has already followed these principles, for example, in his actions over the delimitation of the borders with Russia and China. Discussions and negotiations were conducted over a period of about seven years, and we can now see the tangible result. There is joint patrolling of the Russian-Kazakhstan frontier, which promotes security and confidence in both states' borders.

The Kazakhstan delegation spoke in public at the 32nd UNESCO General Conference in Paris on declaring 2006 International Year of Planetary Consciousness and on the ethics of the dialogue between civilizations. Kazakhstan was the first state to abandon nuclear weapon tests. Kazakhstan's Eurasian integration initiatives can also be considered in the context of the requirements of planetary ethics, the ethics of co-operation, collaboration and mutual aid. Congresses of world leaders and traditional religions were held in 2003 and 2006 at the initiative of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. A general issue is the very

practice of the peaceful, good neighbourly and creatively mutually enriching co-existence of the various peoples on the territory of a unified unitary state. This speaks of Kazakhstan's readiness to conceive the principles of planetary ethics and to put them into practice, presenting a unique Kazakhstan model of international relations, a model of inter-confessional, international accord, the way it should be in the modern world.

These should be constructed precisely on principles that prioritize spiritual and moral values. This is why it is important that the notion of 'planetary ethics' is filled with a sense of not just formal, especially external, contractual 'morality', but with a sense of real morality coming from the very heart of man.

Thus, the humanity is on the way from terrorism and violence towards the planetary ethics of confidence and mutual harmony. In the process it derives its strength from the treasury of world culture, and most of all, from philosophy. Perpetual peace, respect for life, and spiritual renewal are not merely grandiose phrases, but the planetary ethical Code, opening perspectives of humanitarian collaboration and common understanding, confidence and solidarity, reasonableness and spiritualness. Having become unified, humanity finds real Sense.

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

გლობალიზაცია და პლანეტარული ეთიკის შექმნა

ა. ნიჟანბაძე

ფილოსოფიისა და პოლიტიკურ მეცნიერებათა ინსტიტუტი, ალმატა, ყაზახეთი

რეზიუმე და კომენტარი

თანამედროვე მსოფლიო კატასტროფის წინაშე დგას. ავტორი ასახელებს გლობალური საშიშროების ორ არსებით მიზეზს: ადამიანურ ურთიერთობათა გაუცხოებას, გადაზრდილს ერთა შორის კონფლიქტებში და უმძიმეს ეკოლოგიურ სიტუაციას. თანამედროვე ფილოსოფიის ამოცანაა განჭვრიტოს ღრმა, შინაარსეული და საბედისწერო კავშირი აღნიშნულ მიზეზებს შორის.

მსოფლიო კატაკლიზმებში გზადაბნეული ადამიანი უნდა დაუბრუნდეს ღმერთს. ისლამი შორს არის აგრესიისგან. მსგავსად ქრისტიანობისა, იგი ქადაგებს მიმტყვებლობასა და სიყვარულს. ავტორის აზრით, რელიგიათა ჰარმონიული თანაარსებობა ადამიანური სამყაროს გადარჩენის გზაა. ადამიანი უნდა აღიზარდოს ახალი, პლანეტარული ეთიკის მიხედვით, რომელიც რელიგიიდან სესხულობს ტოლერანტობას, სიყვარულს, სიკეთით ბოროტების ძლევას...

ამ მხრივ საყურადღებოა, რომ მსოფლიოს გლობალიზაცია არ არის მხოლოდ პოზიტიური მოვლენა. სიკეთის ძალთა კონსოლიდაციასთან ერთად, გლობალიზაციაში ბოროტებაც ერთიანდება მსოფლიო ტერორიზმის სახით. ავტორის მსჯელობა შთაგვაგონებს იდეას, რომ მსოფლიოს ინტეგრაცია უნდა ხდებოდეს არა მექანიკურად და განუკითხავად, ყველასა და ყველაფრის გაერთიანების მიზნით, არამედ გაცნობიერებულად, ფილოსოფიური აზროვნების დონეზე, რაც საგანთა და მოვლენათა არსობრივ ურთიერთქმედებას და სინთეზს გულისხმობს. ასეთ არსობრივ ინტეგრაციაში ბოროტება ვერ მიიღებს მონაწილეობას, რამდენადაც ბოროტებას არსი არა აქვს.

HUMAN SUBJECTNESS AS SPIRITUAL-MORAL PHENOMENON

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Nowadays an *anthropological revolution* is taking place all over the world, and not only in Kazakhstan. At the end of twentieth century a strong necessity for the *recognition of the specifically human* became apparent.

This is connected with the fact that reality is changing fast, attitudes towards reality are also changing and, finally, the understanding of man is changing among philosophers and scientists.

The main strategies in the modern interpretation of man can be called constructive and spiritually creational.

The first of these is the idea that reality is a construction by man on the basis of a conviction of its non-substantiality, like a game with no rules. The view is that a man has no essence or that he has a multitude of essences.

The consequence of such an understanding in the framework of social reality is chaotic and pluralistic transformations, voluntarism and anarchism. In the best case, it is technocratism as the power of constantly changing and evolving technologies, with which a man is not able to keep pace.

As the Russian scientist Alexander Dugin writes: 'The object of modern anthropology is "man minus soul".'

The continuation or converse of the first tendency is *trans-humanism*: an attempt at the *literal* universalization of man. It is an attempt to imbue him with a whole from various essences. Trans-humanists are those people who use the modern achievements of science and technology for a transition to the 'post-human', a creature with radical new abilities. The main goal of trans-humanism is the endless perfection of man by all possible methods.

Most trans-humanists consider that by 2030–50 continuously accelerating technical progress will permit the creation of *post-man*, whose abilities will be radically different from the abilities of modern people. This process will be especially accelerated by *genetic engineering*, molecular nanotechnology, *neuron pharmaceuticals*, the creation of the neuron *prostheses* and direct 'machine-brain' interfaces.

As Francis Fukuyama underlines in his book *Our Posthuman Future*: 'The aim of our book is the statement that the most serious threat created by modern bio-technology is the possibility of changing human nature and thus a transition to the "post-human" phase of history.'

The second modern anthropological tendency is spiritually creational. Changing man is understood as *his animation*.

The anthropological revolution in modern philosophy and culture permits a visualization of the entire system of values – and its main part, the system of spiritual values – in a new way. Man appears again as a certain unity determined through a system of spiritual values. The spiritual values themselves appear as creating and forming culture.

The spiritual anthropological tendency is the most adequate to man's essence. It contains a direction towards man's evolution within in it, but on the basis of spiritual development, and not on the basis of interference by artificial technology. This lets man evolve in a milder way, more harmonically, conforming to harmony as it is an information of development.

In addition, the spiritual tendency absorbs into itself both of the above, taking only their positive content. From the first tendency an inclination towards the diversity of creativity is absorbed. From the second, use of the best achievements of science and technology is absorbed. But there is a third tendency which does not conform to two others: the elaboration and realization of the spiritually genetic potential of man and the revelation of the possibilities of spiritual genetics.

The problem of the rethinking of man's subjectness naturally fits into the issue of the anthropological revolution.

It is necessary to distinguish between subjectness and subjectivity. This is the methodological basis for further thinking. The difference is connected with a distinction in the understanding of freedom and creativity. Subjectivity contains an element of free will, the contraposition of man to an objective being, whereas in the notion of subjectness the personality of man is accented together with his spiritual, moral and creational dignity.

In this case a new and rather unexpected sounding *anthropoid principle* obtains, which was established in cosmology a long time ago. Earlier, this appeared to most as a 'banal tautology', but it is gentler and quite deep issue. Man is not only a 'microcosm', but he is also a 'microteos', as Nikolai Berdyaev rightly emphasized in his time.

This can be seen if we examine the architectonics of the *Universe* from the point of view of *Man's* architectonics. Man has everything that the universe has, in so far as man has to some extent a spiritual quality the source of such a quality ought to have an objective status, an ontological root. Man and the World are equivalent and equally powerful.

It is necessary continually to bear in mind the wider – that is, fuller – understanding of anthrop principle that already extends not only to the World, but to man: man brings the World in himself, 'holds' it, and bears responsibility for it.

This means that man's subjectness has to be understood, not just as activism, pluralism, free will and «creativity» of a destructive character. It is necessary to understand that the Truth is unique and people are in agreement in spirituality and in the universally creational possibilities. The unity of truth consequently means an internal spiritual unity among people, their ability for mutual understanding and accord.

All these confirm that man is not just naturally universal, but *spiritually universal* as well. His endless, diverse and inexhaustible creative possibilities are mainly connected with, first of all, *spirituality*, which in its essence is dedicated to a man's aspiration to sacrifice his talent to the environment. Then the *universality* of spirituality should be understood as a common substantial basis of man's content in an individual, that is, as man's origin, which is peculiar to all people and which defines man, that is, it is his pivot or core.

Consequently, man's subjectness today has to be a responsibility for world harmony. It must not be just *culture*, but, first of all, *spiritually moral creativity* for the sake of the blossoming of the harmony of being.

On the notion of spirituality we can say that the first, albeit very superficial step towards an adequate understanding of the notion of spirituality is that the spiritual is something contradictory to the material. This is the roughest way, but it is right on the whole, because it is based on the primordial etymology of a word and historically thoughtful genealogy of the notion of the spiritual.

It is obvious that spirituality has a direct relation to the essence of man. Man is not just a body, is not just a physical structure, but he is also a soul: he is a spiritual creature. He is ambiguous, and his spirituality is his delicate and profound definition, and materiality is a more empirical and external definition.

Let us accept a definition of 'spirituality' as man's *internal world* that differs from the outside world.

It is often consented and saved: spiritual production is the production of spiritual values. In other words, creativity is the creation of the excellent and eternal.

Such an opinion is very widespread, but it can be rejected. Among 'spiritual values' are monuments, museums, temples, pictures, and so on.

But then we contradict our own definition of the spiritual: it is the internal world of man, but not the external production. It is clear that museums, monuments and so on are the objectified result of some internal attempts; however they cannot be spiritual in themselves. They are the result of man's activity that obtained an external being, and are not on their own a profound definition of man.

This logical contradiction is aggravated by the next idea.

If values are understood as something external, estimated by man and often having a certain price, then values belong to *culture* and not to *spirituality*.

Spirituality is man's internal world. What about culture? By any understanding culture, even if it is *internal*, is the processing of some material or quality. Culture is the polishing, correction, skill, handicraft, keeping of the external correctness, achievement of some creational results and their immortalizing in generations of people, that is, strictly speaking, a *shape*, even internal and sometimes very substantial.

What is the content of this shape? It is obviously spirituality or its absence.

This very 'or' shows that culture is neutral with respect to the spiritual content in itself:

it can be lofty and low, culture and 'anti-culture', 'contra-culture', 'mass culture', and so on. Culture is like the phenomenon of beauty, which can be aspiring and frightening, kind and wicked, pure and monstrous. By the way, the traditional division of culture into the material and the spiritual also testifies that culture and spirituality are not synonyms.

Except for the power of life (which manages our physiology) or the energy of active functioning, there is something in man over and above these: the power or energy which is able to raise him over the material conditions of life, to elevate him over Nature, but to elevate him by *good qualities*. And under such circumstances when it seems that man should be subordinate to the common trend of events in the material world, when it seems to be more useful and rational for man to move by the logic of that necessity which makes him care about his food and self-preservation.

But the matter is that this spirit of genuine humanity presents itself as *another* in contrast to the spirit of Nature.

The spirit of genuine humanity, that internal power which makes man Human with a capital letter, is not just a vital power or a physical ability, or natural harmony, or instinct or something like that. This spirit is *man's moral origin*. It may also be called the *sacred* or *divine* in man. It interfaces with internal feelings, like the feeling of the sacred, faith (confidence), love, awe of human life (and not only of his life), a feeling of eternity, and a feeling of the soul's immortality.

Thus, there is something in man that can not be vital energy, consciousness or psychic life at all, but something deep, internal, essential and different from all material, however subtle it is.

This very essential, light and spiritualized origin rather differs from the rest of the Universe. This very quality is *infinitely valuable* for the world. Man is valuable, first of all, because he is unique among those laws and phenomena of the material Universe with his spiritual qualities.

From this point it is obvious that the purpose of man in the world is to bring spirituality into the world, that is, cordiality, love, and a caring attitude towards the Harmony of natural being.

Consequently, spirituality has to be *practical*, that is, it has to be creativity for the sake of people. And the converse: only spiritually developing man acquires the full right to create.

The conclusion of all the above is that subjectness is not wilfulness, and it is not man's dissolution into objective being. It presents by itself a dialectic unity of personal self-standing and a caring attitude to the environment, a unity of creativity and responsibility for the results of such creativity. In other words, the *modern understanding of man's subjectness* is that subjectness is the spiritually moral origin of man, which is realized and objectified in culture, ennobling them and making culture and creativity genuinely lofty, full of exclusively positive meaning.

SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

ადამიანის სუბიექტურობა, როგორც სულიერი და მორალური ფენომენი

ა. ნიზანბაევი


ფილოსოფიისა და პოლიტიკურ მეცნიერებათა ინსტიტუტი, ალმატა, ყაზახეთი

რეზიუმე და კომენტარი

დღეს, როცა თანამედროვე ადამიანი ცხოვრობს როგორც სულიერებას მოკლებული პიროვნება, აუცილებელია, რომ ჩვენს სამყაროში მოხდეს ანტროპოლოგიური შემობრუნება. ამიტომ, ავტორის აზრით, უპირველესად უნდა გავარკვიოთ განსხვავება სუბიექტად ყოფნასა და სუბიექტურობას შორის. სუბიექტურობა ადამიანის შინაგან, ფსიქომოციურ სამყაროსთანაა დაკავშირებული; სუბიექტად ყოფნა კი პიროვნების აქტიური ქმედებაა, როცა მისი თავისუფალი ნება პასუხისმგებლობის გრძნობით მოქმედებს.

კულტურა ადამიანის ქმედების და შემოქმედების შედეგია, იგი შეიძლება იყოს სულიერიც და მატერიალურიც, სიკეთის მთესველიც და ბოროტების მქმნელიც; ანუ კულტურის ფენომენი, როგორც საკუთრივ ადამიანის ქმედების შედეგი, თავისთავად ნეიტრალურია სულიერების, სიკეთისა და მორალის მიმართ. ანტროპოლოგიური შემობრუნება ნიშნავს, რომ დამყარდეს დიალექტიკური ერთიანობა ადამიანის სუბიექტად ყოფნასა და გარე სამყაროს შორის, მის თავისუფალ ნებასა და პასუხისმგებლობის გრძნობას შორის, მოხდეს კულტურის ინტერპრეტაცია იმ სულიერ ღირებულებათა მიხედვით, რომლებიც კულტურის ფენომენის არსობრივ იდეაციას განახორციელებენ მორალისა და სიკეთის თვალსაზრისით.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY





ABSTRACT PERSONIFICATIONS AND PROJECTION OF REALITY

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In this paper we will discuss the phenomenon of abstraction and its impact on human consciousness in general, and also the mind's abilities to interpret, determine and project an objective reality. This issue will be discussed in two basic dimensions of human mental development: the mythological (or theological) and the economic. During this discourse we will attempt to ascertain the discriminative abilities of the mind with its logical consequences – artificially constructed fictions that appear as reflections of a subjective character, but ones which actually play a basic role in the projection of an objective reality for human consciousness. The central issue in the above statement is: Do human-created fictions objectively exist and are thus primary phenomena, or are they merely secondary reflections of a factual world?

We start by examining Greek abstract personifications or 'gods'. The reason why we give Greek mythological personified images as examples is that they express the psychological nature of abstraction as the ability of the mind to discriminate its own elements (emotions, impulses and mental states) most clearly. To convince the reader of this assumption we give some examples of mythological personified images which are primitive human reactions and emotions: Dike – justice, Eris – discord, Eros – love, Hygienic – health, Hypnosis – sleep, Lyssa – rage, Mnemosyne – memory, Nemesis – divine retribution, Nike – victory, Peitho – persuasion, Phobos – fear, Soteria – salvation, Thanatos – death,...

As we see from these examples, there exist appropriate psychological images (gods) for each known mental state. It is not difficult to see that these images are reflections of ordinary human emotions and impulses. As personified mental conditions and basic instincts were spontaneous and not subordinated to conscious control, they turned into fetishes, alien elements within the human mind and completely dominating it. Presumably, these kinds of alien elements (psychological images) within consciousness gave rise to neurotic experiences which needed to be brought under control, and this is why the ancient Greeks sublimated their natural impulses into mental fetishes, which they called 'gods'. Consequently, these strong emotions used to form the main driving force and motivation in human life. As

for current mental conditions and instincts (basically, unconscious destructive emotions), these are suppressed and brought under control by means of different stimulants and antidepressants, the so-called 'painkillers'. Literarily speaking, the ancient gods have turned into modern zombies within the human mind.

We can discover a link between ancient abstract personifications and the image of a monotheistic god (the Creator). The assignation of personal features and characteristics to the Supreme Being is a typical example of an alienated psychological process. We can talk about concrete personal predicates which are assigned to God: merciful, just, strict, caring... As we see from our example, monotheistic personified images are more complex and deal with a higher level of emotions, while the ancient Greek gods are reflections of primitive human reactions and impulses and so are less sophisticated. However, in both cases ordinary mental conditions are being transferred outside consciousness and placed in different – and thus independent – ranks. From this point personified mental images start to dominate almost all psychic processes. Indeed, it is of great interest how ordinary emotions, impulses and mental states transform themselves into 'gods' within the primitive mind and what is the psychological mechanism that inspires the mind to believe that the supreme and absolute being carries its spiritual character and not any other characteristics.

This question has something in common with the statement given in the article of previous issue: it concerns an interesting political problem, the transformation of ordinary natural activities into artificially created dimensions that are classified as 'political'. These activities may range from fundamental biological facts to the conventionally-based deviations of the 'political animal'. It is obvious that natural phenomena transform themselves into conventional terms. This is not to say that these changes are 'metaphysical', but they are quite tangible empirical facts if observed carefully. The important point is how these natural phenomena reflect and reveal themselves in conventional categories. As mentioned above, natural activities are turned into political ones: competition between individuals, which is a manifestation of the 'struggle for survival', gains a political feature. In such a dimension every natural phenomenon is turned into political terms. A political feature can be assigned to such a natural fact as death. This phenomenon can even be classified in as 'political death' and 'political assassination'. Actually, political antagonism is a cause of the phenomenon under consideration. This fact once more proves the significance of the political way of perception of objective reality and its impact on human life in general.

Erich Fromm has made a deep analysis of this mental activity in his examination of the nature of alienation and the creation of 'idols', psychological images within consciousness. 'An idol is an object created by ourselves on which we make a projection of our own powers, thus impoverishing ourselves by this act of disposition. We come under the influence of our own creation and by means of such influence we conduct an act of relation in an alienated

manner with ourselves. So just as I possess an idol, the idol possesses me as I am under its influence.' (Erich Fromm. *To Have or to Be?* 1977, p.50)

The interesting point for us in this discourse is the emphasis on a specific attitude of individuals towards their inner spiritual world that is based on the 'possession' of mental images that are their own creations. We find here close ties with the materialist attitude towards objects that is typical of consumerism in general. Here the mind convinces itself that it 'possesses' a concept of god and, accordingly, faith in this is just like the 'possession' of any other product of mental activity.

Questions arise as to whether abstract personifications exist in the minds of modern individuals, and what are the forms by which these reveal themselves. In order to understand this complex psychological phenomenon we refer to the issue of fetishism, specifically to one of its forms, the personification of commodities. Probably this kind of fetishism appears as the most widespread form of alienation. What does the term personification of things (commodities) and its side effect (fetishism) mean? Through the mass media various products (objects) are presented to various groups of individuals (consumers). Consequently, stereotyped images of these products are created. If one observes carefully, one may notice that subjective (human) features and characteristics are assigned to products in advertisements. For example, in many advertisements products 'speak' to consumers, they are the 'sponsors' of different programmes and social facilities. 'Indeed these characteristics are typical of human beings but, in the minds of ordinary consumers, the message is being perceived and interpreted for the most part in a direct way without realizing that their consciousness and imagination are being manipulated. As a result, consumers engage in subjective interactions with products (things). Subjective interactions with objects mean emotional attachment to the products on offer. This is a stimulus for the consumer to engage in a pattern of behaviour (buying the advertised product) that is intended and foreseen by the producers who are 'hidden' behind the goods they produce and who use indirect means of communication with their consumers. This kind of interaction is anonymous in character' (E. Solovyov. *Mass Culture – Illusion or Reality?* 1975), meaning that interactions between consumers and producers are being realized through, and by means of, objects (products), so that consumers engage in direct interactions with commodities and in indirect ones with producers.

The process described above is a fetishist attitude towards commodities, which is the basic reason for consumerism and shows the 'mental blindness' of consumers.

This paradoxical pattern of social interaction is described in Marx's *Capital*: "The labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labour of society only by means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes directly with the products and, indirectly through them, with the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relation connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appears, not as direct social relations between

individuals at work, but as they really are: material relations between persons and the social relations of things.' (Karl Marx. *Das Kapital*. Theory of Value)

As mentioned above, in this converted psychological process subjective characteristics are being assigned to things (objects), that is, 'they derive social phenomena directly from technical phenomena'. The personification of things, as a consequence, appears as a process when the 'social characteristics of things (value, money, capital) are considered as natural characteristics which belong to the things themselves.' (I. Rubin. *Essays on Marx's Theory of Value*. Ch. 3) To demonstrate the assumption that 'social phenomena are derived directly from technical phenomena' we adduce another example of the subjectification of an ordinary conventional means, known in economics as 'price regulation'. According to the free market approach to economics, markets regulate prices, which is a reflection of a fundamental psychological error. It is obvious that market regulations and the economy itself are the results of human activity. These are social interactions which aim to create material values. Following from this profound (objective) definition, it would be irrational to assume that 'the market regulates itself', as there is nothing in social processes that 'creates and regulates itself' and, if not, we have to confess that social phenomena are of an unconscious and self-creatable character. Every particular pattern of social interaction is the result of concrete human activity. However, as a result of such mental errors and misunderstandings, social processes are perceived and therefore interpreted in a distorted manner. From this point of view, personified patterns of social interactions become dominant in human behaviour, as if not dependant on their regulation. Logically, personified (or alienated) social phenomena start controlling human behavioural patterns. In the case where 'the market regulates itself' there is no place for human endeavour to change any error existing in the system. This would literally and directly mean that humans cannot control the market, while the market controls and regulates itself regardless of human interference.

These statements demonstrate the assumption that social processes are of unconscious origin (Lévi-Strauss) and form patterns of homogenous self-regulated systems. It seems really curious that humans – who imagined and believed in their superiority over nature and who even try to explore space (in order to find our place in universe!) – cannot believe in the ability of their minds to control an ordinary pattern of social interaction called 'price regulation' which ought to be an entirely conventional phenomenon, just like any other pattern of social interaction. The two types of alienation discussed above refer to Marx's statement of 'material relations between persons and social relations of things' while it ought to be the other way around: that material relations should be conducted between persons by means of their social relations.

We can determine common features of the two types of alienation: just as the ancient Greeks believed that the 'gods' were directing all their behaviours and they had no power

over themselves, modern individuals consider that economic systems are self-sufficient and function independently. The phenomenon shown here is a fiction which is a side effect of converted physiological activity. Ancient abstract personifications were personifications on a mythological level, while modern personifications are connected basically with an act of consumerism. In other words, it is alienation on an economical level of human mental development.

Ancient abstract personifications and monotheistic personified images can be given a common name: religious fetishism. This is a specific level of human mental development when humans assign their own (subjective) features to the personified Supreme Being, God, created by them. Fetishism on an economic level of human mental development reveals itself in assigning subjective characteristics to commodities (objects) which cause an emotional attachment to things in individuals (consumers). Here the act of purchasing and consuming transcends its functional aspect and gains an emotional character. The interesting point here is that, if for the ancient Greeks their own personified emotions were the main driving force, for modern individuals it is a consumerist-acquisitive psychological attitude that plays the same role.

When people believe that economic systems are functioning self-sufficiently, they become homogenous entities that are not subordinated to human regulation (the ability of money, value and capital to function independently and within themselves, the market regulating prices by itself, and so on). Eventually, fetishism appears on this level of human mental development in the form of the personification of commodities (things).

It can be clear how significant the role of abstraction is for the human mind in general, as it determines the ability of interpretation and projection of objective reality. The central issue is that 'mankind could not distinguish and determine the "social contents" of things (commodities) for many thousands of years, considering those contents as characteristics they had been already given.' (E. Solovyov. *Mass Culture – Myth or Reality*. Moscow, 1975)

Here we come across differences in abilities of discrimination, interpretation and projection of reality in different religious and economic perspectives. The interesting point is that each ideological framework has its own ways of interpretation and projection of the factual world, meaning that the means of satisfaction of material needs and their psychological reflections are different. In orthodox Christianity, gaining material wealth greater than what is needed is considered a sin, that is, behaviour that is not encouraged and is an object of shame, while in Protestant ethics it is the contrary: the limitless acquisition of material wealth is one of the highest virtues and such an individual is believed to be supported by God.

Another comparison can be made: socialism and capitalism have different approaches to the satisfaction of material needs. Socialism stresses systematically

planned production, distribution and consumption, while in the capitalist system there are no practical limits of consumption (satisfaction of needs). Satisfaction of material needs in socialism is not an 'end in itself', and appears as a means of achieving a concrete socio-economic order, while in capitalist economic formation the process of production and consumption appears as the highest standard and measure of existence, forming an endlessly repeating circle within itself. Considering these fundamental ideological (or psychological) differences, we may assume that they are the result of a specific feature of the human mind – abstraction – and its logical end-projection of reality. From this statement follows the conclusion that each ideology has its own ways of projecting reality, so that we can talk about different projections: an Orthodox projection, a Protestant projection, a Nazi projection, and so on. But what is the nature of the projection of reality and why do different forms of projection exist? What are those images and mechanisms which represent and reflect outer reality inside the human mind? Presumably, the characteristics of sensorial stimulus are not represented in consciousness, but rather reflections of the process of coding of a factual reality, links between its components, and also the conditions of a percipient (subject) itself. So this type of representations should be understood as the representation of phenomena and links of an objective reality within the consciousness (I. Hoffmann. *Das Aktive Gedächtnis*. Berlin, 1982, p.57). We emphasize the term 'conditions of a recipient' to reinforce the statement of the subjectivity and conditionality of projection as of a mental process. Following on from this definition, we can assume that all types of projections are reflections of the coding of different semantic signs within the consciousness, thus Orthodoxy has its own coding system of reality, just as socialism, capitalism or any other ideology have their own.

It is of interest that humans create fictions on which they become dependent and, eventually, these fictions determine how they perceive and interpret objective reality, and also their behavioural patterns. There exists a curious disposition (interaction) of human consciousness towards the outer world where factual reality reveals itself in the form of fictional reality. Here we refer to A. Adler's perspective of the individual's psychological constitution, which he calls 'lifestyle'. (Another expression which he uses is 'leading fiction'.) According to Adler, an individual's lifestyle is a fiction, but one that is necessary for existence. Fictions, as a rule, are not realized by an individual, which means that they may remain unconscious during an entire life. (*Issues of Philosophical Anthropology*. Part 2. Tbilisi, 1971, p.79) A reason for giving this example is its correspondence with the assumption above that, within the context of fiction, all ideologies appear as a product of the imagination. As mentioned above, fictions are the basics of collective unconsciousness, by means of which social relations function. This kind of co-relation is clearly seen in the social contract, when people transfer their natural rights to the supreme power, which is the state, and

eventually this energy returns back to them in form of the compulsory power of the state. Here the state appears as a dominant element, but one that was created by humans themselves. As a rule, in all observed cases human-created fictions dominate over them.

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

აბსტრაქტული კერსონიფიკაცია და რეალობის დასახვა

გივი ამაღლობელი

“შავი ზღვის” უნივერსიტეტი და თბილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი,
საქართველო.

რეზიუმე

მოცემულ ნაშრომში განხილულია აბსტრაქციის ფენომენი და მისი გავლენა ცნობიერებაზე ზოგადად; ასევე დასახულია აზროვნების მიერ ობიექტური რეალობის ინტერპრეტირებისა და პროეცირების შესაძლებლობები. საკითხი ძირითადად განხილულია მენტალური განვითარების ორ საფეხურთან მიმართებაში. ესენია: მითოლოგიური (ან თეოლოგიური) და ეკონომიკური საფეხურები. მსჯელობის პროცესში გამოიკვეთება აზროვნების განმასხვავებელი უნარები, რომლებიც წარმოიქმნებიან მენტალური აქტივობის პროცესში, სათანადო ლოგიკური შედეგებით, ხელოვნურად შექმნილი ფიქციებით, რომლებიც წარმოადგენენ სუბიექტურ რეფლექსიას, მაგრამ თამაშობენ მთავარ როლს ობიექტური რეალობის პროექციაში. ძიების მთავარი საკითხი შემდეგში მდგომარეობს: არიან თუ არა აზროვნების მიერ შექმნილი ფიქციები ობიექტური ბუნების თუ ისინი წარმოადგენენ ფაქტიური სამყაროს მხოლოდ მეორად ანარეკლებს?

IDEAS FOR A “DEMOCRATIC” FUTURE

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INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades of the 20th century the period of reaction to the past happenings started, at least in Europe. In this period the illusions of emancipation of the previous years vanished, a global or planetary capitalism developed and a feeling of impotence and resignation spread. It is the epoch, when so-called a mercantile and capitalist “globalization” developed, from which the “globalization” has been spreading to the various spheres, like politics, culture, etc. A new world scene arose.

On the ground level, this new world scene polarizes the dynamics towards two ends that are facing opposite directions: one of them leads to a progressive social fragmentation, in which societies will see their competences diminishing, their autonomy limiting itself, and increasing external interferences. As a reaction, societies will generate a defensive attitude. On the other hand, ambiguous messages on universal rights secure themselves as if they were valid, no matter of the context. This situation is going to generate a tension between the both ends, unknown until now, at least in the proportion in which they are now given. All these will make it necessary to establish new rules of the game in order to resolve the new conflicts. Among these tensions and conflicts, a new path is opening in the new millennium, along with the new possibilities. But they will also generate new serious risks. Moreover, as Habermas has declared recently, if Europe were not able to find its own space, if it couldn't reach an agreement in the form of a common constitution for the year 2009, it would definitively be trapped in the claws of neoliberalism and the European future would be uncertain and dark.

The defenders of antiglobalization have many arguments in their favor. Robert Shiller, professor of economics in Yale, warns us in his work “Irrational Exuberance” of the danger that exists in the “tremendous instability” created by the growth of the population after the economic boom of the past years. This economic boom is precisely which has made flourish what we were naming: “globalization”.

It is evident as well, that development of the culture has not escaped the grip of the economic “globalization”. Rather, in spite of our efforts to seek cultural commonalities (though only within the Europe), the achievements are minimal and the critical voices continue to

rise. Philosophy must play a part in this scenario. Otherwise, the dynamics of the world may be doomed to exist within an uncontrollable environment that is favorable to irrational conceptions and “dogmatisms”, and that, once installed, will block any possibility of our having a truly “democratic” future.

THE CULTURE

When an inequality increases, it is our habit to appeal to education, to culture as a means of correction. The plurality of cultures, the so-called “multiculturalism,” that today shows itself more than realizes, is real only if it emerges and develops within some particular culture that always has its own traditions. This dynamics is the opposite of the one that has been imposed up until now in the process of globalization. The case of Iraq is not an exception, but rather a good example. Human rights only make sense to us if they are understood as a goal achieved after a conscious effort. The problem tends to crop up whenever a culture considers some feature or practice that is opposite to the so-called “universal human rights”. For example, the ablation of the clitoris. The liberal solution supposes, that the women suffering from it, will be able to decide freely on the subject, like Habermas thinks. It is the typical case or model of “forced choice or election”, since the framework of “human rights” has been chosen in advance as that which it will be necessary to choose later. Apparently, there is only of correct choice and if the thought, that it is considered necessary to choose, is, in fact, not chosen, then the choice is not free. This scenario closes itself into a complex paradox that is impossible to settle in the liberal way of thinking. So, what is supposed to be “correct” is actually the problem. First, the subject that “reports” or “educates” tends to be the “westerner”, who considers his culture “above” those which he informs and shapes. And that brings us to the second problem: what can be done when the attempt to disperse “correct” information actually reinforces precisely those convictions that they were trying to change or correct for being supposedly erroneous or opposite to “human rights” - since, for example, in scenes of warlike confrontation the conquered party usually feels a growing hate for their alleged “saviors”. And in the same way, to affirm that values are absolute or universally valid tends to provoke a reaction in which the particular is doubled and dogmatic defense arises of that which is one’s own, against that which is different. This doubling of the particular has many aspects, but the dynamics is always the same: doubling of particularities, of tiny nationalisms, of religious sects, of culturally limited small groups, which do not have any other aim than to affirm their own uniqueness.

But within this trend lies something real: the need to affirm “absolute” singularities, the truly singular. We reject mercantile globalization in the sense that we pay attention to the singular phenomenon to the things that break the rigid world order. The phenomenon of anti-globalization is the true face of globalization, its logical response. They are tied to-

gether. The abstract character of the world market and doubling on small particularities are just two faces of the same phenomenon. We could speak about anti-globalization as a syllogism between two possible ends: a fierce submission to the hegemony of the capital or anarchy.

TO THE SEARCH OF A CURRENT DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT

In 2000 Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau y Slavoj Žižek published a book titled: *Contingency, hegemony, universality*.

The book, somehow, gathers dispersed reflections on topics related to the new situation that confronts us in the new millennium. The topic of the subject occupies a dominant place. I would say the most privileged place. It is necessary to redefine the subject, to rethink it, since identity addresses a new challenge to an old problem. The subject cannot diminish unilaterally, neither in its individual dimension nor in the social dimension. It is a question of bringing together both dimensions in order to find one identity. Psychoanalysis has been proved helpful in unraveling this difficulty. The failure of Heidegger wouldn't have been penetrated into the budgets of his own approach (for which he would have left his project of **Sein und Zeit**), to have confused the "ontological" level with the "ontic", not have been able to articulate adequately the individual and social dimensions of the subject, the establishing an unfounded short circuit between them.

The common thread between the authors is that the "identity" is never something closed and definite, that identification can never become identity, that between the two there is a tremendous gap. But precisely this statute, far from being a weakening of the joint of a general, universal or global, is rather the articulate force of the strictly democratic one; the negativity in the heart of identity would itself be the engine of dynamics capable of articulating the different singularities between themselves. The specific problem is the conception of the concept of universality: "Universality is neither a static concept, nor a given a priori, and it should be dealt with as a process or an uncompromising condition to any of its manners determined by appearance." (Butler, Laclau, Žižek, 2000. Introduction). A substantive and procedural conception of universality, such as, for example, that of Habermas, turns out to be inadequate, abstract. *The philosophical speech of the modernity* anathematized by Habermas seems to conspire now against himself. Habermas's effort is characterized for "a pre-established universality discovering or conspiring to be a presupposition of the act of speech, a universality that supposedly concerns a rational feature of the act of speech, a universality that supposedly concerns a rational feature of man". It would be a question, then, of an abstract substantive conceptions of universality that retains a cognizable and predictable determination and a procedural way of conceiving universality, according to which it is presupposed that the political field is made up of rational actors.

CONCRETE UNIVERSALITY

What Hegel says of the philosophy might also be worth describing here. According to the German philosopher, any authentic philosophy takes into his bosom the mark of “universality made concrete”. This means that every singular philosophy undergoes self regulation as well as regulating other; every era is, somehow, all the eras. It is not a question of a complete external subdivision, but of the same apprehended in a specific way. It is not a question of a reduction of the universal to the particular, but of the fact that every singular has its own universal; each has a specific perspective of the entire field. Every universal is tied to a certain singularity, and without it, the universal is not possible. Definitely, the problem consists in determining what is a “universal singularity”, how a truth, which is always of the order of the singular, can simultaneously be valid for us all.

Alain Badiou, a modern thinker who with has considered this problem with much rigor, speaks of the possibility of that of a “universality makes concrete” by what he defines as an “event”. The event differs, according to the way it deals with a “situation”. The situation defines the field of the multiplicity of ever is objective and real. It is of the order of enumerable, of the discernible, of nameable; that is to say, of the field of knowledge. Morality belongs to this order. The “event”, on the other hand, is of an entirely different order. It is defined as radically unrepresentable with the situation, as emptiness. The event breaks the order of the situation, bringing to light what the situation conceals. It is suppressed within it, and it is always singular (not individual, not universal abstract), since it cannot be carried back to any previous order, to any situation. For the event, the relation between the two is one of “subtraction”: the event avoids the situation. Ethics is tied to the concept of event.

The event opens up a new perspective, for it is still indeterminate, we can either accept it radically (then we speak about “loyalty” to the event), or can deny its radically new perspective, in which case of an “evil” arises, as a perversion or corruption of the truth that encloses the event.

An event is always oriented to the emptiness of the situation. “What makes a real event become the origin of a truth, the only thing that is always and that is eternal”, writes Badiou, “lies upon the fact that is tied to the particularity of a situation only through the emptiness. The emptiness, the multiple, neither excludes nor forces anybody. It is the absolute neutrality of being - so that the loyalty originated by an event, in spite of being an immanent break in a singular situation, it still points at universality.” (Badiou 2004, p. 146).

The event is founded in what is radically unrepresentable within the situation, which constitutes its emptiness. The event is the declaration of the emptiness, a radical break from the situation that makes visible only what the situation can conceal. Whereas knowledge is the inscription of what happens within previous objective categories, the truth – the series of implication derived from the emergency of an event – is singular: the nature of the

event cannot surrender to a preexisting rule. In this way, the event is incommensurable with the situation; its break from the situation is truly foundational.

From this conception, briefly outlined above, some authors have developed a political theory, lately turned out to be very controversial, that I would like to mention at least in its most basic form. The concept of democracy, which arose in Greece, is tied to the possibility that things have been happening. According to Rancière (that is one of the critics of Badiou), in Greece, the disadvantaged classes, those who were excluded from power (the empty set that does not count as such) rose up demanding their participation in the public arena. Democracy was born, then, as a revolt of the disadvantaged class in order to be held into account, so that they might have been included. The more capable is a society to open up integration processes for those who are not currently involved, the more democratic it is. Some classic examples are Antigone's fight to make her "law" valued in opposition to Creon; or during the French Revolution, the struggle for the recognition of the voice of a third party separate from that of the nobility or the clergy; or the proletarians seeking to achieve a corresponding place in the capitalist society; or the women wishing to be included in the roles dominated by men; "illegal" immigrants "*sans papiers*" are now the new force in the global world; and the model repeats itself.

The truth of the ones is situated in the others. Likewise, the truth of globalization could only become real if it answered its own particular interests, at the cost of an imbalance increasingly accentuated among human beings.

Antiglobalization has two enemies: those who understand the globalization as being unilateral and scarcely globalizing at the end – since they only want their own profit; and those who stick to their own particularities, wishing to stand up to any external pollution. The "trickery of the reason" is precisely what makes the antiglobalization movement stand for the interests of a real globalization "with a human face", in which singular interests are not annulled. On the contrary, these are turned into the concrete universality, owing to the miracle of the event of globalization and against globalization itself.

Similarly to the subject that it supports, democracy is always a process, never a final point, in which those who have taken part in its production can now savor its fruits.

Thus, the paradigmatic dialectics of the owner and the subject that he supports is then always a process (never a final point), when those who have taken part in his production, can savor now his fruits. Here the paradigmatic dialectics of the owner and of the slave, or of Antigone and Creon (opened by Hegel in the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*), have the perfect current importance.

THREE FORMS OF EVIL

According to Badiou, when the truth of an event perverts the evil, the evil can adopt three different forms: the form of the perfidy (abandoning the loyalty to the event), the form of

the sham (substitution of the emptiness with the fullness of the community for the act of naming) and the form of a dogmatic totalization of the truth. We will not analyze this complicated topic, since it would lead us to perfecting the scalpel to differentiate, for example, a real event, since it is the French Revolution, for mentioning only the evident one, and not real forms, since it is the Nazism or invasion to Iraq. A more extensive analysis might give us a key to separate democratic authentic processes from others that obey only forms of perfidies, shams or dogmatisms.

A CRITICAL NOTE: LACLAU

Badiou's exposition has a weak point that has been a position of relief in diverse discussions, the clearest of them probably be that of Laclau. This one criticizes the rigid opposition that Badiou establishes between situation and event, between emptiness and fullness. Both categories, according to Laclau, are already always mutually contaminated and it is not possible to separate them completely. For example, the demands of "without papers" are particular demands; their particular character never disappears completely, though none of it fights for stop being able to stimulate an emancipating movement more widely that goes beyond the particular interests. That is to say, the tension between "universalism" and "particularism", which can never be broken completely. The emptiness has potentially certain content: the universal thing. Any event appears as potential vehicle of a new order; the sense of the event is suspended between its content and its ontological role. The pollution between the eventual thing and the situational thing is the fabric of the social life.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

Badiou himself goes beyond his ontological basic opposition between situation and event, whose unique foundation is given by the category of "subtraction". So, according to his budget, it is necessary to leave aside the material contents of the situation and to reduce it to a purely formal principle (the organization of the countable thing, the differential thing as such). According to this logic, it is possible to contain only one of the events, like pure subtraction is the presentation or the declaration of the unrepresentable thing; as if the loyalty to the event cannot have any concrete content, it only has a formal order. In such a case the distinction between event and sham (simulacrum) must be a formal distinction. The response to the problem of establishing a criterion to distinguish an event of a sham is that the event is orientated to the emptiness of a situation. The sham - for example, the Nazism - links itself with a situation conceived as fullness or a substance. According to the logic of the sham, the pseudo-event does advent the being, naming not the emptiness of

the previous situation, but its completeness. Not the universality of what individual does not support, exactly, in any outline (in no multiple one), but the absolute particularity of a community, takes root in the features of the land, the blood, the race.

Everything what the subjects can do compromised with a truth, with a real event, has clearly of what the perfidy of an event would consist - but this is not enough to establish a criterion of distinction between the truth and the sham. The distinction truth/sham only can be kept resorting to something that goes beyond them. The truth only can be understood as the process of integration of the event and the situation. And this supposes articulating dialectically both poles, the situation as the place of the particular thing and the event as the place of the singular thing, in whose an average term places the only possible place of definition of the “universally I make concrete”, the unique “real” cell of the process of globalization.

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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN

იდეები “დემოკრატიული” მომავლისათვის

ფრანცისკო ჰაბიერ ინსაუსტი უბარიზა
ბასკეთის უნივერსიტეტი, ესპანეთი

რეზიუმე და კომენტარი

ავტორის მსჯელობის საგანს წარმოადგენს თანამედროვე ადამიანური სამყაროს საგანგაშო მდგომარეობა. ერთი მხრივ, დოგმატიზმი და მეორე მხრივ ირაციონალიზმი, წაღმა-უკუღმა ატრიალებს მსოფლიოს პოლიტიკურ ურთიერთობათა სცენას, სადაც სცენარის მიხედვით, კეთილგონიერი და რაციონალური აზროვნებით დაჯილდოებული მსახიობები უნდა თამაშობდნენ. ფილოსოფიას და კულტურას, ავტორის აზრით, მიუძღვის განსაკუთრებული როლი, რათა მოაწესრიგოს არსებული ქაოსი და აღკვეთოს ისტორიულ ფორმაციათა საბედისწერო მერყეობა ანარქიასა და დიქტატურას შორის; წარმართოს მსოფლიო პოლიტიკა ჭეშმარიტად დემოკრატიული ღირებულებებისკენ.

ავტორი განიხილავს ჰაბერმანის და სხვა თანამედროვე ფილოსოფოსთა მოსაზრებებს, თუ როგორ გავიკვლით გზა და როგორ მოვძებნოთ კომპრომისი გლობალიზაციისა და ანტიგლობალიზაციის საერთაშორისო ტენდენციათა ჭიდილში.

ამ მხრივ, მეტად საინტერესოა, რომ ავტორი მკვეთრად განასხვავებს სიტუაციასა და მოვლენას ერთმანეთისგან. სიტუაცია – ეს არის კერძო შემთხვევათა მოხდენის სივრცე, მოვლენა კი ისეთი განსაკუთრებული ფენომენია, რომელიც თავის თავში ზოგად არსს მოიცავს და რომელიც გამოირჩევა სიტუაციისგან. მოვლენა სიტუაციაში არ ჩანს, საჭიროა საგანგებო ძალისხმევა, რათა დაირღვეს სიტუაციის კერძო შემთხვევითი სავსეობა და გაჩნდეს სიცარიელე, რაც მოვლენას სიტუაციიდან გამოყოფს. საგულისხმოა, რომ მოვლენის ზოგადარსობრივი ბუნება სულაც არ ნიშნავს, რომ მან უნდა შეავსოს და დაიქვემდებაროს მთლიანი სიტუაცია; პირიქით, სიტუაციის ფლობა, სიცარიელის, როგორც თავისუფალი, სასიცოცხლო სივრცის მოსპობასა და მოვლენის ინდივიდუალური არსის დაკარგვას ნიშნავს და როცა ეს ხდება, მოვლენა ფსევდომოვლენად, ანუ “სიმულაკრად” იქცევა. სწორედ ასე ხდებოდა და ხდება დემოკრატიულ ღირებულებათა გაუკუღმართება;

ანტიკური ხანიდან მოყოლებული, დემოკრატიის ანონიმური მიზეზი იყო უპოვართა კლასის ბრძოლა ადამიანის უფლებათა მოპოვებისთვის. ეს, სიღარიბის ზღვარზე მყოფი

ფენა, თავისი უმძიმესი ცხოვრებით, ღრმად იყო ჩაძირული გაუსაძლის არსებობაში და, როგორც ფარული საზოგადოებრივი მოვლენა, არ სჩანდა ისტორიულ სიტუაციათა ზედაპირზე. დემოკრატია დაიწყო იქ, სადაც დაიწყო ამ ფარული არსებობის გამოვლენა და გამოსვლა საზოგადოებრივი ცხოვრების სცენაზე. მაგრამ სწორედ აქ გაჩნდა საშიშროება, რომ სცენაზე გამოსული ახალი, დემოკრატიული ძალა აღარ დაკმაყოფილდებოდა მხოლოდ საკუთარი როლით, დაარღვევდა ინდივიდუალური მოვლენის საზღვარს და მთლიანად დაეუფლებოდა ისტორიულ სიტუაციას. ასე მოხდა დემოკრატიული არჩევნების შედეგად ფაშინის დიქტატურის დამკვიდრება გერმანიაში, ასე ხდებოდა და ხდება დემოკრატიული მმართველობის წესის გაუკუღმართება და გადასვლა ტოტალიტარულ მმართველობის რეჟიმში.

ამრიგად, დღეს, ფილოსოფიაც და პოლიტიკაც, აბსოლუტიზმის, ანუ ტოტალიტარული აზროვნების საფრთხის წინაშე დგას. ეს რომ არ მოხდეს, გვაფრთხილებს ავტორი, საჭიროა არსებობდეს სიცარიელე, როგორც სიცოცხლის უნიკალური გამორჩეულობის თავისუფალი სივრცე, სადაც ყოფიერების ინდივიდუალობაც და ზოგადობაც, შერწყმული ერთმანეთს, არ გადავა ერთი, არსობრივად განსაზღვრული ფენომენის საზღვარს, არ გამოიწვევს მოვლენის ზღვარდაუდებელ გაფართოებას და გადაგვარებას ფსევდო-მოვლენად, არ განაცხადებს აბსოლუტის პრეტენზიას, მთლიანად დაეუფლოს არსებულ სიტუაციას და არ დაკარგავს თავის, როგორც ინდივიდუალური და ცოცხალი ფენომენის, განუმეორებელ სახეს.

MAIN PHILOSOPHICAL EVENTS IN 2008/9

Concerning the second issue of the journal
“Culture and Philosophy”



International Conference

“Philosophy Emerging from Culture”

(July 27-29, 2008 Seoul, Korea)

Sponsored by:

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP)

The International Society for Metaphysics (ISM)

The World Union of Catholic Philosophy Societies (WUCPS)

Soongsil University, Seoul, Korea

THEME

The theme of the 2008 World Congress of Philosophy in Seoul, “Rethinking Philosophy Today” is most appropriate. The year 2000 proved not only to be the beginning of a new millennium, but also the end of the 400 years of the modern era. Philosophers had already begun to speak of a post-modern era, and the attempt to enter this new global arena in terms of the old coordinates of control for national self-interests has quickly shown itself to be a formula for disaster. It is truly time to rethink the philosophical enterprise, to look for a new paradigm able to integrate the achievements of the past while moving into a radically new era.

As groundwork for this broad task The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) – with the International Society for Metaphysics (ISM), the World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies (WUCPS) and Soongsil University and the assistance of National University of Taiwan – held a conference in Seoul during the three days immediately prior the World Congress of Philosophy distinct therefrom and focused specifically on “Philosophy Emerging from Culture”.

Global times now endow – and challenge – philosophy with a broad diversity of cultures and civilizations. At the same time the progressive deepening of human concerns reaches beyond what is clear and distinct to what is of meaning and value, and beyond that which is universal and necessary to free human creativity. That is, to persons and communities which over time and space have cumulatively generated cultural traditions. These two dimensions; one of global breadth and the other of the depth of the human spirit, now combine to open new sources for philosophy as the work of human spirit.

The intent of this pre-Congress conference was to examine this new dynamic of philosophy, moving now not only top-down to restrictively apply broad principles, but bottom-up from the full breadth of human experience and creativity to evolve more rich vision which can liberate and guide.

Program Overview

July 27

1. The Dynamics of Change; What remains of modernity and why is it no longer adequate for philosophy?
 - a. an evaluation of modernity its strengths and weakness
 - b. the philosophical hermeneutics of the transition to a global era

July 28

2. The nature of culture and its Potential as a Philosophical Source
 - a. the subjective turn
 - b. the new awareness of values and virtues as cultures and civilizations
 - c. the emergence of philosophy from culture

July 29

2. The Challenges and Opportunities for Philosophy from the Global Interaction of Cultures and Civilizations
 - a. philosophy expanded to and by global horizons
 - b. philosophy deepened to basic meaning and values
 - c. a new paradigm for philosophy as the integration of radial diversity of persons and peoples; again, the one and many.

Reprinted from the materials of an International Conference
"Philosophy Emerging from Culture"

**XXII WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY
“RETHINKING PHILOSOPHY TODAY”**

**July 30 – August 5, 2008
Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea**

PROGRAM (The main topics)

- 1. Korean Philosophy 1**
- 2. Korean Philosophy 2**
- 3. Plato and Greek Philosophy in the Contemporary World**
- 4. Issues in Ethics**
- 5. Issues in Epistemology**
- 6. Issues in Philosophy of Language**
- 7. Issues in Philosophy of Mind**
- 8. Philosophy in Asia, Africa and South America**
- 9. Philosophical Problems in Medicine: Core Concepts**

Reprinted from the materials of XXII World Congress of Philosophy

(NEO)PLATONISM AND MODERNITY

**Materials of the International Conference dedicated to Tengiz Iremadze's
book
"Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus"
June 30, 2008, Grigol Robakidze University**

**Edited by Giorgi Baramidze, Mikheil Gogatishvili, Lali Zakaradze,
Udo Reinhold Jeck, Duane J. Lacey**

PHOTOS:

- 1. Presentation of the first issue of the journal Culture and Philosophy at the World Congress of Philosophy (pre-World Conference), Seoul 2008***
- 2. World Congress of Philosophy (pre-World Conference), participants, Professor Hu Yeping and Professor Sergey Nizhnikov***
- 3. World Congress of Philosophy (pre-World Conference), Professor George McLean, Seoul 2008***
- 4. Participants of the World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, 2008***
- 5. The Round Table at the World Congress of Philosophy. Professor Anatoly Karas and Professor Mamuka Dolidze, Seoul, 2008***
- 6. Opening of the World Congress in Philosophy, Seoul, Korea, 2008***









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
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